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CROZER QUARTERLY

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF LIBERALISM

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

Crozer Theological Seminary

THE LIBERALISM of which I speak is Protestant theological liberalism, and I speak as a liberal. But what *is* theological liberalism? The term is used very confusingly today—so much so that one is inclined to agree with Dean Inge of St. Paul's that "all labels are libels."

I

To the Christian layman, the liberal is usually someone who has rejected certain orthodox doctrines such as the infallibility of Scripture, original sin, the virgin birth, the physical resurrection of Jesus. Liberalism is thought of as a set of conclusions, some negative like these mentioned, some positive. The positive views usually suggested are that God is immanent in the world, that Jesus really lived, that reason is a dependable guide, that the kingdom of God can be attained in history. The difficulty with such a definition of theological liberalism is that the liberal theologians differ so much in their theological conclusions and yet recognize themselves and each other as belonging to the same camp. Indeed one of the marks of the liberal is the latitude he allows in doctrinal belief.

Let us, then, try another way of defining the liberal. Let us say that he is a Christian who is committed to a certain method of theological inquiry. He employs the method of historical science in examining any and all religious documents, seeking to ascertain from their historical context what they mean, and he applies this even to the Bible. Furthermore, he admits all religious claims as subject matter for honest investigation, whether they be a man's assertion that he can speak with tongues, or a report of a miraculous cure, or even Jesus' own claim to be the Messiah. Again, he keeps in close touch with modern science and philosophy in order to broaden the critical basis of his judgment regarding such claims.

A third way of defining a liberal is by his general attitude in matters of religion and theology. Is he tolerant? Is he objective about his own conclusions and about the views of others which are repulsive to him? Does he, in the words of Professor Hocking[1] of Harvard, have "reverence for reverence"? Is he unafraid in the presence of new ideas? Does

[1] In D. E. Roberts and H. P. Van Dusen (edd.), *Liberal Theology* (New York, 1942), p. 57.

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he exercise independent judgment in the face of authoritative pronouncements?

Because liberalism is understood sometimes as a set of beliefs or disbeliefs, sometimes as a method of religious inquiry, and sometimes as an attitude, people easily become confused as to just what it is. This confusion is increased when we encounter people who share certain liberal ideas but not its methods, or who reach conservative conclusions yet maintain a liberal attitude. Are they liberals or not? The very flexibility of the liberal thinker makes it still more difficult to put him in a fixed category.

How then can we describe the liberal position? I think we might identify a liberal Christian as follows: He is not afraid of new ideas even if they require him to change his own. He is confident that his faith can come to terms with reason, say as found in science and philosophy, without losing integrity. He will stress the primacy of Christian experience over doctrine. Consequently he will respect the personal experience of another man even if he cannot share his theology. He will be apt to declare that the world is all of a piece and that our human life is continuous both with its own historical past and with the universe of which it is a part. And he will manifest a concern for the moral values which will lead him to suspect pious people who lack rudimentary honesty and trustworthiness, just as, on the other hand, he insists on the duty of the church to reckon with the social ethical issues of the day.

Such an outlook is not confined to the modern world; and, despite the idea held by many people, it is not a twentieth-century, or even a nineteenth-century, product. The liberal spirit is as old as Christianity itself.

II

When Jesus was confronted by the literalists of his day, the Scribes, he dared to appeal beyond "the tradition of the elders," that accumulation of human formulations, to the spirit behind the laws. Paul, in the presence of a great Christian leader, Peter the apostle, even declared that no legalistic system could imprison the Christian faith; and he went out into the gentile world to offer Christianity as the answer to their hopes and yearnings. To be sure he encountered sneers and reacted after his experience before the Areopagus with a declaration that the Greek philosophical mind would not see the depth of meaning in the gospel—but he never gave up trying.

In Alexandria in Egypt there flourished in the second century a Christian school, under the leadership of Pantænus and Clement, where a systematic attempt was made to state Christian truths in terms intelligible to Greek thinkers; while Justin Martyr, a philosopher by profession, traveled about the Mediterranean lecturing to show the naturalness of

Christianity. In the fourth and fifth centuries the Christian school at Antioch, where Theodore of Mopsuestia, fellow student of Chrysostom the great preacher, was a leading biblical scholar, developed historical exegesis of the Bible in contrast with the widely prevalent method of finding mystical allegories in the Scriptures. They were joined in their emphasis on the moral side of faith by Pelagius, the British monk at Rome, who defended the moral ability of man against the Augustinian view and rejected the doctrine of original sin as a menace to personal responsibility.

In the ninth century an Irishman called Eriugena or Erigena declared his reliance on the authority of reason, and opened the way for the sympathetic approach of Anselm of Canterbury two centuries later who, setting aside the familiar method of the proof text from Scripture or the Church Fathers, offered to meet Moslem and Jewish thinkers on the common ground of human experience. Starting from the universal fact of human failure, he developed his argument for the Incarnation; but by his starting point he showed the possibilities of an experiential approach to theology. This was caught up into the insistence of Franciscan thinkers on the empirical method, for which that school of Roman Catholic theology has been famous from Roger Bacon to our own day, giving us such men as William of Ockham, and much later the biologist Mendel. Meanwhile Abelard in the twelfth century had advanced his theory of plenary inspiration as against verbal inspiration, holding that the Bible was written by human agents filled with the Holy Spirit, rather than by direct divine dictation.

Men like Nicholas of Cusa and his younger contemporary Erasmus exhibited four and a half centuries ago the suave and broad-minded thinking that enriched our heritage by its Christian humanism; and in the seventeenth century the Cambridge Platonists were advocating toleration in a day of bitter bigotries. John Wesley, great revivalist though he was, chose the Arminian theology for his platform with its greater confidence in man, in opposition to the pessimistic views of Calvin. And in the first half of the nineteenth century Horace Bushnell in our own country urged the value of Christian education as an avenue to salvation.

No, liberalism did not begin with the modernists. It has had a long career, and is just as much a part of the Christian tradition as any other trend the neoörthodox might stress as being "classic Christianity."

III

Of late, however, liberalism has been subjected to criticism from various quarters. This is not surprising, for every age of history is an age of reaction against some phase of the thought and outlook of its predecessor. In this way the human race corrects itself and maintains its balance.

The quarters from which the criticisms come are Roman Catholicism

and fundamentalism at one end, and atheistic humanism at the other, with a revolt within liberalism in the form of neoörthodoxy.

Roman Catholics and fundamentalists criticize the liberals for being unorthodox. These critics argue that the liberal is too independent and individualistic in his claim to restate the Christian message in his own way. Without some authoritative basis for faith, they declare, Christianity becomes an inchoate muddle of conflicting interpretations, and thus the liberal's "free and easy" treatment of the great church creeds and of the Bible denatures faith and adds to chaos. Each group is clear as to the authority by which it swears. The Roman Catholic appeals to the church, represented in the councils, the papacy and the clergy, which created both the New Testament and the creeds and therefore is in a position to know their meaning. The fundamentalist rests his faith on a verbally inspired Bible where God himself has given the answers to all human problems and questionings. To set private judgment above these is human pride and rebellion, and threatens the saving work of Christ and his church. To rely on such private judgment is to lapse into subjectivism.[2]

If this is the attack from the theological right wing, the left wing, represented by humanism, accuses the liberal of being obscurantist. By his sentimental attachment to the historic tradition he is inhibited from clear-eyed thought about the modern world. Copernicus, Newton, and Darwin, by their revolutionary scientific discoveries, exploded the whole world view in terms of which theology was developed. As Edward Scribner Ames once put it to me with his genial good nature, "Theology is to philosophy as alchemy was to chemistry," meaning of course that traditional theology is hopelessly outmoded. The liberal confuses men by using ancient theological terms with more or less concealed new meanings. There is sometimes an implication that the liberal is not quite honest, but there is always a vigorous objection that he is dealing in sentiment rather than clear thought and thus breeding obscurantism. The charge is often elaborated by a complaint that the liberal retains in his view of religious experience a place for vague, nonrational apprehensions which again confuse the candid thinker.[3]

If liberals were subject merely to attacks from these two extremes, we might say that the criticisms cancel each other out; or that liberalism probably holds a sound middle ground. Just as a man who is thought by some to be too generous and by others to be penurious is probably a man of good financial judgment, so the liberal might claim that if some think

[2] For the Roman Catholic critique see J. Maritain, *Three Reformers* (French original, Paris, 1925); and for the fundamentalist, J. G. Machen, *Christianity and Liberalism* (New York, 1923).

[3] For humanist criticisms of Christian liberalism see M. C. Otto's contributions to the triangular debate with D. C. Macintosh and H. N. Wieman in *Is There a God?* (Chicago, 1937); or R. W. Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age* (New York, 1928).

him too traditionalist and others not traditionalist enough he has in all probability struck a good balance. But this form of self-satisfaction is undermined by a revolution within his own camp.

The leaders of the present theological movement known variously as "the crisis theology," "Barthianism," "dialectical theology," and "neoörthodoxy" are all ex-liberals. Karl Barth was an ardent social gospel modernist, Emil Brunner is a higher critic in biblical studies who nevertheless has been led to a new defense of biblical authority, Reinhold Niebuhr is a product of Union Theological Seminary and Harry F. Ward's liberal social passion who has, in his own words, moved to the left politically and to the right theologically. None of them give any aid or comfort to the fundamentalist, because they know that he is merely fighting a rear-guard action of religion in retreat.

There is therefore a greater seriousness in the neoörthodox disaffection. This seriousness is accentuated when the nature of their critique of liberalism is known. They accuse the liberal of being unrealistic. "This is the most unkindest cut of all," for if liberals have prided themselves on anything, it has been on their realism. They have sought freedom from sham, objectivity in the face of prejudice, an eager acceptance of the facts established by science, an unrestrained response to truth.[4] Why, then, should they be considered unrealistic?

Here we enter upon the more complex examination of the liberal position. First of all, liberalism is censured for its optimistic and shallow view of human nature. The cause for the censure is found in the intellectualism of the liberal view of man as a rational creature who can understand his own spiritual problems, yields to persuasion, and will take the necessary steps to improve himself when he is convinced of error.

Against such an easy view of human nature it is urged that the problem of man is deeper than his conscious, rational life. A century ago Marx showed that much of our supposedly sane judgment is middle-class prejudice, and half a century later Freud began to expose the subtle psychological processes by which our emotions influence our so-called reasoning. Almost two thousand years earlier the Apostle Paul had spoken of an obscure conflict within himself between his ideals and his impulsive drives; and long before that Plato in his famous myth of the charioteer and the horses showed man's problem to be that of reconciling the intellectual and emotional elements in life. Common sense, too, has taught us that when we are convinced of our evil ways we do not necessarily mend them. Sin is thus something far deeper than poor judgment. Sin is so deeply ingrained that a man feels that it must come from beyond himself, and that it is so firmly rooted that rational self-control cannot cope with it. From such

[4] The last phrase is that of H. S. Coffin in Roberts and Van Dusen (edd.), *op. cit.*, p. 234.

experience the ancients concluded that sin was inherited, and they pushed the argument back till they reached the first man, Adam, and then spoke of original sin. From this they further concluded that man is now totally unable to cure himself of this curse in his own nature. We might decide that the story of the fall of Adam is a myth and reject the traditional theological explanation; but we still have the fact of the depth of human recalcitrance to reckon with. Liberalism, it is argued, has glossed over the seriousness and depth of the problem of sin and thus become unrealistic.

Or again, the liberal view of the individual as a separate entity whose life is his own is charged with being artificial and unreal. When Descartes decided to begin his philosophical inquiry without reference to any presuppositions drawn from the past, he exhibited an amazing lack of historical realism. As though anyone could pretend to be independent of his culture! Furthermore, to assert that each individual person is responsible for his own life alone is to ignore the close-knit solidarity of men in society. The groups to which we belong thrust burdens of responsibility upon us which we cannot evade; and conversely we are blamed for many evils which we did not ourselves initiate and in which we are victims of a complex social situation. This paradoxical situation, the critics of liberalism tell us, undermines the individualism of liberal theology, makes it trivial.

To speak of paradox is to introduce the second major criticism leveled by the neoörthodox: that the liberal's confidence in reason is ill-calculated. For all the profounder experiences of life have this same paradoxical character; they all embrace facts which we know to be true yet which contradict each other. Man seeks the good, or he would never be worried about his failures; he seeks evil, or he would have no problem in his attainment of the good. This is a paradox: an insoluble contradiction between opposites both of which we must affirm. A century ago Kierkegaard, the great Danish religious thinker, pointed out that all the great Christian doctrines have this strange, paradoxical quality. Christ is really human and yet he is really divine, even though God and man are entirely different from each other. The eternal and the temporal are qualitatively different; yet in Jesus the eternal becomes a historical figure. God is a god of inflexible justice; yet he is a god of love. The world as God's creation is bound to be good; yet it stands under his judgment precisely because it is evil. The Christian life is one of suffering and yet of blessedness. Faith is the exercise of free decision on our part; yet it is a gift of God.[5] To resolve these paradoxes is to lose one half of the Christian faith, and to grant to reason a power which it does not possess. The effort of liberalism to achieve a rational theology is therefore branded unrealistic, and its confidence in reason is declared to be hollow.

[5] For the references in Kierkegaard see my *Present Theological Tendencies* (New York, 1936), pp. 70-72.

The liberal insistence on rational objectivity is also attacked as being untrue to human experience. No man lives apart from his world. We are actors, not spectators, in the arena of life. How, then, can anyone pretend to stand apart and pass a judgment on life as from some high Olympus? We are always caught in a situation as in a rope of which we can see neither end. As the imagination tries to reach out to eternity in either direction, it fails of its goal; and yet the forces of history and the cosmos before history began, as well as the dim future to which our actions lead, are active upon us in every decision we make.[6] Every free act is thus entrapped in some fatality: fate and freedom are inseparable.

Since reason essays to take experience and examine it as from above, such reason is unreliable and we have no business to trust in it. To have the liberal confidence in reason is thus unrealistic. So runs the argument of the existential philosophers so-called, and it has been amplified by such writers as Kierkegaard, Barth, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Tillich. The approach is very clearly set forth in a recent book by Charles D. Kean, *The Meaning of Existence.*[7]

The third item in the neoörthodox bill of complaints against liberalism deals with the social gospel and its vain hope of realizing the kingdom of God in history. When liberal theologians of the last century turned against the extravagance of millennialism and its expectations of a cataclysmic second coming of Christ, they stressed the evolutionary character of human redemption, and referred to Jesus' teachings about the mustard seed and the leaven in the lump to show the quiet, progressive nature of the kingdom's coming. But under the leadership of Albert Schweitzer's volume, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, this interpretation was subjected to devastating criticism.[8] In its place stress was laid on the references in the gospels to the end of the world, to eschatology; and then Jesus' teaching was understood either as an ethic for the interim period pending the sudden Second Coming or else as a counsel of perfection by which all human goodness is to be judged and convicted. In either case, the idea of the Sermon on the Mount as a charter for social planning on a permanent basis was definitely rejected.

At the same time the idea of progress, which fitted so well the popular interpretation of Darwinism, was severely condemned. Dean Inge of St. Paul's earned for himself the title "the gloomy dean" by his virulent

[6] To try to escape decision by resort to skeptical detachment does not solve the difficulty, for that resort itself is a decision which carries important moral responsibilities and spiritual effects.

[7] (New York, 1947). The other references are, *e.g.*, to S. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton, 1941); K. Barth, *Römerbrief* (Bern, 1919); M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle, 1927); K. Jaspers, *Vernunft und Existenz* (Groningen, 1935); P. Tillich, *The Interpretation of History* (New York, 1936).

[8] German original *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (Tübingen, 1906).

attack on the notion of progress;[9] and the tragic events of the two world wars have shaken men's faith in anything like Herbert Spencer's doctrine of incontrovertible progress. Insofar, then, as liberalism espoused this idea and advocated quiet, patient labor to bring in the kingdom among men, the protest has been overwhelming. But this whole attack also involves the theory of history and its relation to eternity. Against the notion of continuity whereby history comes to its fruition in the kingdom of heaven has been set the doctrine that time and eternity are qualitatively different. This brings us back to the interpretation of history in its bearing on Christian faith.

If history is the be-all and the end-all of human existence, then the philosophical positivists are right in their abandonment of metaphysics with its talk of the eternal and the suprahuman. But if Christianity is understood to teach belief in God and a divine order above and beyond history, then the realization of the kingdom of God is beyond both historical evolution and human ability. The social ethical implications of this are extremely serious. These implications are seen in an article, "Utilitarian Christianity," by Richard Niebuhr recently published in *Christianity and Crisis*,[10] in which the Federal Council of Churches is criticized for holding out the hope of curing social ills through religion. Liberalism stands between the extremes, accused by both parties of being unrealistic.

Finally, liberals are castigated for their treatment of the Bible. It is charged that they have become so preoccupied with the techniques of biblical criticism that they run the risk of "a strange kind of rabbinical blindness."[11] Most laymen will agree with Karl Barth that when they read the Epistle to the Romans they want to know not merely what Paul had to say to the first-century Christians in that city but what he has to say to us today. Biblical study is not merely a historical discipline; it is responsible for conveying a clear idea of the message of the Bible.

But this message, say the neoörthodox, is oriented in a radically different direction from modern thinking, and therefore needs to be understood from its own presuppositions and not ours. Only so can we understand what it has to say. Then we face the choice between the authority of modern ideas and the authority of the Bible. While neoörthodox writers are not clear in their statement of just what constitutes the authority of "the biblical viewpoint," they demand a return to it. Certainly they do not mean what fundamentalists mean, for they specifically oppose the doctrine of verbal inerrancy.[12] Instead they see in the Bible a revelation of God

[9] *The Idea of Progress* (London, 1920). A good bibliography of the critical literature may be found in C. A. Dawson, *Progress and Religion* (London, 1929), pp. 251 ff.

[10] July 8, 1946.

[11] B. E. Meland, *Seeds of Redemption* (Chicago, 1947), p. 43.

[12] On this see E. Brunner, *Revelation and Reason* (Philadelphia, 1946), chap. xxvi.

which lies behind and gives rise to the biblical literature, and stress the fact that this revelation is in acts of God and supremely in Jesus Christ. The confrontation of man by these divine acts is the source of biblical authority; and this divine-human encounter is not rationally explainable. It must be shared to be understood. There is an obvious ambiguity here as to how the hidden meaning of the Bible is to be brought to light, and there is an unclear premise as to the relation between revelation and history,[13] but we are concerned at this point merely to note their criticism.

From the neoörthodox standpoint, then, liberal theology is unsatisfactory because it is shallow in its view of man and his rational power, because it is overoptimistic in its hope of progress, and because it tries to subordinate to modern rationalistic standards of judgment the biblical revelation which defies all reason and stands itself in judgment on all human pride and self-sufficiency. In a word, the trouble with liberalism is that it starts in its thinking from man as centre rather than from God, that it is anthropocentric and not theocentric theology.

IV

What has been the response of liberals to this array of criticisms?

Some have refused to budge from their well-established position. They regard the controversy with Roman Catholicism and fundamentalism as finished so far as they themselves are concerned and feel that time is on their side. They consider the theology of crisis to be a part of postwar pathology, largely a sophisticated brand of fundamentalism, and a theological loss of nerve. I would put in this group S. J. Case, D. C. Macintosh, J. E. Boodin, E. S. Brightman, and H. N. Wieman.[14]

This response strikes me as superficial and dangerous: superficial because it fails to come to terms with the serious issues raised or with the careful discriminations made within neoörthodoxy itself; dangerous because it betrays a spirit of dogmatic finality which prevents that growth to which liberalism is itself committed by its own history and spirit.

Other liberals like Reinhold Niebuhr, Douglas Horton, Walter Horton, Edwin Lewis, Joseph Haroutunian, and John Mackay (if he was ever a liberal) have abandoned liberalism and adhered to the neoörthodox position in greater or less degree. No philosopher or theologian likes to be classified too readily in any school of thought—that is, unless he helped to found it! And every thinker likes to feel that there are certain original

[13] The countercriticism may be found, for instance, in H. W. Robinson, *Redemption and Revelation* (New York, 1942), pp. 164 f.; John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (New York, 1939), especially pp. 17-35; W. Pauck in the *Westminster Bookman*, vol. VI, no. 5, p. 5; and D. C. Macintosh, *Problem of Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1940), pp. 344-348.

[14] In listing these names I am not accusing all these men of failure to examine neoörthodoxy, but stressing the common conclusion they share about it.

elements in his own thought that put him in a class by himself. There is justice in both these demurrers, and I warn the reader against taking any such classifications too literally. For instance, Wilhelm Pauck, once a Barthian, has become a liberal; and Reinhold Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures, *The Nature and Destiny of Man,* show a weakening of Brunner's influence and a new appreciation of Renaissance elements which the neo-orthodox in general condemn.

Still other liberal theologians such as John Bennett, Robert Calhoun, Douglas Steere, George Thomas, and Henry Van Dusen have absorbed some of the criticisms of neoörthodoxy and restated their liberal position in a spirit of self-criticism. I should like to range myself with this group. We have not abandoned our liberal position, and we see grave faults in neoörthodoxy; but we acknowledge the need for correction and deepening of our earlier thought. (When I use the first person plural here and in what follows, I do so with apology to these friends who may not agree with me on all points.)

We still insist on the priority of experience over doctrine, but we recognize the social matrix of our reasoning and its dependence on postulates which we cannot prove to the hilt. For this reason we see in the church, viewed as a historically developing group, a valuable body of insights that enrich philosophical thinking; and we see in scientific method some limitations which modify the range of its authority in our thinking. Nevertheless, we propose to exercise our reason, both because we know of no better way to test truth and because, for all its limitations, it is still the most reliable medium for reliable communication of experience among Christians.

We are more keenly aware today of the depth of sin in human life, but we are inclined to find our clue to that depth in modern psychologies of the unconscious rather than in the categories of total depravity, predestination or the Fall. We recognize the need for more thoroughgoing application of the "new psychology" to the problems of theology, even while we are aware of certain dangers in the metaphysical implications of the psychologies to which we refer.

We have come to acknowledge more definitely the importance of the doctrine of the transcedence of God, but we do so with the same insistence as before on his immanence. And we believe that these two insights belong together.

Thus we still insist on the doctrine of continuity: continuity between the human and the divine, between the natural and the supernatural, between time and eternity, between history and metaphysics, between special revelation in Jesus Christ and general revelation in the world of nature and in religious insights of other religions, between the sacred and the

secular. This is anathema to the neoörthodox, but we remain in this sense liberals.

We believe, too, in the social gospel, even though we cannot share the alleged confidence of some liberals in the assured progress of the human race. We feel, however, that morality should not be confused with religion, but depends on profound theological beliefs for its validity. Yet we insist that moral experience yields men valuable insights about God, who is a moral being, however much his goodness may transcend ours. To speak of God as beyond all morality seems to us dangerous, as the experience of Hinduism suggests. Because of our faith in the validity of moral ideas about God we propose to continue the prophetic criticism which our religion has never failed to exercise against society, but we also have hope for the future because God has not forsaken his world. At the present moment this hope seems to us a note of prime importance in our message to a world which suffers not from overconfidence but from cynical despair.

We believe finally in the crucial importance of personal religion, accepting the insistence of our critics upon the need for deeper awareness of the unplumbed profundity of personal evil and of personal decision. We had never lost sight of the incalculable outreach of the private moments of our individual experience, but we are perhaps more disposed to admit that the deep dilemmas of our spiritual life are insoluble by ourselves without the grace of God. Yet we see that grace as operating in and through natural processes.

Prayer is therefore not so much a conversation which expects some direct answer, but a discipline of thinking and waiting by which the will of God is more clearly apprehended. Since thinking operates with the experiences which sensitivity provides, we want to cultivate that awareness in which foregone conclusions and habits of thought are relaxed and new values perceived. Such values and insights have bearing also on that other side of personal religion, the conscientious discharge of one's vocation in society. Devotions and duty we believe to be inseparable; and the state of grace we think of as applying equally to worship and to work.

We believe that this faith carries forward the liberal tradition of the past and provides for its growth in the future.

Many are the reports of the demise of liberalism. Many funeral orations—not always eulogies, either—have been pronounced over it. But we are not impressed, and we feel lively and in good health and ready for what the future may bring, so help us God.

REVELATION AND MYTHOLOGY

Friedrich Schleiermacher *versus* Johann Grohmann

ELLIOT VAN N. DILLER

Mills College

Few things are as devastating to intellectual pride or as jarring to mental complacency as the discovery that the author of some book we have read with careful attention was really "some one else." We are familiar with the disillusioned comment of a college senior that the *Iliad* was not written by Homer, but by another man of the same name. Actually, this chastening discovery of bibliographic error is seldom experienced today because of our tidy literary habits. I do not mean habits of thinking, but merely of labeling. Mistaken identity in formal authorship is practically impossible in the case of current books, in spite of "ghost writing." And, as the vast majority of modern readers follow well-trodden paths when venturing into older literature, there is little chance of confusion. We are seldom deceived by pseudonymity.

Of course, the root of our trouble, insofar as trouble still exists, lies in the area of genuinely anonymous publication. This is so clearly out of fashion today that we at once suspect a dubious motive if an author conceals his name. But when we recall the character of biblical literature, to mention only one example, we realize that anonymous presentation was a matter of course in ancient times. In fact, it is somewhat of a shock for the modern reader to find that distrust of the anonymous has developed only within the last hundred years. It is a product of the "scientific spirit."

Thanks to tireless research, our major bibliographic catalogues have now overcome most of the important difficulties caused by anonymous publication in the past as far as famous names are concerned. While some fascinating problems of attribution still remain in areas of technical and detailed scholarship, even these *minutiæ* have been drastically reduced in number during recent years. For all practical purposes, the issue appears dead. At least, I believed it to be dead until study of the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher proved it to be very much alive.

However sympathetic we may feel towards bibliographers who have faced the challenging hazards of identifying the authors of anonymous books, it is truly amazing to find a clearly stated error in current classification of the writings of the man whom Hastings' *Encyclopædia* calls "the Father of Modern Theology." If Schleiermacher were of less significance in the history of religion, or if the erroneous ascriptions appeared only in local journals of uncertain reputation, the point might be disregarded as

trivial. But such is not the case. Granted that the book in question is not a vital item for the interpretation of Schleiermacher's theology, as his fame rests upon clearly proven writings, the assertion of such an error by certain international "authorities" in bibliography becomes a matter of considerable importance to students in the history of religious literature.

Because of the prominence of Schleiermacher's name and the care with which the leading bibliographic catalogues approach their task, it would be foolish to request a neatly packaged solution to our present problem in authorship. We must expect subtle confusions, or, indeed, there would be no problem at all. Had these complications not been actually present in the historical circumstances of production, the error in question would neither have occurred in the first place, nor been perpetuated for more than a century.

Therefore, it is convenient to divide this brief presentation into three parts in order to achieve clarity. The first considers Schleiermacher in the rôle of author. This is necessary, both to refresh our minds concerning the major periods of his literary production, and to see the background from which the erroneous attribution emerged. The second section treats of the factors involved in the appearance of the error as such, and the third presents certain tentative conclusions with regard to positive ascription of the disputed book.

I

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born on November 21, 1768, in Breslau. He died in Berlin, following a short illness, on February 12, 1834. This span of sixty-six years saw an upheaval throughout all of Central Europe, and it marks the beginning of modern Germany. Napoleon's entire life was lived between these dates, and the battle of Jena occurred almost midway between them. The history of that period is filled with famous German names in all ranges of activity, and it is perhaps only natural that the great significance of Schleiermacher should be seriously neglected in English translation and criticism owing to the very fertility of the time.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) can hardly be termed a contemporary, because, while the period of their lives actually overlapped, Kant retired from active life in 1797, two years before Schleiermacher did any serious writing, and the latter is definitely a post-Kantian. Johann Fichte (1762-1814) was a contemporary, as were Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854); Henrik Steffens (1773-1845); Friedrich Jacobi (1743-1819); Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811); Karl Reinhold (1758-1823); Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829); Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860); and Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827). For English readers Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-

1831), who was born in the same year as Beethoven and two years after Schleiermacher, dominates the period in the field of philosophy, while Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) quite properly holds our attention as a poetic and dramatic genius. Because of his outstanding contribution in the field of religion, Schleiermacher actually forms with Hegel and Goethe a great literary triumvirate. In all the array of contemporary brilliance he was the only one seriously and consistently devoted to religious concerns.

Schleiermacher's life as an author began in 1799. His age was thirty-one. In this important year two books in the field of religion were published in Berlin which achieved immediate, popular attention. Both appeared anonymously, and the problem of their relation, one to the other, underlies our present investigation. One of them was clearly and definitely a work of Schleiermacher, and has never been disputed in terms of authorship. He publicly claimed the book after its appearance, and the well-known circumstances of its production establish it beyond any doubt. This was *Ueber die Religion, Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (Concerning Religion, Addresses to its Cultured Despisers). In this paper I shall, for the most part, refer to the book simply as the *Reden,* or the *Addresses.*

The other anonymous publication bears the title *Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie* (Concerning Revelation and Mythology) or *On Revelation.* In spite of the fact that its initial appearance seems to have created considerable discussion, the book has long since dropped out of circulation and is now a museum piece. Its importance for the history of religious literature does not rest so much in the value of its content as in the fact that certain sources have identified it as a product of Schleiermacher's pen, probably predating the writing of the *Reden* by a few months. As a first publication by Schleiermacher, a kind of trial balloon, so to speak, his authorship of *Ueber Offenbarung* is plausible. The fact that the more mature and original *Reden* was claimed at once by Schleiermacher, and carried through several editions to form the basis of his later writings, might help to explain why *Ueber Offenbarung* dropped out of popular attention. We shall leave *On Revelation* with this brief statement, because other parts of this paper deal specifically with it.

The appearance of the *Reden* in 1799, written by Schleiermacher at the urgent request of friends in the Romantic Group, caused immediate interest in Berlin, and, as soon as the implications of its teaching had been digested, aroused a storm of negative criticism. The Romantic Circle was centred in the *Mittwoch Verein,* or Wednesday Club, of which Goethe was a leading member. The author was promptly accused of Spinozism by the Pietists, who were unable to appreciate the meaning of *universum* ("the

world as organism") and other difficult terms. He was soundly condemned for his use of "feeling" (*Gefühl*), and much of the significance of *Anschauung* (intuition, insight), *Geschmack* (taste), and *Sinn* (sense) escaped attention. His religious theory was branded as completely subjective and hostile to all true theology. Friedrich Schlegel was a leader of the opposition: he called the *Reden* a work of "infinite subjectivity." But in spite of bitter criticisms, and perhaps because of some of them, the *Addresses* gained a hold on the popular imagination. With this attention Schleiermacher's status as a figure to be reckoned with in the field of religious philosophy was assured.

Die Monologen (Monologues) was the next product of what may be called "the first Berlin period." This appeared one year later, in 1800. The tone of the *Addresses* was continued with especial reference to ethics, freedom, and the importance of individuality. The frankly "romantic" temper of this work quite naturally helped to popularize the author's name. This book came from the publishing house of Johann Unger, as did also the *Reden* and *Ueber Offenbarung.*

From 1802 until 1807 Schleiermacher was absent from Berlin, acting as pastor of a church in Stolpe, Pomerania, and chaplain to the court, and then serving in the more important post of professor of theology in the University of Halle. It was here that he prepared the second edition of the *Addresses,* which was published in the late summer of 1806, the year of the battle of Jena. He then returned to Berlin as pastor of the large Reformed Church of the Trinity. He was appointed professor of theology in the new University of Berlin when it was established in 1810, but continued to hold his church position.

He had gained academic recognition in Halle and other universities through his sweeping condemnation of previous treatments of ethical theory, which appeared in the scholarly *Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre* of 1803. The author's close association of ethics with the life of Nature separated him widely from both his master, Kant, and his famous contemporary, Fichte. The "Lectures on Dialectic," which were soon to draw crowds of students in the new University of Berlin, grew from the root of this ethical criticism, and took final shape in 1811. However, some hints of their structure may be found as early as the first appearance of the *Reden* in 1799.

The year 1821 is of particular importance in the growth of Schleiermacher's fame, and it represents the peak of "the second Berlin period." The again rewritten third edition of *Ueber die Religion* was published, this time by G. Reimer, and the volume included the author's explanatory notes. These are really new essays appended to each of the five addresses, which change the original character of the book in several respects. This

year (1821) also saw the appearance of his most impressive work in systematic theology, *Die christliche Glaube.* The third edition of the *Addresses* and *The Christian Faith* continued to hold the spotlight of popular interest during the author's lifetime.

Schleiermacher's death in 1834 was the signal for another burst of interest in his work. The fourth edition of the *Reden* appeared only a few days after the funeral, a reproduction of the text of the third with minor alterations. During the last months of his life he placed great stress upon his "Lectures on Dialectic," and, in fact, several times subsequent to 1811 made plans for their publication. However, he was so deeply immersed in the practical work of preaching and lecturing that the occasion never arose. He did, however, find time to prepare an introduction for them. One week before he died, realizing that the end was near, he entrusted his manuscripts to his friend, Pastor Ludwig Jonas, asking him to organize the material of the "Dialectic" after the systematic form of the *Christian Faith.* Jonas published the revision of the "Lectures on Dialectic" five years later, in 1839. Thus interest in Schleiermacher's writing was continued after his death, each posthumous publication arousing fresh controversy. The *Reden* ran to seven editions, the last three carrying the text of the fourth and coming from the House of G. Reimer. The final one appeared in 1878, acting as the stimulus for Bernhard Pünjer's "critical" edition of 1879. This summary mention of Schleiermacher's most important books only scratches the surface of his production. His collected writings contain eleven volumes on theology, ten volumes of sermons, nine volumes of philosophical and miscellaneous subjects. Only a fraction of this list appears in English, and most of the translations are now out of print.

There are several reasons why interpretation of Schleiermacher's religious development, as reflected in his writings, is difficult. He was clearly an eclectic, in the best sense; and his relations to Plato, to Spinoza, to Leibnitz, to Kant, to Fichte, and to Schelling are important. In each case he gave his findings the stamp of his own peculiar genius. This study of relationship is a large subject in itself.

Another cause of trouble lies in the informal character of the writings, especially the early ones. Even for the romantic period, much of his work is loosely knit. *Die christliche Glaube* and the *Dialektik* are formal presentations, but, on the whole, Schleiermacher distrusted system. Further, his terminology is quite flexible, which makes precise definition hard. He stands at the opposite pole from Hegel at this point.

And it is necessary to take account of his moods. He could be rigorously logical and technical upon occasion, but his writings also show a free play of emotions. The clarity and vigor of his mind, the wide sympathy and many-sidedness of his point of view, the high peaks of his exaltation

and the depths of his despondency, the critical attitude lying close to the stress upon immediate insight and direct personal experience—all remind us more strongly of the late William James than of any other modern thinker. Like James, Schleiermacher was not a formalist in religious philosophy. It is necessary to read many of his books to gain acquaintance with his religious and philosophical point of view, and he also shows in his writing the same dialectic of activity and passivity within the religious consciousness.

I personally feel that the greatest single obstacle to a clear appreciation of Schleiermacher's authorship, taken as a whole, lies in the transitional character of the writings. For example, the first three editions of the *Reden*—notably the first of 1799; the second of 1806; and the third of 1821—differ in marked respects from one another. I have found only slight variations between the third of 1821 and the fourth of 1834. The second and third editions were not merely editorial revisions of the first, as the author himself claimed. While much of the original phrasing was retained, striking, new elements may be discerned in each case, and the editions are, despite the author's claim, really rewritings, which cover a period of twenty-two years.

The opinions of scholars regarding the importance of these changes in the editions of the *Addresses* are varied. Schleiermacher maintained that the spirit of his original statement in the first edition remained the same. This is clearly expressed in the preface to the third edition. The author admits that there are many verbal changes, but he holds that they are external to the meaning. His phrase is *"noch ganz derselbe."*

The most decisive of German contradictions comes from Bernhard Pünjer, an outstanding critic in the philosophy of religion. He says flatly of Schleiermacher's statement that it is not true—*"Ganz so steht es jedoch nicht."* Many of the changes concern style only, but many indicate a new attitude towards the meaning of religion, and thus are of material importance.

Swinging between these two poles of opinion represented by the author and by Pünjer are judgments by such prominent scholars as Höffding, Wenland, Karl Swartz, Dilthey, Röhr, Schenkel, Bender, Ritschl, Lipsius, and Bruno Weiss. All have something more or less definite to say about the importance of the changes. It is not relevant to examine the opinions of these men here. I mention them only to suggest an added reason for my interest in undertaking a detailed analysis of textual alterations in the several editions of the *Reden*, and their meaning for the development of the author's religious *Weltanschauung*.

So much for the background of Schleiermacher's authorship. Let us turn to the immediate problem before us.

II

Because the second edition of the *Addresses* was prepared during the spring and early summer of 1806, I was naturally interested in finding as many as possible of Schleiermacher's articles and letters dated in that year. Of course, the outbreak of the recent war made further correspondence with German universities and libraries impossible, and, therefore, I have been obliged to confine myself during the war years to domestic sources, which are meagre, and to the interpretation and correlation of materials that I had already gathered from Europe.

This investigation of Schleiermacher's literary activity in 1806 led eventually to a reference to *Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie,* the mysterious, anonymous volume of 1799. The letter appeared over Schleiermacher's signature in the *Jenaische Literatur-Zeitung,* June 16, 1806. For our present subject, it acts as an atomic bomb.

Up to this point in my study, which had carried for several years nearly to the beginning of war in Europe, I had followed the classification of the Harvard University Library. This gave *Ueber Offenbarung* to Schleiermacher in the year of the *Reden's* first edition, 1799. I had already read the rare copy of *On Revelation* owned by Harvard, and I found it very Kantian and characterized by just the kind of vivid imagery which one meets time and time again in reading the *Reden.* While it seemed to add little to the religious point of view of the *Addresses,* it offered no definite contradiction, and I had already become accustomed to the unevenness of Schleiermacher's style from his other writings. I was therefore considerably shocked to find that the letter of June, 1806, to the *Jenaische Literatur-Zeitung* was nothing less than a denial by Schleiermacher that he ever wrote the book. Before that time I had not been especially interested in *Ueber Offenbarung,* as my concern was almost entirely with the several editions of the *Reden,* but now I was anxious to follow the new problem to its source.

Further enquiry revealed that the Harvard attribution to Schleiermacher was based on the British Museum *Catalogue*—a recognized international authority, if not *the* authority for European publications. The British Museum makes a double ascription to Schleiermacher in notations three years apart. The British *Catalogue* volume of 1893 is still standard for the "O" of *Offenbarung,* and that of 1896 for the "S" of Schleiermacher. Thus under both the subject of Revelation and name of author the citation plainly appears. The new edition of the Index has moved from "Aa" to "Co" after an effort of sixteen years. At this rate of progress, the Schleiermacher listing will be rewritten in the year 2027, and thus will be enjoyed by my great-grandchildren. I am a great admirer of British

thoroughness; it faces only one major responsibility: it cannot afford to make a mistake. Our present question is, *Did* it make a mistake, and if so, *why?*

Turning to sources nearer home, I was interested to discover that Professor Baldwin's *Bibliography of Philosophy,* which I have found to be the best American guide, likewise gives the book to Schleiermacher. The compilation of this material under Baldwin's editing was made by the brilliant American scholar, Benjamin Rand.

A tracing of the reference back into German catalogues increased my already keen curiosity. Georg Hamberger and Johann Meusel in the modern *Das Gelehrte Deutschland Lexicon* place *Ueber Offenbarung* under "Schleiermacher." Going back a century, the fact appeared that Kayser in *Vollständiges Bücher-Lexicon für 1834* gave Schleiermacher the authorship.

Digging still further into the disagreement to find the original source of the conflict, the fact emerged that G. L. Spaulding, a close friend of Schleiermacher, wrote to the latter on February 28, 1803, four years after the appearance of the disputed book, asking him about the authorship of what is probably the work in question. "Tell me," he enquires, "for why should I not ask you? Did you write *Mythologie der Offenbarung* (Mythology of Revelation)? I have not seen the book, but I understand something from the physiognomy of the title, and so do not think it is a product of your family. Yet I may be wrong, and many people are convinced that it is your work." This letter appears in the German among hundreds of others, and without comment, in Dilthey's elaborate compilation of Schleiermacher's correspondence. The translation of the passage cited is mine, and I think the wording is adequate. It is interesting to note that Spaulding was in error regarding the title—"Mythology *of* Revelation." No wonder that he questioned the ascription of the work to his friend! The mention is also very significant that "many persons" believed the book to be Schleiermacher's, and this in 1803, four years after publication.

I have been able to discover no answer from Schleiermacher to Spaulding's letter. We would give much to find one. But three years later, on June 16, 1806, Schleiermacher published the signed statement in *Jenaische Literatur-Zeitung* (No. 54) which began my troubles, and which brings the question of the disputed book to a head. At this time—during the spring and summer of 1806—he was engaged in completing the rewriting of the second edition of the *Reden.* The fact that this work was being carried on in the university atmosphere of Halle probably called his attention to the current dispute concerning the authorship of *On Revelation.* During the year 1803, when Spaulding wrote to him, he was pastor of the church in Stolpe. As this was a small Pomeranian town, and as he

had left Berlin the previous year, much of the urban discussion of the book may have escaped his attention. Of course, he *may* have answered Spaulding's letter in the early months of 1803 from Stolpe, but if he did, and if the letter is still extant, a copy would hardly be available on this side of the Atlantic.

The fact remains that on June 16, 1806, two months and a half before the appearance of the *Reden's* second edition, the *Jenaische Literatur-Zeitung* published over his signature the statement that the "News-sheet" (*Intelligenzblatt*) of the *Neue Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung* for March, 1806, had specifically attributed *Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie* to him. Further, Schleiermacher states that the editors failed to make correction of the error after he had called it to their attention the following month, April. This letter, written in June, 1806, is phrased in the strongest of terms, an example of his early, vigorous style at its best, and it is plain to see that he was much disturbed, both by the initial error of the Leipzig publication in March, and by the failure to retract it after protest had been made.

It is very difficult, indeed, for us to account for the lack of equally vigorous protest three years earlier, when Spaulding's letter pointed out that "many persons" held the erroneous view. If Schleiermacher received Spaulding's letter—and we must assume that he did, as it appears in the compilation of his correspondence—he may have been so immersed in pastoral duties in Stolpe that the matter seemed more trivial than it appeared in the University of Halle atmosphere of 1806. I have found no record that Spaulding's concern was based on the appearance of any false statement *in print* ascribing the book to Schleiermacher, and it may have been the formal character of the Leipzig error of March, 1806, which caused his immediate and vigorous reaction. It is very strange that such a popular misunderstanding could have continued for nearly seven years unrefuted by the true author of the work, by the publisher, or by some scholar of the time. Of course, the publisher, Johann Unger of Berlin, may have been asked to remain silent by the true author—indeed, a strange situation! Unger had published the first anonymous edition of Schleiermacher's *Reden,* and it may be significant that neither the second edition of 1806 nor any of his other works after that year were given to Unger. Perhaps Spaulding did his best to correct the impression in 1803, but lacking confirmation from Schleiermacher of his mere opinion gained by hearsay, which amounted to an apprehension founded on a mistaken version of the title (Mythology *of* Revelation), it seems safe to suppose that Spaulding was not the leader of any crusade. Were it not for the reference by Spaulding that "many persons" believed the work to be Schleiermacher's, we might think that the Leipzig journal had made an isolated,

mechanical error, as both the *Reden* and *Offenbarung* came from the same publisher the same year. But this can hardly be the case, as Spaulding's letter of 1803 falls midway between the original publication in 1799 and the erroneous, printed ascription from Leipzig of 1806.

On July 5, 1806, the editors of the Leipzig "News-Sheet" tardily corrected their mistake of March, adding that Schleiermacher's statement in June had been written with greater warmth than was deserved by "a small literary error." The mistake may have been small, it was only the listing of a title under a name, but it was significant enough in result to start a chain of misinformation which has carried on for nearly 150 years, determining the classifications of certain German, British, and American bibliographies usually authoritative. That Schleiermacher's strong protest to the Liepzig journal and the late correction of the error in July, 1806, were of little avail is clear. In 1834, the year of his death, thirty-five years after publication, and at a time when much attention was directed to a study of Schleiermacher's work, Kayser perpetuated the myth of *Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie* (it appears that the title has dogged the history of the book!). The authoritative *Vollständige Bücher-Lexicon* for 1834 specifically attributed the writing to Schleiermacher as a kind of ironic epitaph. This ascription is probably the most direct source of the British Museum error. It is improbable that reference was made to the Leipzig "News-Sheet." However, *Kayser's* official *Lexicon* is known the world over, and *its* German editors almost surely drew their classification directly, or indirectly, from the *Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung.*

This is one side of the picture: for us the more important. It is, quite naturally, of more concern to a student of Schleiermacher to find that he did *not* write a work which has been attributed to him by some of the best catalogues, than to establish, once and for all, the proper author. That is a different problem. But as the course of the foregoing investigation uncovered the fact—as a kind of by-product—that three important German catalogues agree on a single man as author, other than Schleiermacher, it is relevant to examine the new question for a few moments before leaving the subject. The name involved in the triple agreement is that of Johann Christian August Grohmann.

III

The earliest attribution of *On Revelation* to Johann Grohmann that I have been able to discover is found in *Bibliographisches Handbuch der philosophischen Literatur* of 1850, edited by Johann Ersch. The *Lexicondes Hamburgischen Schriftsteller bis zur Gegenwart,* covering the years 1851-1883, makes this classification also, and probably copied Ersch. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (vol. IX) 1879, likewise follows this listing, using, however, the inverted title, *Ueber Mythologie und Offenbarung,* why, I do

not know. Apparently the name of Johann Grohmann was not sufficiently prominent to carry far beyond Germany. For instance, it appears in neither Baldwin nor Hastings, and the French catalogue of the *Bibliothèque National* gives an incomplete listing, mentioning only two writings, neither of which is *Ueber Offenbarung.*

I have not been able to discover that Johann Grohmann ever claimed or denied the book—an interesting fact in the face of the early and continuing attributions in Schleiermacher's favor. Someday after Germany settles down, I hope to visit Wittenberg and Dresden to see if any information concerning Grohmann is still available. Perhaps he did claim the book, or perhaps the storm of negative criticism which met the anonymous first edition of the *Reden* in the same year 1799 cautioned the true author of *On Revelation,* Johann Grohmann or someone else, to remain silent.

Be that as it may, Johann Grohmann was born one year later than Schleiermacher, in 1869, in Corbetha. He outlived his more famous contemporary by thirteen years, dying in Dresden in 1847, just a century ago. Like the author of the *Reden,* he was the son of a preacher, and, having begun his theological studies in Leipzig, soon became greatly interested in æsthetic, philosophical, and psychological problems. His original intention to enter the ministry must have been diverted in some way, as I have found no definite reference to any subsequent church affiliation. In 1790, while in Leipzig, he wrote *Æsthetische Beurtheilung der Klopstoc'schen Messias* and he received the degree of doctor of philosophy in the same year, at the age of twenty-one. The next year, 1791, while studying art in Dresden, he wrote a volume on the relation of art to religion. This was entitled *Ideen zu einer physiognomischen Anthologie.* The following year he was called to the University of Wittenberg as *Privatdocent,* and he was appointed full professor in 1803, the year of Spaulding's letter to Schleiermacher. He was *ausserordentliche Professor* in 1799, when he may have written the disputed book, *On Revelation.* One of the strongest points in favor of Grohmann's authorship is the fact that (according to Ersch) he published *anonymously* the year before, 1798, *Kritik der christlichen Offenbarung* (Critique of Christian Revelation). One *Revelation* might well lead to another! Or again, it might not, and the two similar titles may have been confused by later bibliographers. The *Kritik der christlichen Offenbarung* is directed specifically against Kant's *Practical Reason.* Our mysterious *Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie* is concerned largely with the ethical postulates of Kant and Fichte, being especially hostile towards the latter. And now we remember that Schleiermacher's epistemology is Kantian in many respects, and that he differs sharply from Kant on the fundamental question of the *Practical Reason.* During the crucial year 1799, Schleiermacher's letters to Henriette Herz, to von Brinkmann, and others, were

outspoken in their attack upon Kant's ethical formulation. They also were scathing in their criticism of Fichte. Schleiermacher and Grohmann (as the quite certain author of the *Christian Revelation,* and the much less certain author of *On Revelation and Mythology*) had much in common in these respects.

Thus the fact that both authors wrote in vivid style, using colorful phraseology; the fact that both were Kantians in general epistemology, but opposed to Kant in many particulars, especially ethical; the fact that both were sharply critical of Fichte—these points, taken together, tell us a good deal. And when we add that both were of nearly the same age; that both were the sons of preachers, and trained in theological studies; that both were liberal university professors of theology; that both had a marked aversion to public recognition, and an inclination towards anonymous publication; that both used the same Berlin publisher; that both were especially interested in the subject of revelation: we understand somewhat better one of the strangest confusions in the history of philosophical and religious bibliography. If the two men, because of the pressure of professional duties and geographical separation, were not in intimate contact with one another, Schleiermacher might well have remained in ignorance of Grohmann's literary work, and Grohmann might have overlooked attributions of his own book to Schleiermacher.

All this seems very plausible, and points to the easy way out of our difficulty. On this basis, we accept the ascription by Ersch, and by the two prominent German bibliographic catalogues which evidently followed him, and so give *Ueber Offenbarung* to Johann Grohmann. The reason for his silence in the face of attributions to Schleiermacher was simply that he did not know of Schleiermacher's writing, or, at least, did not follow his work with sympathetic interest. He did not see the Leipzig error of 1806, and thus did not know that the book was given to the Berlin theologian. Perhaps the confusion resulting from the battle of Jena in 1806 prevented his reading the material concerning *Ueber Offenbarung,* published in Jena and Leipzig the same year.

Thus we might end our statement of the case with a glowing feeling of satisfaction. Schleiermacher did not write the disputed book. Johann Grohmann did. The bibliographic sources asserting the Grohmann authorship are correct. We *might* do this with an easy research conscience *if* we could carefully avoid contact with the Index of the University of California.

The California Library lists only one book under the name of Johann Grohmann, and it is one which I have found in no other catalogue under his name. It appears in neither German nor French references to my knowledge. This work is of considerable historical interest. It is entitled *Christenthum und Vernunft für die Abschaffung der Todesstrafe.* Let us

call it simply: *For the Abolition of Capital Punishment.* I think it is probably the only copy in this country. I assume that it has seldom, if ever, been removed from the library stacks in seventy-four years, as two messengers were required to locate it, and as no date slip was pasted in the back. It was a gift to the library from the estate of Dr. Francis Lieber, of Columbia University. The donation was made in 1873. The volume is an interesting compilation of demands made by certain prominent Germans of the first quarter of the last century for the abolition of the death penalty. As there is little material included beyond quotations, almost anyone sympathetic with the general point of view might have sponsored its organization and publication. On the title page appears "Professor Grohmann." The dedication which follows is signed simply "Grohmann." The introduction, which shows no peculiarities in German style or any unique features in terms of ideas, is signed, *"Der Verfasser"* (the author). The place and date of writing are included, which may be significant: "Dresden, December, 1834." The time was ten months after Schleiermacher's death. Nowhere in the volume does the author's first name appear. And yet it is catalogued under *"Johann* Grohmann." As this is a recent find, I have not yet had opportunity to enquire concerning the reason for the attribution. It should prove instructive.

According to *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie,* 1879, Johann Grohmann died in Dresden in 1847. The name "Grohmann" and the two mentions of "Dresden," thirteen years apart, seem, at the present writing, to form the only links between "Johann" and California. We must enquire concerning the kind of crystal ball which is used by the California librarian. There are other "Grohmanns" of this period listed in German catalogues, and any one of them might have made the compilation on capital punishment, as it is a subject of general interest. The book was published by G. Reimer of Berlin, the large house responsible for Schleiermacher's later works, but this tells us nothing.

What *is* surprising, and of the greatest importance, is the compiler's inclusion of the first half of a sermon by Schleiermacher, quoted *verbatim.* This material occupies ten and a half pages of the book, beginning on p. 64. The sermon was delivered in Berlin on "Jewish Sunday" of the previous year, 1833. The use of such a large portion of the sermon, a full half, in the Grohmann compilation against capital punishment, argues either for a personal acquaintance with Schleiermacher in order to obtain the manuscript, or for a sufficient interest in his sermons to discover the text by other means. Perhaps Johann Grohmann and Schleiermacher were personally acquainted. Perhaps this acquaintance developed long after the Leipzig episode of 1806, twenty-seven years before. Johann Grohmann is still the author of *On Revelation,* but the ancient history of the error in the

Neue Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung was a closed book to him. He had been absorbed in teaching at the University of Wittenberg at the time, and the controversy had escaped him entirely.

But granting all this as a bare possibility, how account for his silence when now confronted by Kayser's ascription in *Vollständiges Bücher-Lexicon* of 1834? The attribution of *Ueber Offenbarung* to Schleiermacher by this well-known bibliographic index could hardly have remained unknown to anyone interested either in Schleiermacher's work or in the general field of contemporary religious and philosophical production. If Johann Grohmann were the author of *On Revelation,* it seems almost inconceivable that he would not have known of its ascription to Schleiermacher in 1834, the very same year in which he showed sufficient interest in Schleiermacher's point of view to include half of one of his sermons in defense of his own position relating to capital punishment. The best argument for Johann Grohmann's silence concerning his authorship of *On Revelation* lies in his ignorance of Schleiermacher's literary activity. The closer the two men are brought together, the less likely appears Grohmann's authorship, or conversely, the more mysterious his silence in the face of an erroneous attribution in 1834 becomes. He was then a mature scholar of sixty-five.

If, indeed, the University of California has been as unfortunate in the instance of Johann Grohmann and capital punishment as was Harvard in the case of Schleiermacher and revelation, all may yet be well. In that contingency, we are back where we started, and we merely give the book to Johann Grohmann on the strength of Ersch, and the two prominent German bibliographies which hold his position. In that event, we now have another mystery on our hands: *Who* wrote *Abschaffung der Todesstraffe?* If not Johann, which other Grohmann?

But perhaps we have carried the matter far enough for one sitting. Lacking actual confirmation by the true author, and, of course, such *may* exist of which this writer is ignorant, we cannot give the book, *On Revelation,* once and for all to Johann Grohmann, much as we might like to do so. The possibility is still good—in spite of the California contribution, just when all was going smoothly. However, for our primary subject, we cannot escape the significance of Schleiermacher's clear and decisive statement in the *Jenaische Literatur-Zeitung* on June 16, 1806: "I know nothing of that work, *Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie* and I am not its author" *(Ich erkläre also hier dass ich von jener Schrift: Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie nicht weiss, und ihr Verfasser nicht bin).*

In conclusion, we may summarize this comedy of errors as follows: 1. The editors of the "Leipzig Literary Journal" for March, 1806, are guilty of false ascription of *Ueber Offenbarung* to Schleiermacher on the basis of hearsay report, or clerical error, if nothing worse. They are the

primary culprits. Further, they are guilty of tardy and ineffective acknowledgment of the mistake, after formal protest had been made. 2. Kayser, editor of *Vollständiges Bücher-Lexicon* for 1834, is clearly guilty of extreme carelessness in the reproduction of the Leipzig error, especially after an interim of thirty-five years, during which period Schleiermacher might have been interviewed. A literary journal can afford to make occasional blunders of this kind. But a publication, such as Kayser's, whose *sole* purpose is accurate bibliographic reporting, cannot afford this luxury. The same may be said of later German catalogues which copied Kayser. 3. The British Museum *Catalogue* is guilty of failure to cross-check the classifications of the several leading German bibliographies. Had it done so, it would have discovered in three of them the attribution of the book to Grohmann, and simply omitted it from the "Schleiermacher" listing, or indicated its doubtful status. For once in its long life, the British Museum was too hasty. 4. The Harvard Library is guilty of accepting the authority of the British Museum at face value, instead of making a separate check of German catalogues, which should have been done in the case of a German author. 5. Professor Baldwin's confidence in the scholarship of Benjamin Rand may be admired, but Dr. Rand should have gone beyond the Harvard *Index,* and beyond the British Museum, if he reached that point, before accepting *Ueber Offenbarung* for the *Bibliography of Philosophy.* 6. The French *Catalogue* of the *Bibliothèque National* may be commended for its restraint in *not* listing the book under "Schleiermacher." It refers only to more recent editions of his collected works which have been streamlined. Neither does it list the work under "Grohmann." But in view of the fact that German catalogues ascribe several books to Johann Grohmann beyond the two mentioned in the French *Catalogue,* it seems that *Bibliothèque National* may have been right by chance, rather than by design. For instance, it does not list the California "capital punishment" work under Johann Grohmann. It has both the virtues and the sins of omission. 7. The life and writings of Johann Grohmann deserve careful study. He is the "Falkenberg" of this complex saga. It has not been proved that he was an accessory *after* the fact only because it has not been absolutely proved that he was in the situation at all. If he was involved, and if we accept the three German attributions of the book to him, then his excuse of ignorance as a reason for silence is materially weakened by the evidence from the University of California that he was acquainted with Schleiermacher's work. This is so, *provided* that the California Library is correct in the ascription of *Capital Punishment* to Johann.

And now, as few theologians or philosophers are able to leave a specific problem without attempting a generalization, I conform to tradition and offer the pertinent maxim: Trust no "absolute" bibliographic authority absolutely; and *never* publish an anonymous book!

A BAPTIST LOOKS AT ECUMENICITY

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THE TIMELINESS of the discussion, suggested by the rather awkward title of this paper, is apparent, when the present divided Christendom is envisaged face to face with the confusions of the world in which the churches have to live and serve. In America there are upwards of two hundred different sects or denominations. As another observer writes: "The catholic church of Christ is in schism." Obviously such schism is a weakness.

As a step toward the simplification of the theme an exegesis of the title will be attempted. Two words of the title must be defined at the threshold of the discussion. These are "Baptist" and "ecumenicity."

What is a *Baptist?* More accurately, *who* is a Baptist? That is, *who* is looking at ecumenicity and *where* does he stand while making his observations? These questions are not answered easily. For the most part Baptists are proudly individualistic. Each professed Baptist regards himself as a typical Baptist. Thus it happens that, when one seeks to find the base of a Baptist and the situs of his view point, one is likely to find oneself puzzled. We do not have just one person looking at ecumenicity from a fixed point but a crowd of individuals viewing it more or less from a merry-go-round. That gets you nowhere. Therefore to prevent giddiness, and, perhaps, to get a step or two toward something stable, a definition of a Baptist is here offered. It will, of course, be a limited definition, and all Baptists may not be willing to accept it. There is, however, at least one trait in common held by all Baptists. This unity is found in the Baptist idea of what a Christian church is.

In this view, a Baptist is a regenerated believer in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord, who holds that his local group, which he calls a Baptist church, is a sovereign, independent body entirely free from all forms of outside compulsion. It is as independent of all other churches as the United States of America is independent of all other nations. This assertion of independence links the various divergent claimants of the Baptist name into a sort of isolationist autocracy. This is the lens through which ecumenicity has to be viewed by a Baptist.

Commonly, this conception of independence finds its strongest advocacy in the Southern Baptist Convention. But that Convention has no monopoly on the idea. There is some of it in all Baptists. The notion is often carried too far.

The *Watchman-Examiner,* organ of the extreme right wing of the

Baptists, in its issue of April 17, 1947, has this rather startling statement, "There is no such thing as the interdependence of independent Baptist churches. Such an idea is absurd." This editor has apparently departed entirely from reality. He forgets the fellowship of the old-time associations, to say nothing of the activities of the various state conventions and the American Baptist Home Mission Society. There are countless churches all over the country whose founding and support are directly traceable to their interdependence with other Baptist churches.

Another editorial of equally startling nature appeared in the same paper in its issue of April 3, 1947. Quoting from the Philadelphia Confession of Faith, the editor goes on to say: "This helps us to see that our Baptist foundations are laid solely in the New Testament and that neither we nor our fathers at any time claimed to be other than a *movement* in Christendom for the emphasis of the truth revealed in the New Testament." What does this mean? Baptist churches are not churches at all but only parts of a movement. One wonders how they can be absolutely independent from other parts of the same movement. Movement means motion. Motion toward an end means keeping step with other segments of the same movement.

To quote the same editorial again: "Another fact peculiar to the Baptists is that they do not accept any man-made church organization as the church of Christ. . . . In their development the Baptists have built their greatest defense around the ideal of the independence and absolute autonomy of the local church. We are a separated people because our function is to be a witness to the church universal itself." Is that human egotism, or what is it? It looks as though the convert to the Baptist position who is the editor of the paper in question had not lost all fear of the totalitarian communion he left to become a Baptist.

This estimate of Baptists as a separated people living on a sort of sanctified mesa and looking down on the benighted desert dwellers below has in it a streak of pride from which we may all pray to be delivered. When the talk is of a sovereign, independent church, it must be recognized that the church is not the sovereign. It has a sovereign Lord, one Jesus Christ. It is his directive that is to be followed even though that means that independence of action is surrendered to the Sovereign. The acts of the democracy must square with the law of God who is sovereign.

Baptists do have a kind of hazy figment of the imagination postulating what is called the "invisible, universal church" composed of all true believers in Christ past, present, and future. This serves as a soothing thought when the losses caused by a divided church on earth assail the equanimity of the individual. No matter what its foundation, this idea tends to contribute to the stubbornness with which Baptists cling to the notion of

independence. It is next to impossible for a Baptist to look at the matter of ecumenicity except from the background of local church independence. Herein lies much of the difficulty of the subject.

Undertaking to define *ecumenicity,* one realizes at once that he is dealing with an orthographic hybrid. It doesn't fit into everyday English speech. So we hike to the dictionary to find out what it really means. The *Century Dictionary* says that ecumenicity means "the character of being ecumenical" and ecumenical is "general, universal; specifically belonging to the entire Christian church." There is familiar ground for this discussion.

The former habit was to talk of catholicity. According to one of my erudite friends the difference between catholicity and ecumenicity is that catholicity deals with theology while ecumenicity is chiefly a geographical term. At any rate the popular place of catholicity has been usurped by ecumenicity. To be up to date a person must learn how to say and mean this new word, ecumenicity.

To this writer, catholicity stands for unity in doctrine, while ecumenicity is concerned more with union in organization. Inevitably the two have to meet. Theology tends to organize itself into institutions, hierarchical or otherwise, and church polity influences the forms of doctrine accepted under its different systems. Dogmas determine polity, and polity creates its own defensive dogmas. The two spheres of thought are vitally connected.

The urge behind the urge to ecumenicity is definitely shown in the several efforts to create some kind of universal organization of the Christian church in all lands. We propose to examine the several behind-the-scenes motivations that lie behind the urge to universal Christendom.

The first of these is a rather widespread *sentimental* urge to fellowship with all other Christians. This motive is expressed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in a recent address at Cambridge University. He said,

> We are not yet ready for organic or constitutional union, but there can be a process of assimilation, of growing alike. My longing is not yet that we should be united with other churches in this country but that we should grow to full communion with them. Full communion between churches means not that they are identical in all ways but that there is no barrier to exchange of their ministers and ministries.... What I desire is that I should be able freely to enter their churches and they mine in the sacrament of the Lord, that His life may freely circulate between us. Cannot we grow to full communion before we start to write a Constitution?

In this statement, Dr. Fisher indicates the influence of the emotions in this whole matter. But the emotions clash. On the one hand he seeks fellowship with his brethren of other names in the climactic observance of his church, while at the same time, loyalty, another emotion, bolsters his devo-

tion to his own communion. The situation in the world calls for something more than nude emotion. As the Scotchman, George F. MacLeod, has said, "Moscow the third Rome will not solve our times, nor will the first Rome, nor sentimentally ecumenical Geneva."

Dr. Joseph Fort Newton, who has passed through several denominational transformations and has come to rest in the American Episcopal Church, speaks, in a recent article in the *Christian Century,* with the title, "The One Great Church," of the discovery he made when he was a young minister.

> As a young minister [I think he was then a Baptist] I made a great discovery which has guided all my life. . . . It became a profound conviction with me that all the seekers, finders and servers of God are one, united in heart, however they may differ on the surface. At bottom they are one fellowship, holding a like precious faith, as the Bible tells us. All are trying to speak the same truth, each with his own accent and emphasis. All are doing the same work—seeking to lift man out of the mire and materialism into the higher air of God, and detain him there until his eyes are cleansed. Out of the mists of misunderstanding and the fogs of prejudice this mighty fact is emerging that the lovers of God and the followers of Christ are one church.

That is truly an intriguing coloration of the feelings.

The sentimental groping for fellowship has had much to do with the lessening of sharp contentions between the churches and may be credited with a share in bringing together certain branches of the churches with the original stems from which they had broken off. A conspicuous example of this is the union of the followers of John Wesley into the one American Methodist Church.

This is not to deprecate the influence of emotion in religion. All religious movements owe a big debt to the emotions, and the trend toward ecumenicity is no exception to this rule. The motive must be recognized and appraised at its full value.

So we come on the fact that *fear* is playing its part in the pressure toward ecumenicity. This is a frightened world, and religion feels the impact of fear in many directions. Two world wars in one generation have taken their toll of human nervous energy. This condition is well stated by a recent writer. "Historical crises have always given rise to fears whether a given civilization, an approved culture or any way of life could survive. That they have never survived unchanged is a basic lesson from history, but that essential values can be retained and even strengthened has been demonstrated again and again in man's long and painful struggle toward a better life and a better society."

The menace of the atom bomb hangs over this scared world. But there is another real threat menacing the church, namely, a growing

secularism. Communism, as practiced in Russia, is an exaggerated form of this insidious secularism. There are these real threats to Christian civilization and to the very existence of the church. The church is commonly counted as a bulwark against these threats. But the tragic thing is that the church is divided. There is a rift in the dike through which the floods of destruction may sweep. To add to the confusion, Protestantism is seen threatened by a new advance of Roman Catholicism.

Under all the circumstances it can be seen that these fears are justified, and if the fears bring a strengthening of the church in its function as a dike, it will be all to the good. The scared churches must get into the same fold somehow or the wolves will destroy the whole flock.

Fear is never logical and, as pointed out by the president of Haverford College in his inaugural address, "Fear has never been the basis of lasting development." Fear may arouse to the danger of a situation, but defense against the danger must be based on something stronger than fear. Indeed as a book reviewer declares, "Sentimentality is in itself a confusion, a failure to discriminate in feeling." To clear up the confusion and banish fear is one of the tangible motivations toward ecumenicity. It is certainly needed, for sometimes the churches seem more afraid of one another than of the common enemy.

The desire for *power* has played a part in the motivation toward ecumenicity. Since the days of the Roman empire the mirage of a world power has tantalized the human race. Religionists are not free from some taint of this sort. Power looks good to them. One church, and only one church, in the world means power. Arguments to support this position may be found all through church history. The world was to belong to the Old Testament Jews, but Christians are now the chosen people. The New Testament conception of a kingdom would certainly seem to contribute to the same conclusion.

Certainly, overlapping and overstaffing of the churches is a regrettable hindrance to Christian progress. Workers on the missionary fields abroad are hampered by their denominational differences which mean nothing to the pagan. This is all too true. But, do we really want the stagnation, the corruption and tyranny, inevitably associated with one great church? To ask the question is to answer it. That, however, is not to set the face against proper measures to correct the weaknesses of the present church situation.

It must be said that the hunger for fellowship with all Christians, the apprehension of danger to the spiritual life of mankind, the weaknesses of division in action, and the urge on the churches to move like a mighty army toward the conquest of the world are all realities and justified realities. They are not the fading colors of a dissolving kaleidoscopic dream.

The efforts toward ecumenicity have taken on forms that permit of classification into three categories.

I. There is the movement directed toward organic church union. This reaches far back in history. Indeed, the word used in the modern slogans derives from the ecumenical councils of the early Greek and Roman churches. Jesus also talked of the kingdom of heaven on earth, and it is not difficult to identify that kingdom with the church. The Roman church still sees itself as the successor of the Roman empire and the one only true church. It is, therefore, impatient of all its opponents whom it regards as schismatics and heretics. The traditional prayer of Jesus for his disciples that they may all be one adds strength to the objective of those who work for the union of all churches in one hierarchy.

Something like the Roman idea pervades all denominations. Each of these offers itself as the one church for the one world. A patent instance of this is the Lambeth Quadrilateral of the Anglicans, which proposed reunion on the condition that everybody becomes an Anglican.

Bishop Angus Dun, of the American Episcopal diocese of Washington, D. C., in a lecture at the University of Chicago in November, 1946, outlined the situation in a restrained but realistic fashion.

> In many ways the divided churches contradict themselves. The divisions have confused the simple and offended the sensitive and have made the church incapable of helping the world to overcome its tragic divisions of race, class and nationality. . . . The presence in our one world of the many divided churches is so established a fact that most professing Christians take it for granted. . . . Yet all have shared memories of a common origin and inheritance. They live on and by its memories. This shared and unifying memory of the one church must be rediscovered.

The bishop said that a reunited church must include the three main divisions of the Christian confession: 1. The Anglican, Roman, and Eastern catholics who see the church as the great institution established on earth by God to bring men into right relations with himself and with one another under him; 2. the classical Protestants who make the Bible the centre of their belief and church life; 3. the Quakers and other groups who see the church as the fellowship of the Spirit or the community of the perfect way. This is a clear statement of the objective of one group of ecumenical advocates and an appraisal of the reasons why it is essential in the world scene today.

The movement among the churches of South India, which has been in progress since 1919 and, as expected, was consummated in September, 1947, is a pertinent illustration of the objective of this segment of the ecumenical movement. This means the creation of a new church, "The Church of South India" that will be ecumenical in character so far as the area of its operations extends. The churches uniting are: 1. the South

India United Church, resulting from a union of Presbyterian and Congregational groups; 2. the South India Provincial Synod of the Methodist church (British and was formerly Wesleyan); 3. the four diocesan councils of the Anglican church of India, Burma, and Ceylon.

Here is an attempt to bring the congregational, presbyterian, and episcopal polities into one organization. The ordained ministers of all the uniting churches are received into the united church without any ceremony and with equal status. Future ministers will be ordained by the president of the diocesan council who will be a bishop. The Anglicans held out for episcopal ordination of all the ministers of the uniting churches at the end of fifty years. This was defeated, consideration of the point being postponed for thirty years after the consolidation, when the church would settle the question for itself.

The Church of South India also deals with matters of creedal character. The two Testaments (Old and New), the two sacraments (baptism and the Lord's supper), as well as the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds are agreed to by all parts of the uniting groups. Freedom of interpretation is guaranteed to all. It is recognized that differences of interpretation will arise, but these are not only to be tolerated but are not to be criticized. It is expected that the continued support of the missionary societies to which these Indian churches owe their existence will still be received although the scheme is mainly of Indian origin and Indian support.

No Baptist churches seem to be in the movement although the Baptists have a considerable constituency in the area. We do not forget John E. Clough and the Ongole field or the ministry of others of our people in South India.

One has the feeling that this effort in South India is a brave experiment. Yet it contains many diverse ideas of organization and theology, the pressures of which may become great enough to cause the dissolution of the whole structure.

For entirely different reasons Kyodan was organized more or less by force in Imperial Japan before the war. It is too early to appraise its standing in these days of Japanese occupation by American troops. There are signs of its being resolved into the original churches, however much this is to be regretted.

To this Baptist it looks as though the conflict between dogmas held by the various churches, the conflicts sure to arise, and the diverse polities embraced in these movements for organic unity carry their own seeds of destruction. The movement is faced with real hazards. My view was expressed in an article in the Crozer Quarterly for October, 1946.

One fears that it will not be easy to reconcile the high-church idea of historical succession and other notions of what makes a minister with the position of the nonconformist churches. Can the churches built on a creedal basis be brought to admit the right of private judgment in the interpretation of truth? To some that right is unalienable. Sacramentarianism is sure to collide with the interpretation of the ordinances held by Baptists and others. State-supported churches may be persuaded to live peaceably with the free churches, but it will not be without a struggle.

To these points may be added the clash about forms of worship, rituals, litanies, and liturgies. It looks like an impasse. If ecumenicity has for its goal organic union of the churches—one church organization in the one world of disorder in which we live—that goal seems a long way off.

II. Certain successful attempts have been consummated in the merger of one or more denominations into one body. The most conspicuous of these is the grouping into one church of the several Methodist Episcopal and Methodist Protestant bodies. There are two or three other examples of this kind of merger. In all these cases there were the same ideologies at the base of each segment of the merger. Something of the same kind is going on among the Lutheran bodies. One can only applaud the accomplishment of such unions that bring Christians holding the same polity and theology into working unions, even amalgamation.

Some proposed mergers, like that between the Episcopalians and Presbyterians, are stalled on the ways for some reason or other. Much spade work remains to be done in these cases. In this connection it might be asked why are not the Disciples of Christ and the Baptists merged? The same polity and much of the same theology in both bodies ought to make this possible. It may be that the impulse given to this merger at the recent meeting of the Northern Baptist Convention will have tangible results.

The merger of denominations resulting from close association and understanding seems to be a step toward the realization of true ecumenicity. One hopes for more such mergers.

III. The remaining class of movements requiring notice are those that are directed toward coöperation between the churches. Coöperation in a great task minimizes the differences. The effort to bring all the churches into one organization serves to reveal more differences than it cures. The arguments over polity are divisive; the formulation of strategic plans to move forward for the accomplishment of great ends of action and redemption are unifying. When a fellow is working alongside of you to fix a hole in the dike, it doesn't make much difference what he believes about church government or how he explains the mysteries of revelation. The important thing is to get the hole plugged.

In the early years of this century I was a minor participant in two movements directed toward greater coöperation between churches. One

of my most pleasant memories is that of the gathering in the Calvary Baptist Church of Washington, D. C., in 1907, when the urge to better coöperation among Baptist churches resulted in the creation of the Northern Baptist Convention.

A year later, in 1908, I was present at the meeting in Philadelphia where the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America was organized. This action signalized the introduction into Christian thinking of a new idea—distinctly American—the idea connoted by the word *federation*. The analogy of the Federal Constitution of the United States—the outstanding example of sovereign, independent states agreeing to federate for certain specified purposes—was followed in the new grouping. Federation is believed to be truer to the realities than is ecumenicity or even catholicity.

A series of organizations followed with the purpose of facilitating coöperation in other fields by federation. A conference in Geneva in 1920 resulted in the meeting of a Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm in 1925. Then came the Conference on Faith and Order at Lausanne in 1927 and the Missionary Council at Jerusalem in 1928. The greatest of the missionary conferences was held at Madras in 1938. At about the same time the two Conferences on Life and Work and on Faith and Order were blended into the World Council of Churches, which is just now emerging from the eclipse thrown around it by World War II.

These coöperative enterprises were generated in the period between the two devastating world wars. It is fair to assume that the fears stemming from the scare of a third world war have had something to do with the widespread interest in the World Council of Churches.

A clear understanding of what the Federal Council in America is may be had from a summarized statement printed by that body in September, 1946. It contains these points: 1. The Federal Council really is a Council of Churches—not a superchurch, or any kind of ecclesiastical hierarchy. It has no authority over any of the coöperating churches. 2. The Council is an instrument not of union but of coöperation. 3. The Federal Council is not an association of diverse and heterogeneous faiths but a fellowship of churches which all confess Jesus Christ "as Divine Lord and Saviour." Beyond this the Council does not go in the matter of doctrine. 4. The Federal Council increasingly represents a common Protestant front in support of the priceless heritage that we all have in the Reformation. 5. The Federal Council is an instrument for bearing a combined witness to the principles which must be applied to the social, political, and international life of the world. 6. The Federal Council provides a channel for relating the American churches to the church as an ecumenical community. These principles seem altogether worthy of support to this Baptist.

The basis of the proposed constitution of the World Council of Churches is: "The World Council of Churches is a fellowship of churches which accept our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour."

In the proposed constitution the functions of the World Council of Churches are stated as follows:

1. To carry on the work of the two world movements for Faith and Order and for Life and Work.
2. To facilitate common action by the churches.
3. To promote coöperation in study.
4. To promote the growth of ecumenical consciousness in the members of all churches.
5. To establish relations with denominational federations of world-wide scope and with other ecumenical movements.
6. To hold world conferences on specific subjects as occasion may require, such conferences being empowered to publish their own findings.

The World Council shall not legislate for the churches; nor shall it act for them in any manner except as indicated above or as may hereafter be specified by the constituent churches.

The provisional Committee of the World Council has so far undertaken the following activities: 1. Reconstruction and relief for the suffering. Without question, it is the activity of the Council in this regard that has given it prestige and support. 2. A Training Centre is to be set up in Geneva. 3. A Commission for International Affairs is proposed, and preparations for a World Youth Assembly are in process.

To this program again this Baptist gives assent. But, unfortunately, all who carry the Baptist name will not agree. On numerous occasions the Federal Council has met with opposition in the Northern Baptist Convention. The opposition comes for the most part from that sector of the denomination which demands the adoption of a statement of belief on the part of the Convention. The proposed statement is based on differences of theological interpretation. Historically, Baptists have always taken a position against any creed or statement of belief to be used as a test of fellowship. Any Baptist who so desires may write down and publish his interpretations of the Scriptural teachings. Until now it has never been admitted that such a statement was to be used as a test of fellowship.

Something new has happened in Baptist circles. During the past winter three regional conferences of the so-called Conservative Baptist Fellowship were held, and all of the three adopted the following manifesto:

We recommend to our Conservative Baptist Fellowship meeting in Atlantic City that it proceed to formulate a united Conservative Baptist Association of America to which any sovereign Baptist church may belong regardless of other affiliations provided that each church subscribe to our Conservative Baptist Fellowship doctrinal statement.

The Conservative Baptist Fellowship at Atlantic City voted to proceed with the organization of the Conservative Baptist Association of America. Thus a rival to the Northern Baptist Convention with a creedal basis is put into the field. This rivalry is further indicated in the following declaration:

> We declare that we will no longer give monies to the constituent bodies within the Northern Baptist Convention which can in any way be appropriated for the support of missionaries, secretaries or others having direction of our organizations who do not affirm faith in the Bible. [This means adherence to the creedal statement referred to.]
>
> We now further reaffirm that we hold it to be inimical to the successful operation of missionary work for fields and secretarial offices to be staffed with personnel of diverse belief and oppose such policy which, while recognizing truth, condones unbelief and violates conscience.

Note the kinship of this position with that of Red Russia is striking. Believe with us, or else—— That this is not far-fetched is evident from the published statement by the chairman of the Committee of the Conservative Baptist Fellowship which arranged the regional conferences. He says: "Let the Northern Baptist Convention restore doctrinal purity, discontinue the practice of the Inclusive Policy and I am prepared to channel my gift and that of my church through the Northern Baptist Convention."

In all this there is an attempt to carry on a divided loyalty. Lip service is offered to the Northern Baptist Convention but allegiance to another body—the Conservative Baptist Association of America—is made supreme.

These alleged conservatives overlook the fact that the Northern Baptist Convention came into being as a development of the desire of Baptist churches in the North to coöperate in carrying out the missionary enterprise of the churches. It is democratic in structure, and all who belong to it are assumed to be in sympathy with its purposes. The majority rules. When a minority differs, it has an ethical obligation to coöperate so long as the minority retains membership. When they can no longer do so, the correct thing is to withdraw, not to stay within for the purpose of continuing diversive measures. There is no place for a religious fifth column.

Aware of this condition, the Northern Baptist Convention at Atlantic City voted to empower its General Council to review the relation of the Convention with the Federal Council of Churches, to report on the Conservative Baptist Association of America so that the Baptist public might know of its purposes and also to recommend the adoption by the Convention of a definition of a "coöperating church" within the meaning of the constitution and by-laws of the Convention. It is hoped that this will serve to put an end to this unfortunate and unnecessary argumentation.

Federation does require some surrender of sovereignty. This is

evident in the United Nations and is equally implicit in the relations between the coöperating churches that compose the Northern Baptist Convention. But the surrender has only to do with measures essential to the common task. Even Virginia and Rhode Island surrendered some sovereignty in order to make the United States. That it took a Civil War to settle finally the question is a sad commentary on human nature.

A dying world cries shame on the pride of independency that hinders federal coöperation. I wonder what the Head of the church thinks of it all.

The popular novel, *The Miracle of the Bells,* contains a moving story. The moral of the story appears when the bells of the five churches in the little coal town all join in sounding forth on the day of the funeral of one of the town's forgotten girls. Each had a different sound, but they were all one in the praise they spoke for an unselfish heroine.

Will it take another miracle in the churches to get them all to work together so that the tocsin of victory may be heard over the world's sin and selfishness? If so, let us begin to work the miracle right now. May I put the conclusion of the matter in a fervent appeal to all Christians everywhere? Let us seek fellowship with all who profess allegiance to Jesus Christ (that is creed enough), and join with them in coöperative action for the establishment of his spiritual kingdom on earth. When the fight for righteousness is over, we can talk over our differences, if we want to, while resting by the river's bank in the green fields of Eden.

THE MINISTER AS ARTIST

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THE WORK of the minister has many aspects. He is a preacher and teacher, a pastor and parish administrator, a counselor and a beneficent influence in the secular affairs of his community. But all these activities are subordinate to his function as the leader of the worship of a congregation. In fulfilling this function he is primarily, if often unconsciously, an artist, for, as Dean Sperry has pointed out, "The conduct of worship is an art, one of the great historic arts of the race."[1] Public worship, in other words, is, or should be, primarily concerned with the presentation of religion in forms of beauty with an emotional appeal, instead of as a series of intellectual propositions formulated in doctrine, or even as a set of principles for guidance in the conduct of life. To use the metaphor of the human body, one might say that doctrines compose the underlying skeleton, and ethical principles the muscles which make action possible, but that our hearts are stirred and quickened by an outward form of beauty which awakens an emotional response.

The employment of beauty in the service of religion is an immemorial and universal tradition embodied in architecture and stained glass, painting and sculpture, music and ritual. Those forms of beauty are not ends in themselves, but are rather the means by which the emotion of the worshiping heart may be awakened. They are but passive instruments, waiting to play their part when the living voice of the leader in worship shall bid them enter the harmonious orchestra of praise and aspiration.

If, however, they are thus effectively to play their parts, the leader must himself be moved by the spirit of the artist. He must recognize that worship is not didactic. It is the utterance of emotions which cannot be taught but which can be awakened and kindled, the kind of emotion aroused and expressed by great poetry, not only through its ideas but by its rolling, sonorous phrases, or by that type of music which Sidney Lanier describes when he says that "Music is love in search of a word." That is not to deny that the service should also convey truth in intellectual forms, for, as I shall presently point out, I hold that every service inevitably embodies a more or less definite interpretation of the universe, or of man's relation to God. Similarly, an ethical undertone should run through the whole fabric of the service. But, at least until the sermon is reached, the dominant note is one of feeling, rather than of ratiocination or ethical inquiry, and feeling must necessarily find utterance in a form of art, even though the

[1] W. L. Sperry, *Christian Register*, Jan. 17, 1935, p. 36.

form it takes may, in this or that particular instance, be crude and inadequate.

The conduct of worship is, then, a form of art in which the priest or minister is an interpretative or a creative artist, or both. In this respect it may be not irreverently compared to the drama, and indeed the Mass is frequently called by Roman Catholic writers a kind of divine drama. Now beauty in a drama depends upon three factors: first, upon the text of the drama itself, upon its being possessed by a great idea, fused in the fire of genius, cast in memorable and ennobling phraseology; second, upon its being given a worthy setting; and, third, and perhaps most important of all, upon the degree of skill and knowledge with which the printed text is interpreted by him who transfigures the words upon the slumbering page into a living experience which he communicates to others. Similarly in worship there are three factors: first, the order of service, whether it be fully printed as a detailed ritual, or be chiefly a matter of customary usage; second, an appropriate setting; and, third, an adequate presentation. I cannot now deal with the question of the setting, which would take us far afield into architecture and its allied arts. Suffice it to say that the building, and all its accessories of use or adornment, whether it be the simplest of meetinghouses or the greatest of cathedrals, ought to be carefully planned as the tabernacle especially adapted to the particular type of worship which is to be held therein.

Turn to the first point, that an order of service should primarily be a form of beauty giving expression to a particularized interpretation of religion. Because it should partake of the character of poetry or music, it is handicapped if it is too explicit or didactic. Like great poetry, it must, indeed, be the utterance of a profound idea; but merely didactic verse, even though we readily accept its precepts, does not stir our hearts. The teaching function of the church has its place in the sermon, but the purpose of the service is to make articulate the sense of wonder, mystery, reverence, awe. Therefore its words should be grave and sonorous, awaking the mood of worship as much by their very sound as by their meaning. Because of the strong power of association, language too close akin to the colloquial speech of the street or the market place fails to convey this sense. I have often had occasion to study the attempts of various "Humanist" ministers to arrange services which shall express their point of view. The trouble with them is not so much their theology as their common lack of beauty and often of good taste. They are too literal-minded to be poetic. They try to inculcate a theory instead of creating a mood. And they ignore the almost magical power of noble words, laden with long associations, to stimulate the imagination.

Every student of liturgics knows that the Roman Mass is a consum-

mate expression of religious art. Granting the theological presuppositions on which it is founded and which have determined its form and content, it is so admirably calculated to produce the intended effect upon the understanding worshiper that one can readily understand why for centuries it has been deemed inspired. It is true that its power is often greatly diminished by inadequacies or faults of presentation, of which I shall speak presently. It is also true that even Roman liturgiologists point out minor defects and displacements in its order, and if we read the ordinary of the Mass, we shall quickly perceive the anticlimactic character of its conclusion. It originally ended, of course, with the words *Ite, missa est.* Then the responsory *Deo gratias* was added; then the prayer, *Placeat tibi;* then the blessing; then the opening passage of the Fourth Gospel; after which the priest disappears into the sacristy. All these are postscripts which have been gradually appended to the service, very much as in some Protestant churches the *Nunc Dimittis* is chanted after the benediction (inappropriately, as I think); but they really detract from its unity, and, if used at all, should have been introduced at an earlier stage. Nevertheless the Mass has the majesty and uplifting power of a great poem, though indeed the only poems to which it can fitly be compared are Dante's *Divine Comedy* and Milton's *Paradise Lost.*

Our Episcopal brethren can claim something of the same quality of beauty and power for the *Book of Common Prayer,* which is, as every one knows, a condensation of the missal and the breviary offices, fortunately translated in a period of great English prose. It has less range and amplitude and perhaps less of uplifting majesty than the parent offices; yet it also is rightly recognized as a great work of art, being deliberately planned to awaken and express the several phases of religious emotion, and cast in prose rhythms which have much of the character of noble music.

The various forms of worship in the free churches, which may in general be called congregational worship, have seldom been consciously considered as an expression of art. We may doubt whether either those who formulated them or many of the men who have used them, thought of themselves as either interpretative or creative artists. Art in its more elementary and less sophisticated forms is not introspective and analytical. But we recognize the genuine, if unconscious art, of simple music, such as folk songs, or of a ballad which narrates its story with what we call artless simplicity. A form of worship reduced to the barest elements may have a similar appeal because the genuine sincerity of its untrained but not inexperienced leader is manifest in its direct spontaneity. Probably we nowadays underestimate the power of a bare and unadorned order to arouse emotion because our lives are set in so rich and complex a civilization that what seemed adequate to our ancestors, and still seems so to

simple people, seems to us thin and meagre. But we shall do well to remember that what has been called "the austerity of congregational worship" often makes its appeal by sheer simplicity and sincerity to persons who instinctively suspect hollowness and artificiality in a service overloaded with distracting details and with an outworn symbolism from which any easily comprehended significance has evaporated. Thus John Calvin's very simple order of service was an expression of the revolt against forms which had lost their meaning for the common people of Geneva, who turned with joy to a type of worship which they could understand and in which they had a share.

It is, therefore, psychologically sound to interpret even the simplest service as a work of art, since it is intended to fulfill a definite emotional function. Beauty does not consist in elaborate and intricate detail but in the perfection with which the several parts are adapted to produce the desired ends. Indeed, simplicity and directness are essential elements in beauty, especially in structural form, and intricate and inappropriate detail becomes an obscuring and distracting feature which not infrequently ends in falsification. So in congregational worship the emotional end of stimulating and expressing the devotional spirit is achievable by the simplest means, providing the end be clearly understood, the means be intelligently ordered, and the minister be aware of his function as an interpretative and creative artist.

The trouble with many congregational forms, especially since "the austerity of congregational worship" has been so largely overlaid by more or less incoherent attempts to "enrich" them, is that very seldom has the service been built on sound psychological lines. The form is unsatisfactory or positively bad because it has left simplicity behind yet fails to conform to any reasoned theory of worship. The desired "enrichment" has been sought by adding various external adornments, odds and ends picked up from older services, without regard to their fitness. They are too often like the gingerbread work with which a later generation sought to decorate the plain but honest dignity of a house inherited from colonial days. The worst and commonest example of such attempts is to be found in the use of anthems rendered for the entertainment of a congregation by a professional quartet. There is only one legitimate use for an anthem, sung by any kind of choir, and that is to occupy a place in the service where there is a transition of thought to be bridged, as between the responsive reading and the scripture, or between two scripture lessons, or a necessary action which causes a pause in the forward movement of the service, as when the collection is taken. And the anthem at these moments ought always to be chosen, as regards both words and music, with a view to maintaining or enhancing the mood of worship. Yet congregational orders of worship

are frequently interlarded with three or even four anthems or "choir numbers," often more operatic than religious as to music, trivial or sentimental as to words, and inserted at most inappropriate points. How, for example, can the minister possibly lead the congregation in prayer directly after the soprano has warbled a trivial and sentimental solo just over his head? That is not the way to create a form of worship which shall be a work of art. That can be done only when certain fundamental principles are laid down and observed. Let me formulate five principles essential to every sound order.

The first principle is that of organic unity. The service must be an integrated whole, to which each element in turn contributes something needful to the total effect desired, and in which there is neither a lack of anything essential, nor the presence of anything superfluous or distracting. In other words, no worshiper ought to feel that something which he instinctively sought was lacking, or that anything which disturbed his mood was intruded upon it.

The second principle is that of movement or progress. Each phase of the service ought to lead naturally and logically to the succeeding one, so that the mind and heart are unobtrusively led onward and upward. The transition from one phase to the next must not be too sudden for the worshiper to follow readily, producing a sense of jarring abruptness. That, for example, is the reason for versicles between the scripture and the prayer. "The Lord be with you"—"And with thy spirit"—"Let us pray." They serve at once as an indication of what is to come and a bridge by which the mood of the worshiper is adjusted to the phase that follows. Equally, of course, there must be no sense of dragging, of wearisome iteration or delay, to cause the feeling that the service is getting nowhere. The criticism of a service, or of a sermon, as unduly long, is more likely to arise from the failure to make obvious progress than from the actual number of minutes which it consumes.

The third principle is that of a customary order, by which I mean that an accepted sequence of events should be habitually followed. Some familiarity with the procedure is essential to the worshiping heart, which does not wish to be perplexed with the question of what is happening, but is carried forward along paths it has traveled before. We are little likely to perceive the beauty or meaning of a wholly unfamiliar service. Let a Protestant attend Mass for the first time, or a free churchman a service in an Episcopal church, and he is at a loss to understand what is going on. Normally the familiar order seems to us the natural order, even if it be in fact inadequate, and nothing is more disconcerting to a congregation than unexpected deviations from an accustomed sequence of events. I do not mean that in congregational worship the order is to be one of iron invari-

ability. For particular occasions it will have to be modified, as in the Episcopal Church the service may be abbreviated by the omission of the litany or in other ways. But such modifications should of themselves be according to custom, so that the congregation may know what alterations to expect.

The fourth principle is that of variety. Though the customary order should be followed Sunday by Sunday, the constituent elements should be varied rather than ceaselessly repeated until they grow stale and trite. The principle is illustrated by the Roman use, which provides some variable elements for the Mass and more for the breviary offices. The *Book of Common Prayer* allows some variation of canticles and provides collects "for the day." And, of course, the rotation of psalms, scripture lessons, and hymns, even though it be a fixed order, provides a further element of variety. But both the Roman and the English rites are open to the criticism that constant repetition of unchanging formularies tends to dull the attention and to become mechanical. In a congregational order it is easy to combine a much greater variety of the elements used—exhortations, invocations, prayers, as well as psalms, scripture lessons, and hymns—with occasional repetition, so that the habitual worshiper will recognize and welcome great words heard before without finding them dull and wearisome. The human mind craves this combination of variety with familiarity, and there is no contradiction here. It is essential to ordered worship that the scripture and the prayer, the responsive reading and the hymns, should all come in their expected places, but it is not essential that the worshiper should know what passage is to be read, what prayer or psalm used, or what hymn sung. The very fact that he does not know gives a kind of expectant freshness to the service. The artistry of the minister will consist in observing the familiar sequence while at the same time providing a constant variety of materials chosen from the great storehouse of devotional literature, or carefully thought out to meet the occasion.

The fifth principle is that the whole service should clearly express a definite religious idea. I do not mean that it should be explicitly theological in content, indeed I would remove theological formulas from it altogether, including creeds, even though the creeds are cast in noble language. And I am fortified in my position by Dr. Dearmer, who, "high Anglican" though he was, urged their omission in his *Art of Public Worship*. He pointed out that a creed was not used in the East, outside of the baptismal office, until the fifth century, nor in the West until the sixth. My objection to the use of creeds is not simply that I do not accept the theological dogmas which the historic creeds were framed to perpetuate with exact precision, but because theological formulas seem to me to be incompatible with the spirit of art, which is undogmatic. But the service,

even if creedal statements be absent, ought nevertheless to express a definite attitude towards life and towards God, so that any intelligent person following the service will obtain a clear impression of what that attitude is. For example, one may attend a Roman Mass on weekdays without hearing the creed said, for it is used only on Sundays and other special occasions, but no one who understands the service can fail to grasp its meaning as an interpretation of the universe in sacramental terms. A Quaker meeting, in which form is reduced to a minimum, though it is not entirely absent, and in which spontaneity of utterance is expected and customary, though it represent the other extreme from the Mass, is as logical an interpretation of a certain theory of worship and of the relationship of God to man. Similarly, in a church of what we call the "liberal" type, for want of a better term, though no word be said defining the theological position of the church, the whole tone and character of the service ought to convey to the intelligent visitor the general religious attitude of which it is an interpretation.

The measure of any service as a form of art will depend upon its adherence to these five canons—unity, movement, accustomed sequence, variety, and idea. However widely services may and must differ in their form and content, and though one may illustrate one or more of these canons better than another, all may be judged and tested by these rules.

I turn now from the proposition that the order of service is to be thought of as a work of art to the inevitable corollary that the priest or minister appointed to conduct the service must think of himself as in some sense an artist. In those branches of the Christian church which have a prescribed ritual and ceremonial the celebrant is in the position of a musician who plays the music set down in a score before him. He is not at liberty to depart from what is written, and any involuntary variations on his part, through inattention or lack of skill, more or less mar the effectiveness of the performance. He is not a creative artist, because he may originate nothing; but he is none the less an interpretative artist, because, even as the musician may render the music set before him either woodenly and mechanically or with deep feeling and understanding, so the celebrant can do much either to cloud and obscure or to bring out and enhance the beauty of the prescribed ritual.

This is obvious to anyone at all familiar with the ritual of the Episcopal Church or of the Roman Catholic Church. We have all heard the services in the *Book of Common Prayer* rendered in a stilted, artificial, hardly intelligible manner, as though they were sacrosanct formularies to be rattled off for their own sake without regard to their beauty or meaning; and again we have heard the same services rendered with full appreciation of their sonorous majesty and uplifting power. The words were the same

in either case; the difference lay in the skill or the failure of the clergyman or the choir as an interpreter.

The same phenomenon may be witnessed in the Roman Church. That church has, indeed, sought to throw every safeguard about the Mass to make certain that the celebrant shall carry out with fitting reverence the function assigned him. Not only the words that he must say but each action and gesture is carefully prescribed—the lifting of the eyes, the crossings, the bowing and genuflections. Nothing is left to chance, or to individual caprice, in order that no slovenliness, inadvertence, or irreverence may mar the service. Indeed, the Roman Church has erred in the direction of artificiality and formalism in its endeavor to ensure reverence and uniformity, until the feeling of sincerity and spontaneity is endangered if not altogether destroyed. Yet two priests, though they say the same words and make similar gestures, will differ widely in the effect produced, because one is animated by what the other lacks, that feeling and spirit which no prescriptive rubric can secure but which is the essence of devotional worship.

When I was in Italy, many years ago, I attended Mass frequently, and generally sought, missal in hand, to get as near the celebrant as I could that I might observe how he followed the ritual. It is the current fashion in the Roman Church for the priest to say the office as rapidly as possible, and the speed with which the words are gabbled is amazing. I recall attending the "Mass of the Presanctified" in the Church of Santissima Trinita in Florence on Good Friday. Three priests chanted, badly, the moving chapter from the Fourth Gospel which narrates the story of the crucifixion, and did it so rapidly that though I had the words before me I was unable to follow them. They must have practised long to get the words out so fast, but the result was deplorable. In fact, the significance of the words was utterly destroyed, and I doubt if any auditor who did not know the passage by heart understood at all what was occurring. But the chapter, well read, would have been deeply moving, at least for those who understood Latin. This practice of extremely rapid utterance is explained and justified by some writers on the Mass, but it conveys an unpleasant impression of haste and irreverence. The same impression is conveyed by the necessarily hurried gestures of the priest. Only once in Italy did I see a priest cross himself, or strike his breast at the *mea culpa* as if the action meant anything or was other than automatic.

It is true that in the Roman Church the congregation is not expected to follow the service verbatim; indeed many of the prayers are said by the priest silently or in a whisper while the choir is singing something else, but I suspect that the real reason for this rapidity of utterance is that the office is too long for modern men. Our lives are adjusted to a much more

rapid tempo than were those of earlier days. We are impatient of a long and leisurely service; we do not listen with enthusiasm or patience to a sermon which takes a full hour by the glass, but have invented that phrase, so typical of our hurry but so little creditable to our intelligence, that "no soul is saved after the first twenty minutes." Probably the same reason explains the speed at which the service of the Prayer Book is often said, though there is less justification than in the case of the Mass, both because it is shorter and because the people *are* expected to follow understandingly what is said. No service ought to go too fast for clear-cut enunciation and easy comprehension of the words uttered. If the service is too long for modern use, it is far better to abbreviate it somewhat, and to render with dignity and reverence what remains. So far as congregational forms are concerned, since modern usage requires that the ordinary Sunday worship be not more than an hour to an hour and ten minutes in length, the precautions to be observed are the elimination of unnecessary elements, like extra "musical numbers" by the choir, the prompt movement of the service along its successive steps, and the avoidance of undue prolongation of any one feature of the service, such as the free prayer or the scripture lessons.

The Roman use is no more impeccable in its ceremonial than in its use of the ritual. Its ceremonial is, of course, elaborate to the last degree—witness Adrian Fortescue's *Book of Ceremonial,* beside which any stage manager's catalogue of properties and manual of stage directions pales into triviality. But much of that ceremonial borders on the ridiculous or the grotesque, as in the way in which a bishop's stockings are put on, or his mitre repeatedly donned and doffed during High Mass. And in other ways there may be unseemliness. I recall the taking of a collection during Mass in the Cathedral of Notre Dame at Paris. It proceeded rather noisily right through the canon of the Mass and the consecration of the elements, pausing only for a moment at the elevation of the Host. It was taken by clerics in minor orders, holding wooden boxes which they shook up and down with each step forward, preceded by a beadle in uniform, hat on head and staff in hand, who in sibilant whispers adjured "messieurs et mesdames" to contribute, intermittently humming an audible accompaniment to the choir. The whole proceeding was admirably adapted to distract one's attention from the worship of God to consideration of one's pocketbook.

In the free churches, which have no printed ritual to be followed, though they all have a more or less generally accepted order of service in the sense of a customary sequence of events, and in which ceremonial in the sense of a formulated and prescribed series of actions is largely lacking, the minister is not only an interpretative artist, but he may and should be a creative artist as well. He is called upon, that is, to create, Sunday by Sunday, a form of beauty which, though it be composed of the simplest

elements, shall give expression to the mood of worship in which the congregation gathers, but which is inarticulate and inchoate until his skill shall evoke and clothe it in living speech.

This is a far more difficult accomplishment, and it is deplorable that the theological schools of these churches have generally paid so little heed to training men for the performance of this function. In the Roman Church the candidate for the priesthood is trained for two years in the celebration of the Mass. He must learn by heart every word and action of the ordinary, and when he is letter-perfect he must say his "dry Mass" repeatedly under the critical eye of an instructor to make certain that he knows precisely what is to be said and done. Instruction in the conduct of worship is much more limited in the seminaries of the Episcopal Church, but the student is trained in the use of the Prayer Book, if not always in the right use of his voice or in the art of reading aloud. But in other Protestant seminaries it seems generally to be assumed that anybody can conduct a service of worship without much instruction. For example, when I was a student at the Harvard Divinity School, we had invaluable instruction and criticism in preaching, and a small amount of instruction as to the usual forms of congregational worship, and what to do at christenings, weddings, and funerals, but there was practically no training at all in the actual conduct of worship. We were left to the coaching of a teacher of elocution, or to our own devices, as to how to stand, to use our voice, to develop the order of worship. Yet where the minister is called upon to be a creative artist, it is essential that he should understand the nature of worship; how to arrange the available elements which go to make up a service; where to find and how to use the most suitable materials. This situation goes far to justify the criticism by Professor William Adams Brown years ago:

> The besetting sin [of the conduct of worship in our non-liturgical churches] is slovenliness. Unrestrained by any prescription from without, the minister follows the mood of the moment, with the result that great reaches of the Christian experience are passed over without expression, and heights to which the spirit might climb are never attained. And with this arbitrariness there goes a certain carelessness and lack of dignity. One gets the impression that worship is an easy thing, for which no special preparation is needed, that a prayer can be thrown off in one's odd moments, as one might write a note to a friend. The sense of standing in an august presence, the mood of reverence which befits one who is confronted by the ultimate mystery is not characteristic of the worship of our non-liturgical churches.[2]

I am well aware that no instruction can create in the student the essential devotional attitude. We may all sympathize with Theodore Parker in the story told of his student days at the Divinity School. At that time the student not only preached but prayed under criticism, and Parker is alleged to have begun a prayer before his instructor with the

[2] W. A. Brown, address on "Worship" at Auburn, N. Y., Feb. 10, 1917.

words, "O Lord, we pray thee to bless these miserable spiritual gymnastics!" Nevertheless, most young men could profit much by having their idiosyncrasies and inadequacies pointed out to them privately, and by being shown how to avoid unfortunate mannerisms and infelicities which detract from the dignity of the high office which they seek to fill. It is no handicap to the inspiration of the musician that he has to learn finger exercises; or of the painter that he should be taught how to hold his pencil or brush and lay on his paints. The actor upon the stage learns how to make his voice carry to his hearers, what to do in pauses, how to avoid the accidents due to clumsiness which may give rise to mirth at unintended moments.

The occurrence of anything bizarre or incongruous or ludicrous may be well-nigh disastrous to a performance intended to be solemn and elevating. I well recall such an episode at the performance of the *Agamemnon* in the Harvard Stadium years ago. At the opening of the play two actors came forward to offer incense upon what was supposed to be a marble altar, but what was in fact merely painted cloth stretched on a wooden frame. One of the actors trod inadvertently upon the cloth instead of upon the firm step, falling through it to his knees, and with difficulty extricating himself. It was several minutes before the audience regained the frame of mind which the great tragedy was intended to evoke. Another illustration of the necessity of paying attention to details is found in the story of how Johannes Brahms nearly ruined the first performance of his noble concerto in D major. It is recorded that "Brahms conducted in a state of evident excitement. A comical incident came near being disastrous. Brahms stepped on the stage in gray street trousers, for on account of a visit he had been hindered in making a complete change of dress. Furthermore, he forgot to fasten again the unbuttoned suspenders, so that in consequence of his lively directing, his shirt showed between his trousers and waistcoat. These laughter-provoking trifles were not calculated for elevation of spirit."[3] Such incidents are even more disastrous in church, where anything of the incongruous or the absurd even more quickly distracts the attention of the worshiper and dissipates the atmosphere of devotion.

Sound technique can never, it is true, make good a deficiency of ability, but it does enable a man to express more freely and adequately such latent talent as he may possess. Nor is training in technique an infringement upon the liberty or the sincerity of the artist unless it go so far as to prescribe for him exactly what he must or must not do, and thus reduces him to a mere stereotype. That is, indeed, precisely what the Roman method of training the priest tends to do. But in our zeal to get

[3] Quoted from Boston Symphony Program, Sanders Theatre, December, 1927.

away from artificiality and the taint of insincerity, from the feeling that the minister is merely acting a part in which he is carefully trained rather than expressing a natural emotion which he genuinely feels, it is not necessary to go to the other extreme and confuse mere clumsiness or ignorance with sincerity. The true mean is to show the student how to carry through with dignity but in the most direct and natural manner the action which the situation requires. A living art neither produces rubber stamps nor leaves the novice to discover if he can the principles of sound workmanship. Instead it points out to him the traps into which he is liable to fall and the simplest ways to attain the end which he seeks, and then gives him the freedom to develop his own methods.

My criticisms may seem to have been directed chiefly against the congregational forms of worship. That is because they generally are less consciously and less perfectly devised forms of art than the Roman and the English rites, or than the Divine Liturgy of the Eastern Church which, when well chanted or sung, surpasses both of these as a pure work of art producing a profound emotional appeal. But my thesis applies to all alike, namely, first, that any service of worship is primarily the presentation of religion as an appeal to the emotions, the outward expression of an inner feeling otherwise inarticulate and inchoate; and, second, that in the conduct of a service of worship the priest or minister is himself an artist, interpretative or creative, or both. And he finds his joy in his office in proportion to his ability, through a noble service rendered with beauty and dignity, to lead his people to lift up their hearts with their hands to the God and Father of us all.

THE DELUSION OF ADVAITIST VEDANTISM

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At the present time there appear to me to be more confusions of thought than in any period of my forty years of adult life since I was a student in Cambridge. Industry and commerce in the United States, and even more so in other countries of the world, are, at least relatively, in a state of chaos, not merely as a result of the war but also because of the diversities and the lack of clear thinking in economics. Governments in many countries, including the United States, are floundering around in their dealing with different groups of their subjects, loyalist and guerilla, white and colored, labor and capital, Jew and Arab, communist and individualist. This is not merely because of group prejudices but also because of the conflicting conceptions of the meaning of "democracy." Communism is represented and misrepresented in all sorts of contradictory ways, from meaning a social organization for the unified welfare of all, to the dictatorship of the proletariat (or worse of a Communist party caucus), or the overthrowing of government by force. In philosophy not a few have concentrated their attention on the techniques of symbolic logic and now appear frustrated in their leading to so little of real significance. Others, with some ideas of the mathematical and the physical and only the vaguest notions, if any, of the biological, propound forms of naturalism with a generally unadmitted background of agnosticism and an amazing instability in their use of the term "nature." Some futilely strive for intellectual satisfaction in the inadequacy of phenomenalism; others struggle with the unintelligibilities of existentialism. Some, carrying on something from pragmatism and instrumentalism, present as in a Sunday-school class an aimiable humanism; while others turn resolutely again to the metaphysics of mediæval scholasticism. Readers of the Crozer Quarterly know as well as I of the confusions of thought concerning religion and religions in general and of Christianity in particular. Most of these divergences of modern thought are allied with institutional and practical interests and feelings. The amount of calm reflection in efforts to obtain rational solutions of problems appears to be at an all-time low.

And now we are offered Advaita Vedantism to emancipate us from these conflicts, or (as some might say) to raise us above them, to make us aware of universal unity. It is, indeed, ironical that this should be advocated in America when it has proved itself so ineffective through the centuries of internecine conflicts, injustices, and multifarious evils of past history in India, virtually all of which are distressingly manifest there

today. The character of the literature in which Advaita Vedantism is being presented in America is well illustrated in the widely advertised volume: *Hindu Psychology: Its Meaning for the West.*[1] Before discussing the delusion of Advaitism, the methods of the propaganda may be considered with some reference to this book.

In order to suggest that something different is being offered, or to use a common phrase "something new is being added," what purports to be a description of Western psychology is given. But this is not the agelong psychology held by the "common sense" of ordinary people, or as taught in historic Christianity. No adequate attention is paid to the fact that there has been and still is in the West a psychology in accord with and involved in religion and the spiritual life of the West. But when the Advaitist talks of Hindu psychology he definitely means an analogous psychology of the religious and spiritual life of India. Though he maintains this significance for Hindu psychology, he ignores what corresponds with it in the Occident. He takes as Western psychology the altogether inadequate efforts to obtain a modern science of psychology. It is thus that Swami Akhilananda dwells on the views of Freud and Watson, Köhler and McDougall and even J. B. Rhine. Though some reservations must be made with regard to the last two of these, the impression given of Western psychology is one to fit in with a general characterization of occidental life as though predominantly materialistic in contrast with the spirituality of India—the source of Hindu psychology. From my many years' experience in India, I would say that it is just as much a half-truth to describe the people of India as spiritual as the people of America as materialistic.

Having given an entirely inadequate and distorted view of Western psychology, these half-truths and half-falsehoods of life in America and in India, the next method of the Advaita propogandist is to try to produce an atmosphere of ethical goodness and piety. This he does by utterances almost any or all of which might be appropriately used by any religious preacher, Christian pastor, Jewish rabbi, Moslem moulvi, Hindu guru, or Buddhist monk. Swami Akhilananda's book abounds in such expressions of sentiments which have no more specific relation to Advaitism than they have to any other *ism* of religion. In this atmosphere readers and listeners are expected to be in that spiritually congenial state of mind to acquiesce in the Advaitist dogmas then introduced. To allay or forestall criticisms which may arise in intellectual reflection, it is contended that it is of the essence of Hindu psychology that the knowledge implied is not obtained by the logical intellect and cannot rightly be tested by it. The fundamental dogma is said to be justified by a kind of intuitive awareness

[1] *Hindu Psychology: Its Meaning for the West*, by Swami Akhilananda, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xviii, 241. This book contains very little indeed on Hindu psychology. It is the poorest book on the subject that I know, and is of slight, if any, scholarly value.

which comes in a condition of which Hindu psychology is supposed to take note though it is declared indescribable in any known terms. Yet though indescribable, in this condition—a "fourth" state beyond and distinguished from the three states of waking consciousness, dreaming, and dreamless sleep—one is asserted to experience (I know no other word for this, though this may be considered unsuitable) the unity, the self-identity of Reality. "Tat svam asi" is the blessed phrase: "that art thou"—you are the Absolute, the Ultimate One. But so is everybody else. Thus we are all one. Accepting this, even if we are not in the fourth state, I suppose we are to feel a warm glow, some taste of infinite bliss. This is then lauded in platitudes which may sound "sweet" even to a word- and world-weary novelist like Aldous Huxley.

In spite of the fact that the Advaitist tries to put his position, as it were, beyond intellectual criticism (by his assertion that it rests on a kind of "super-conscious" awareness), he expresses it in concepts, and it is so far open to criticism. Actually he is presenting us with a type of philosophy, which rightly or wrongly he declares to be justified "extraphilosophically." Yet, from the standpoint of philosophical reflection, the concept of the ultimate Reality as One gives us no kind of principle or principles of unification of the many particulars of empirical experience. There is, as it has been said, "an ugly broad ditch" between the One Reality and the many appearances (or whatever else they may be called). The fundamental concept of Advaitism is of no intellectual usefulness for overcoming the confusions of modern thought.

That Advaitism has so far failed to bring practical unity in India is painfully obvious. That does not necessarily prove that it is "untrue." It does, however, suggest that attention should be given to some of the implications of the details of its Indian exposition. Thus, somehow or other, "death and destruction" are involved in its "pure bliss," just as "creation" and "conservation." The amiable harmony which propagandists of Advaitism in this country suggest does not correspond with all the symbols of the religion in India associated with Advaitism. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* is often regarded as an exposition of Advaitism. Yet in it, the warrior doubting about warfare is counseled: "Therefore fight." The statement that there is neither slayer nor slain does not indicate harmony in empirical conditions. In the *Gītā* there is no implication that Advaitism leads to an overcoming of actual empirical conflicts. If somehow they now "are" and "are not," there seems no reason why they should not "be" and "be not" eternally with the timeless or time inclusive One Reality.[2] Advaitism has been held with a continuance of caste distinctions and with no evident good effects in opposition to the ideas about and the treatment of "untouchables."

[2] I hope no one writes to ask me what this sentence really means. I do not know. It just seems the kind of way in which the Advaitist refers to the world of empirical life.

Finally, and the criticism is crucial, though in his series of lives he may have fulfilled his duties (for example, as a householder), to reach redemption the Advaitist abstains from the ordinary affairs of practical life to embark upon yogic disciplines and contemplation. This is not to strive for harmony in the world but rather to try to escape from it. Thus Advaitism is useless in relation with the confusions of modern thought as affecting practice.

I am sure that among its exponents, as among some who are being impressed by them, Advaitism seems to give moral inspiration. Yet the feeling of harmonious coöperation is not only possible but actual among persons who reject the supreme megalomania of the Advaitist's claim to be the Absolute. It has been and is being constantly aroused by Christian preachers. But morality is not simply an affair of feeling: it involves thought. The fundamental idea of Advaitism may be conceived in such fashion as to lead logically to conduct the opposite of which the Advaitists wish to suggest. Suppose one said to another: "You and I are one. You are ultimately the same reality as I am. Here is some luscious food: I am going to eat it all, and you get none. If this eating ultimately means anything, it can make no difference who eats it, for its meaning (if any) is for the ultimate reality—and that is the same in me as in you." To any objection that this is just ridicule, it must be replied that the argument is logical, and that it is indeed ridiculous to hold a position open to such ridicule. But, unfortunately, it is worse than that. It may with good reason be maintained, and I believe the whole history of Hinduism in India confirms the contention, that Advaitism more than any religion has been and is open to the charge of being "an opiate of the people." For centuries with this teaching the hierarchy of castes has been maintained in India and the mass of people exploited. It is known by few that Buddhism was ousted, and the influence of Jainism greatly reduced, in large measure through the political support given to leaders of Advaitism. The institution of caste had no place in Buddhism or Jainism. They might eventually have undermined the system had not the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas championed Advaitism. Some of the wealthy in the West may support Advaitist propaganda (as some people think they do the so-called "Moral Rearmament Movement") to counteract movements for social reorganization.

It is a delusion to think that Advaitism has anything specific to offer for the overcoming of our present confusions in thought and action. Further, a careful consideration of it with reference to the conditions in India has led me to feel and to say (as I have never done before) that India needs the influence of an enlightened Christianity. Now that with the departure of the British, Christianity need not be thought of in association with a dominant political power, the peoples of India may be induced to give it a less prejudiced consideration.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

NEARLY THIRTY YEARS ago, in a theological seminary the president was lecturing to the junior class in a course styled "propædeutics" in the catalogue, by the students "proper duties." This morning, in warning against the peril of an overliteralness, Dr. Horr mentioned a conversation he had had some time before. A man had insisted to him that he believed every word in Holy Writ to be literally true and exact and that if he should ever discover the slightest error therein his whole Christian faith would collapse. Said he, "For example, Jesus said that the mustard seed was the smallest of all seeds; were I to find a smaller seed, my faith would be destroyed." To this, Dr. Horr remarked to us, he had replied, "Sir, you have found such a seed; it is your own soul." I do not know what effect that anecdote had upon my classmates. I have never forgotten it, and again and again it comes before my eyes as all too little I learned in the seminary does. At any rate, through the years I have become increasingly convinced of the folly of basing my religious structure—or to use the less pretentious term "faith"—on any historical incident which subsequent information may prove unfounded.

To me this does not mean that the story of the past is either unimportant or uninteresting—at times it seems to me that I am more interested in the first century than in the present one—but it does mean that I cannot conceive of any incident such that if I should discover evidence which seemed to me to warrant the conclusion that it had never happened in fact thereby I should "lose my faith" or feel my religion tottering. Thus I find it hard to appreciate the point of view of the man who "bases his faith" on the reality of the virgin birth, the physical resurrection of Jesus, or any other incident or series of incidents, however precious or significant they may be.

Some years ago there was a distinct stir when certain scholars argued that the whole gospel story was a myth; that actually no such individual as Jesus of Nazareth had ever lived. To many, not only were such contentions blasphemous to the nth degree but, if true, would mean the overthrow of Christianity. To me such a conclusion is utterly unwarranted. Though, as a student of history, I do not feel the contention of those earlier scholars justified—to me the evidence points in a quite different direction—yet were I to be convinced on grounds which I could not fail to accept that Jesus of Nazareth had never lived, that the stories about him were the products of later invention, my faith and religion would not be in the least impaired; nor do I believe that either my convictions or my conduct would be in the least degree changed. I am sure that I should feel a sense of regret and loss, but that thereby the elements of life which I prize as gold would turn into lead I am convinced would not be the case.

Many years ago a student of mine expressed indignant pain at the notion that the Great Commission might have been not the literal word of the historic Jesus but the fruit of the convictions of his early followers, due to their growing confidence in the success of the gentile mission and their certainty that nothing less than the whole world was the proper field for their activity as they trod in their Master's footsteps. Said he, "If I did not believe that these words were spoken audibly from the mountaintop by Jesus to the Twelve, I should instantly lose my interest in foreign mis-

sions and cease my support." To me such an attitude is abhorrent and akin to that so scathingly rebuked by my old preceptor, Dr. Horr.

In the last analysis, does it not in large measure depend on what is meant by the much abused word "faith"? Is faith a blind belief that things happened, a stubborn refusal to examine and regard evidence, or is it a quality of life which scorns consequences?

To me it must always be the latter. And the more I study those ever-fascinating pages of the Christian past, the more convinced I am that in the change from the one to the other is to be found the source of much of what has proved through the years the real Christian tragedy. For Paul faith was life, a new quality of life, rich and free and compelling; it was the new life he was living in Christ; the life Christ was living in him; perhaps better said, the new life that was being lived by the newborn Christ-man. A far step this from what it was destined soon to become: the intellectual assent to notions which must be accepted and defended and which could lead to that most dangerous and stifling of slogans, "Contend earnestly for the faith once for all delivered unto the saints."

The charge that this is an age in which faith is conspicuous for its absence leaves me cold because it seems so evident that in this charge "faith" has lost its earlier quality of life which scorns consequences, be they suspicion or ostracism, cross or dungeon, to become the smug acceptance of things as they are, because they are.

To this it may be countered: Did not even Paul, for whom faith may well have been in essence life not creed, once write, when rebuking the gentile apathy to his insistence that the Christian hope was centred in the resurrection of Jesus, the first fruits of those who sleep: "If in this life we who are in Christ have only hope, we are of all men most to be pitied"? Yes, he did, and I confess that every time I read that famous fifteenth chapter of I Corinthians I find this verse a veritable derailingswitch. I think I am not blind to what he meant or unmoved at the pathos of his argument. Nonetheless, to me that concluding clause strikes a false note and one I believe unworthy of Paul save as a bit of what might be styled "pulpit overemphasis." Could he have been convinced on grounds which he would have had to accept that the resurrection, as he believed in it, was not a fact, would he thereby have asserted that the kind of life which he had lived for years as a self-sacrificing apostle of God had been more than in vain? Would he thereupon have swung about and started on a life of debauchery and crime against which he had so implacably contended? I do not believe it. If he could, he would have been far less than what I count him to be. That he would have felt a devastating and poignant loss it would be folly to deny; that his quality of life and ideals would have been changed; that his standards of values would have collapsed—this I do not believe. Black would still have been black, white still white.

Thus again we end at the place from which we started. Foundations are all-important. Happy the man whose religious foundations are of a sort which nothing can shake, who can examine all the evidence with steady confidence since he knows that whatever verdict he may have to render about "facts" his faith lies secure in a realm untouched by the verdict of history; who can thus assent with no mental reservations to that wisest of sayings of the good bishop of the yesteryears: "Since things are what they are, and results will be what they will be, why should we seek to be deceived?"

From Off the Campus and On

At the dawn of another year the Crozer Quarterly is happy to greet its many readers and friends. Your many generous expressions of appreciation and satisfaction are heartening. It would be too much to expect that every reader would find every article and review of equal value. We have tried to see to it, however, that every reader will find something of value in every issue. Perhaps we should include a department in which letters to the editor might find their place. Being naturally modest, we have hesitated to do this fearing we might be charged with deaconing the barrel. Do continue to write in. If you particularly like something, tell us. Authors and editors are human enough to prefer taffy to epitaphy. If you have criticisms, let us have them. It will do you good to get them out of your system, and we can take it. Be assured that this year you will receive each quarter, as early as the Post Office Department sees fit to deliver it, a journal which we believe you will find of continued interest. A happy New Year to you one and all.

All of our authors this issue are old friends to our readers. Dr. Aubrey, the president of Crozer Theological Seminary, has had several articles and reviews in these pages. He is one of those increasingly rare combinations: a competent executive and a brilliant and original scholar. His name on the title page of a book or in the by-line of an article is an insistent bid to its prompt reading.

Professor Diller (A.B., Williams; A.M., Columbia; Ph.D., Harvard) will be remembered by our readers as the writer of a penetrating review in July, 1946. This is the first article of his we have had the pleasure of printing. He is an associate professor of religion and philosophy at Mills College and dean of the chapel. Previous to going to Mills in 1937 he was on the faculty of Lincoln Memorial University for three years and counselor for the Episcopal Church at Leland Stanford for a similar period. He is the author of several books, the most recent of which is *Christmas in Ephesus*. He is also secretary of the Commission on Church Unity in the (Episcopal) Diocese of California.

Dr. Howard Wayne Smith will be remembered by all our readers as the author of a pungent and provocative article, "Christian Leadership Today and Tomorrow" (October, 1946). To all Baptists, even to those shortsighted enough not to be regular subscribers of the Crozer Quarterly, his is a well-known name. It would be hard to find one better qualified to discuss the theme of his current essay. For twenty-five years he was the honored minister of the First Baptist Church of Ardmore, Pennsylvania, of which he is now minister *emeritus*. He is an alumnus and trustee of Crozer Theological Seminary and holds a doctorate of divinity from Temple University.

In the July, 1947, issue we published an essay, "The Nature of Worship," by Dr. Foote and promised that its sequel would be speedily forthcoming. Today is this promise fulfilled before your eyes. Since Dr. Foote was introduced in this recent issue, it seems unnecessary to do more than to say that he is a retired Unitarian minister, now residing in Cambridge, Massachusetts, after many years of distinguished service as a parish

minister in New Orleans, Ann Arbor, and Belmont, and as a member of the faculty of the Harvard Divinity School. Students of hymnody will know him as an authority upon this branch of church music. It is a rare privilege to publish in the same issue an article and a review from his gifted pen.

Professor Widgery, the distinguished philosopher of Duke University, is no stranger to these pages. Several provocative essays and frequent pungent reviews from him have been our good pleasure to publish. He heartily dislikes bunk and unwarranted pretension, as all members of the American Theological Society will gladly attest, and not only knows what he likes (and dislikes) but why in each case such is the circumstance. We hope that we shall be able to coax many more articles from this stimulating thinker.

Again we can give our readers a solid block of forthright reviews. We never print unsolicited reviews. All the books reviewed are submitted by the publishers for that purpose; our reviewers are chosen because of their competence in their several fields and are then given a completely free hand both as to tone and length of their reviews. We are proud of our growing reputation as a journal where frank, untrammeled, honest, and reasonably prompt reviews may be expected. To the twenty-seven reviewers of some thirty-two books we again express our own (and we are sure also our readers') hearty thanks. Drs. Aubrey and Foote have been already introduced. Mr. Batten is dean of Crozer Theological Seminary. Mr. Boisen is chaplain of the Elgin (Illinois) State Hospital. Professor Bond has the chair of religion at Bucknell. Dr. Brightman is professor of philosophy at Boston University. Professor Cadbury holds the Hollis chair at Harvard, and is one of America's most eminent New Testament scholars. Professor Case, for many years a professor and dean at Chicago, has been professor of religion and dean of the School of Religion at Lakeland, Florida, since his retirement from Chicago. Dr. Cassady joined the Crozer faculty last June as professor of practical theology. It is a pleasure to welcome him to our pages. Professor Cranston has the chair of religion at Dartmouth. Dr. Davis is professor of Christian theology at Crozer. Miss Eggleston is executive secretary of the Philadelphia Conference Board of Education of the Methodist Church. Professor Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer and editor of the CROZER QUARTERLY. Dr. Fogg is vice-provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Harkness is professor of church history at Crozer. Professor Hudson is professor of American church history and administrative associate at Colgate-Rochester. Mr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church of Richmond, Virginia. Professor Keighton holds the chair of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Muelder is dean of the Boston University School of Theology. Professor Otto is professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin. Dr. Pfeiffer is head of the department of Old Testament at Harvard. Professor Pritchard occupies a similar position at Crozer. Dr. Purdy is professor of New Testament at Hartford. Dr. Shryock is dean of the Convocation of North Philadelphia and a former member of the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. White is a psychologist in the Veterans Administration at the Guidance Centre in Swarthmore of Pennsylvania State College. Dr. Willoughby is professor of New Testament at Chicago and an authority on Christian art and iconography. Dr. Wright is professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Religious Pilgrimage of Israel, by I. G. Matthews, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xii, 304, $4.

Shortly before the appearance of this book I had occasion to read the author's first scientific publication, his doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago in 1914, entitled: *The Jewish Apologetic to the Grecian World in the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphical Literature.* A comparison between these two works, written thirty-three years apart, is interesting. The dissertation, which I discovered accidentally in a library, never having seen a reference to it in print, does not deserve the oblivion into which it seems to have fallen; Matthews himself has failed to cite it in his book. Although the dissertation lacks the maturity of the new book, it is still valuable and discloses some of the fine qualities—in their germinal stage—which characterize the later scholarly work of Professor Matthews: a careful study of the original sources, familiarity with the bibliography on the subject, real understanding of the history and psychology of religions, and a good literary style.

No readers interested in the subject, whether experts or novices, will be disappointed with *The Religious Pilgrimage of Israel;* nay, most of them, like this reviewer, will probably be enthusiastic and consider it the best history of the religion of Israel available. Until now this reviewer has regarded the book-length article of E. Kautzsch (Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible,* extra volume; in book form in German) as the best treatment in English, and R. Smend's and B. Stade–A. Bertholet's works as the best in German. Henceforth he will refer his students to Matthews' volume with the assurance that they will find it readable, reliable, informing, and as sound as a hickory nut.

But it is the function of a book critic to criticize, or at least to examine the volume in some detail. The general arrangement is logical and clear. After an introductory chapter on religion in general and the religion of Israel in particular, come four chapters dealing with the ingredients of the religion of David and Solomon (chap. VI): the religions of the seminomads, of Moses, of the Canaanites, and of the Hebrew invaders of Canaan. The national religion of the united monarchy was attacked first by reactionaries (chap. VII) and then by the reforming prophets (called, rather ambiguously, "laymen"; chap. VIII). The religion of Deuteronomy (621 B.C.) represents the coöperation and compromise of the Anti-Assyrians, the priests, and the prophets of Jerusalem, united by Assyrian oppression and its sudden end. The various types of later religion are described in the six following chapters as the religions of individualism (Jeremiah and Ezekiel), of the intellectuals (Job and the Second Isaiah), of the state-church (Holiness Code and Priestly Code), the religion of mankind (Ruth, Jonah, Third Isaiah, etc.), the religion of supernaturalism (Messianic and apocalyptic hopes), and finally Judaism (from 400 B.C. to A.D. 135).

This reconstruction of the religious development of Israel during a millennium and a half, though based on a critical investigation of the sources (chiefly the Hebrew Bible) and on pertinent modern research, will not be adopted in every detail by other scholars. For the historical evidence is fragmentary and ambiguous, and apparently biblical scholars (as their colleagues in other fields) are extremely reluctant to accept a colleague's conclusions if at variance with their own published views. Every scholar who has published an article on a minute subject is convinced

that he has said the last word on the matter, and is apt to resent subsequent deviations from his findings. In a comprehensive work of this kind, a thousand scholars will inevitably find ten thousand points of friction, which they will loudly point out as unfortunate errors of the misguided author!

The present reviewer must confess that he is (alas!) no exception, and that on a number of details he hold different views from Professor Matthews. Of course, since most of these matters will always be *sub judice* owing to the lack of decisive evidence, no umpire can decide who is right. The reviewer merely lists here some questions which may deserve further study.

Matthews regards blood revenge and the *herem* or ban (p. 16) as patriotic expression of the hatred for the stranger, which eventually were "approved . . . as divine." This reviewer, conversely, regards them as sacrifices to the deity which eventually may, or may not, have become patriotic gestures. How the *herem* (ban) could "gradually" give "way to the captivity of princes, slavery of males, and concubinage of women" (p. 18) is incomprehensible to this reviewer. *Delenda Carthago* has never been a matter of arbitration or of amelioration. Slavery can hardly have been derived from the *herem.*

In other instances as well Professor Matthews states categorically opinions which this reviewer not merely questions but wholeheartedly rejects—an attitude which may convince many that Matthews is right! He discovers "relics of phallic worship" in Gen. 24:2, 9; Exod. 20:26 (p. 34); he cites "the numerous animal names of tribes" [which ones? Simeon and Levi?] and "the prevalent bull and snake worship" [prevalent or sporadic?] as evidences of totemism (p. 34); he finds all nature mourning for Tammuz in Amos 8:10; Jer. 22:18; Zech. 12:10 (p. 77); he believes that the Nazarites thought of Jehovah as "a desert God, or as an isolationist" (p. 113), which is more correct of the Rechabites (Jer. 35) than of votaries like Samson, who let their hair grow (Numb. 6) and presumably included even St. Paul in their number (Acts 18:18; *cf.* Strack and Billerbeck *ad loc.*).

With the evil intent of a critic at his worst, this reviewer has diligently searched for actual errors, but he must admit (with redness of face) that he caught only a few minnows while fishing for whales. Although unable to report any real errors of fact. the reviewer would like to make a few suggestions for future editions of this excellent book. When the standard Masoretic Hebrew text is changed, the reader should be informed: in Exod. 15:21 the text reads, "the horse and his rider" he flung into the sea, not (as Matthews renders p. 66, n. 70) "horse and chariot"; Matthews may be right, but he should not keep the reader in the dark about his reasons for changing the text. All those who know some Hebrew would like Matthews to explain why "Yahweh Sebaoth" means "Yahweh commands the armies of Israel" (p. 83, n. 9). Most readers would like to have *all* abbreviations explained in a table in alphabetical order, for they will waste much time in identifying the following, scattered through eight pages of bibliographical titles: GVI, HGHL, SBOT (not, as usually, "Sacred Books of the Old Testament," but D. Jacobson, *The Social Background of the Old Testament*), BAR, HJP, NSI, CMR, LOT. Incidentally, Ursus Major (p. 75) should be Ursa Major. Some readers will be puzzled in hearing that on the one hand "the Arabian desert was the . . . home of the basic group of the ancestors of the pre-Mosaic Hebrews" (p. 7), while on the other "The Amorites . . . to whom the Abraham clan belonged, had drifted down from the northern mountains . . ." (p. 71); moreover, some biblical passages (Deut. 26:5; Gen. 24:10) regard the Arameans as the ancestors of Israel. Of course the problem is obscure and complicated, but it is precisely in such difficult matters that the reader needs the help of the expert.

The reviewer must resist the temptation of discussing numerous other matters of detail about which he cannot agree with the author (such as what is said of the Sinai confederacy on pp. 57-58, of Jeroboam's religious policy on p. 110, and about Micaiah ben Imlah on p. 114), but he will make a few general remarks. Professor Matthews generally accepts the basic results of modern biblical literary criticism—a *sine qua non* for a history of the religion of Israel. It is therefore surprising to be told that Moses was a Levite (p. 51, particularly notes 32 and 33), and to see the following passages used as genuine historical accounts of actual events: Judg. 6:25-27 (p. 88); II Sam. 7:14 and Psalm 2:7 (p. 99) prove the deification of the ancient kings of Israel (*cf.* II Sam. 7:4-9 on p. 100); Gen. 14:8 (p. 101); II Chron. 17:6-9 "may be based on fact" (p. 115, n. 6); etc.

A word should be said about the obvious lack of balance in the book: out of fifteen chapters, the author devotes nine to the pre-exilic period, while Judaism after 586 B.C. (to which six chapters are devoted) was the environment in which Christianity was born, and thus became one of the sources of modern culture. The reviewer, like Professor Matthews, loves fine literature and cannot help preferring the ancient classics (II Samuel) to pious elaborations thereof (Chronicles). Nevertheless the Psalter, though late, deserves greater attention as the classic of personal religion, and Job (whatever its date) is not to be dismissed with a few pages (pp. 171-174); and are two pages (260-261) adequate for that basic institution, the synagogue?

Most readers (but not this reviewer) will like the slightly veiled apologetic tendency of the book. According to the best tradition (but not necessarily according to our best historical information) Israel is presented as far superior to the Canaanites in ethical and religious standards—even "Honor thy father and thy mother" (a universal rule) is presented as "a watchword in Hebrew religion" (p. 91); *cf.* pp. 85-86; "In reality Israel had conquered in religion no less than in war . . ." (p. 89). In other words, Israel as God's people, was always superior to the pagans.

But we must close. Of course any other scholar would have written the history of Israel's religion differently, but to my knowledge no other scholar has written it better.

ROBERT H. PFEIFFER

Miracles: A Preliminary Study, by C. S. Lewis, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 220, $2.50.

This latest book by C. S. Lewis belongs to a growing literature called forth by the present moral and religious situation. It is a literature devoted to the double task of putting science in its place and of regaining prestige for Christian orthodoxy. Judging by the writings one happens upon, those engaged in this undertaking are becoming increasingly self-confident, outspoken, and aggressive. They are no longer manœuvring a retreat, which seemed to be their preoccupation a few years ago, but are directing a bold advance.

Among the books in this category, Dr. Lewis's *Miracles* is likely to attract a good deal of attention. It is lucid and fresh in style, enlivened by an abundance of colorful metaphors, its approach to problems is novel, its solutions ingenious, and it moves on a deeper level of thought than is customary with discussions intended for general reading.

The thing which most people want from a book of this kind is support for the theological underpinnings of their religion. This support the author hands them as it were on a silver platter. Such readers—and there will doubtless be many of them—

may safely be expected to close the book, however much or little they have read of it, pretty thoroughly satisfied with the author's ostensible demonstration that fundamentally Christian orthodoxy has not been touched, and never can be touched, either by biblical or historical criticism or by the spread of scientific knowledge. And they get a premium for accepting the gift, although this comes to them by the way. They need not feel disturbed in pursuing their customary manner of life. The world around them may indeed be full of alarms, agitated to its depths, greatly troubled by constant threats of disaster; yet responsive readers of Dr. Lewis's message can go right on in quest of their usual ends by their usual means.

Any reader who desires to follow up the subject on his own account, is advised by Dr. Lewis to "begin with the New Testament and not with the books about it." Good advice, except for the warning which is added: "And when you turn from the New Testament to modern scholars, remember that you go as sheep among wolves." If this is not a direct encouragement of obscurantism, what is it? Give to its warning the least unfavorable interpretation which the words permit, it still amounts to saying that in order to understand the scriptures which are the precipitate of centuries of many-sided strife between rival faiths and philosophies, you must deliberately ignore the circumstances of their origin and the influences which shaped their development. Honest, painstaking, expert scholarship that has done so much in recent decades to throw light on the course of the early Christian movement, is blandly declared to be not only irrelevant but positively misleading. Neither the temperament, character, or life history of the Christian leaders, nor the contemporary social and moral disintegration in reaction to which Christian theology unfolded, are regarded as having the slightest bearing on the nature of the resultant beliefs. While, of course, it is by no means true generally, we are evidently to suppose that in the case of Christianity the less you know the greater your chances of comprehension.

In fairness it should be noted that this criticism has reference to the author's technique, to his logic or theory of evidence. Nothing is implied either for or against what he aims to establish thereby. Whether he has at all demonstrated that belief in miracles, defined as superficial interferences with the natural course of events, is a rational belief; whether he has made it reasonably credible that the Christian miracles "are not a series of disconnected raids on Nature but the various steps of a strategically coherent invasion--an invasion which intends complete conquest and 'occupation,'" so that "the fitness, and therefore the credibility, of the particular miracles depends on their relation to the Grand Miracle," the Incarnation; whether he has provided his readers with anything like proof for the existence of a Supreme Being who loves man and for his sake became man and died, and that this "was the central event in the history of the Earth—the very thing that the whole story has been about"; these are questions which have not been and are not to be touched upon in this review. The chances are that Dr. Lewis's method will exert more influence than his doctrine, and should therefore have first consideration if a choice has to be made because of limited space. For that matter, he has himself emphasized the primacy of his method in these words: "I am not a trained historian and shall not examine the historical evidence for the Christian miracles. My effort is to put my readers in a position to do so."

The method in question comes to this. You begin by denying the jurisdiction of experience. You announce: "What we learn from experience depends on the kind of philosophy we bring to experience. It is therefore useless to appeal to experience before we have settled, as well as we can, the philosophical question." You treat

history in the same fashion, declaring that what we get from historical enquiries "depends on the philosophical views which we have been holding before we began to look for evidence." That is to say, solutions of moral or religious problems which are grounded in experience or history are examples of begging the question, hence fallacious, for they assume that only answers of a certain type are valid, thus ruling out superexperiential and superhistorical answers. What then? Well, you turn to Reason. Reason gives you insight into a Reality beyond experience and history. And a good thing about Reason is this, that when the question is of a nature which cannot be answered by Reason, Reason plainly tells you so. You then move on to those deeper apprehensions which are adumbrated in religious imagery. This takes you the rest of the way, or as far as authentic knowledge can go.

Now this is very neat. But it is also very questionable. And it is intellectually subversive. It is questionable because the words "experience," "historical enquiries," "Reason," and the like as here employed, leave a good deal to be desired in the way of definition. And it subverts the mind because the argument is invariably weighted in favor of wished for beliefs. Dr. Lewis can hardly be charged with being unacquainted with the philosophic work done on both sides of the Atlantic which assigns a higher status to the senses and the sense world than he is willing to allow. He is of course at liberty to remain unimpressed, but acting as if a head-on clash with his whole rationalistic procedure were unworthy of serious notice hardly suggests that he has the answer. And although he frequently digresses to make nice distinctions in the meaning of words, and constantly emphasizes the need for accuracy in defining issues, he is singularly negligent as regards concepts which have crucial significance in the setup of his theory, such as "experience" and "Reason," showing himself remarkably adept at doing a little question begging of his own.

At any rate, the present reviewer finds many of the author's contentions far from convincing. A person who refuses to believe in the reality of the rats and snakes seen by a man suffering from *delirium tremens* does not, as the author contends, have to disbelieve in the natural biological emergence of human beings who can think. The second belief is simply not as "irrational" as the first. Again, it is self-evidently true that "the relation between Reason and Nature is what some people call an Unsymmetrical Relation," forcing all of us to believe that correctly viewed the relation is "a picture in which Nature (at any rate on the surface of our planet) is perforated and pock-marked all over by little orifices at each of which something of a different kind from herself—namely a Reason—can do things to her," or that "Nature can only raid to kill," as a toothache or an anxiety can interfere with a process of thinking or suspend it altogether, whereas Reason, entering from a Supernature outside, is the sole agent of order in our world, responsible for "the walls, ceiling, and furniture, the book, your own washed hands and cut finger-nails, as well as of the whole ordered cosmos." Now is it obvious that the distinction between right and wrong conduct must by logical and moral necessity have its source in the supernatural. A naturalistic conception of morality may be untenable, but it is pure slander to say that "if Naturalism is true, 'I ought' is the same sort of statement as 'I itch' or 'I'm going to be sick.'" Such assertions, regrettably common throughout the book, appear to be almost willful refusals to understand. In any case they are a flagrant misinterpretation of what a mature naturalist espouses.

Possibly it is desirable to quote a paragraph in its entirety as an exhibit of Dr. Lewis's gifts as a writer and thinker. The one dealing with sex in the life hereafter will do as well as any. It exemplifies a characteristic use of analogy, an art which he has developed to a high degree of perfection, and which serves him

again and again to vault over troublesome gaps in the argument. Although a longish quotation, it is surely not too long for so interesting a subject so picturesquely treated:

> The letter and spirit of scripture, and of all Christianity, forbid us to suppose that life in the New Creation will be a sexual life; and this reduces our imagination to the withering alternative either of bodies which are hardly recognizable as human bodies at all or else of a perpetual fast. As regards the fast, I think our present outlook might be like that of a small boy who, on being told that the sexual act was the highest bodily pleasure should immediately ask whether you ate chocolates at the same time. On receiving the answer "No," he might regard absence of chocolates as the chief characteristic of sexuality. In vain would you tell him that the reason why lovers in their carnal raptures don't bother about chocolates is that they have something better to think of. The boys knows chocolates: he does not know the positive thing that excludes it. We are in the same position. We know the sexual life; we do not know, except in glimpses, the other thing which, in Heaven, will leave no room for it. Hence where fulness awaits us we anticipate fasting. In denying that sexual life, as we now understand it, makes any part of the final beatitude, it is not of course necessary to suppose that the distinction of sexes will disappear. What is no longer needed for biological purposes may be expected to survive for splendour. Sexuality is the instrument both of virginity and of conjugal virtue; neither men nor women will be asked to throw away weapons they have used victoriously. It is the beaten and the fugitives who throw away their swords. The conquerors sheathe theirs and retain them. "Trans-sexual" would be a better word than "sexless" for the heavenly life.

This happy elucidation of sex immortality should bring comfort to those whom this particular problem has tormented. And they will not be the only ones to find peace of mind in the pages of this book. One or two things, however, will not happen to any reader: none will find himself squarely up against the necessity of appraising his religion into present-day intellectual and social actualities or be impelled to do the kind of thinking required of men and women who care what happens to the good life in our disorganized times. The study of miracles is kept entirely free from entanglement with those technological forms of the miraculous which play the dominant rôle in contemporary society. The interests of religion are made to have nothing to do with elevating secular morality or combatting ruinous ideologies. Theological thimblerigging is elevated above the labor of establishing truth by objective testing. Fortunately there is reason to hope that most of those upon whom the future of religion depends will not be tempted by this esoteric program and will respectfully decline the invitation to credulity.

M. C. OTTO

Evil and the Christian Faith, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xi, 173, $2.50.

This book constitutes Vol. II of *Reason and the Christian Faith.* The reader who is unfamiliar with Ferré's other works will conveniently read, in order, the two appendices on "The Christian Faith" and on "Faith and Reason." The Christian faith for Ferré centres in the conception of *agapē* which he makes his highest theistic category. God is *agapē,* not as principle but as person. *Agapē* is holy; active love; perfect wisdom; perfect power; perfect freedom; the source of all; perfect beauty; fellowship-making; and Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, says the author, "is our selective actual, history's most high, the fulfiller not only of law but of reason, our truest index of ultimate reality, the peak point of process. . . . He is the concrete individual who can best serve as our cosmic universal" (pp. 161-162). Because of its relation to the problem of evil it is well to note what is said of *agapē* as perfect power: "He is power at work according to His perfect purpose. Agape is all the power there is. This power is the full capacity to control and condition all and everything. It is the ability inclusively to direct all and everything" (p. 153). From such premises as these it is apparent that the problem of evil will be handled in an essentially traditional and optimistic manner. It is not evident, we may say at once, that the concrete

historical Jesus Christ was "perfect power" in the sense of the plenitude of being ascribed to that concept.

Appendix B reminds the reader of the position taken in Vol. I that "only what is most high within process can adequately be called most real" (p. 166). All process points beyond itself. Time points to eternity, leaving a gap that cannot be "filled" by either faith or knowledge. This gap can only be filled by "actual events, by the concrete fulfillment of Purpose by process, by the historic realization of the eternal Intention" (p. 167). This commits all men to live by faith. Since God is *agapē,* personal and purposeful, Ferré's metaphysics would seem here to be essentially temporalistic. We shall note, however, that he attempts to resolve the problem of evil by a nontemporal view of eternity and that actual events can never bridge a gap from time to the timeless.

Turning now to the main portion of the book we shall first present the points of special significance which the author summarizes for us in the chapter called "Points of Particular Importance." 1. On the question of method we are reminded of his conception of the relation of explanatory to existential perspectives. Both, he holds, are essential, though the problem of evil itself is not primarily a philosophical one (p. 123). Thinking and doing are both rooted in whole-response, but philosophy is not a truly or completely whole-response to reality. On the contrary, "the solution lies in the living synthesis of the explanatory and the existential perspectives made effectual only through deepened concern and trust within the family fellowship of God" (p. 125).

2. The central standpoint is that which was adopted in *Faith and Reason,* namely, the judgment that the "most high is the most real." What is most high is some selective actual taken from process and used as the ultimate interpretive principle. This conception is regarded as a *full* as opposed to a *partial* perspective. The highest purpose is "to effect by the Cross the Christian fellowship." Other purposes and perspectives are at best secondary, partial, and subordinate. They cannot give the ultimate judgment in theory or practice on evil. Such, for example, is hedonism. Such, also, is the perspective of purposeless pain in animals. Such, too, is that of *needless* suffering even "in the existential perspective." Inadequate also is a perspective which is simply a composite of finite perspectives.

3. What is compossible "must be defined by God, not man" (p. 130). The Christian compossible, writes Ferré, is defined by the cross, with respect to the means and by God himself as *agapē* with respect to the ends. "For us those ends require those means." The author here uses emphatically a "selective actual" taken from history as the God of truth. God is the *agapē* of the cross. "The compossible must be solidly defined in terms of the highest, most conclusive and most inclusive symbol, the life, teachings, and Cross of Christ" (p. 132).

4. It is conceded that this position "cannot compellingly explain animal pain" (p. 133). That question he leaves, as do many theologians, in God's hands, though, he insists, "without evasion." It is admitted also that he cannot present a coherently rational theory concerning the question whether God suffers. "It is with us much of a mystery." He leans to the idea that God suffers in history only, though recognizing that he is thereby caught in a paradox: if there is only one God, how can the Son suffer and not the Father? The admission is frankly made "that our whole-response does not completely include whole-thinking" (p. 135). We may point out that failure to achieve coherence on this problem places his whole conception of the relation of God to time and process on an unstable and obscurantist basis.

This leads to a further admission which tends to undermine the confidence with

which he holds, in point 3 above, the view that the compossible must be defined by God, not man. "We must think as men in history . . . not as God or as saints in glory." Taken seriously this means that Ferré's selective actual is, finally, to be treated as a finite hypothesis, not as a self-validating, or existentially privileged revelation which gives to "faith" a truth not accessible to "reason."

The argument of *Evil and the Christian Faith* is organized as a criticism of various levels of proposed solutions of the problem of evil. As already noted, all other levels are rejected save that of the spiritual-personal plane of theistic absolutism. On this level God is viewed as *agapē* in whose passionless perfection all evil is transmuted into necessary means to intrinsically valuable ends. Only the self-realized realm of ends is ultimately real. The plane of history is finally unreal, for the most high, which is the most real, is eternal, not temporal. Here appears what to the reviewer is a flat contradiction. Evil is temporal and the good is eternal, but the most high is concretely found in the selective actual, namely, in Jesus Christ, who was an historical personality, an event in time. Apart from his historical concreteness he is simply a universal ideal. His personal spirituality cannot be the key to God's reality and character unless eternity be conceived coherently with immanent purpose in time.

The first level which Ferré rejects is that of historic fact (chap. II). "Mere fact decides nothing about the nature of the ultimate" (p. 9). "The fact that evil *is* constitutes no final indication of the nature of Reality" (p. 14). On the level of fact, therefore, there is no solution of the problem of evil. What must be shown, he says, is that evil is a necessary condition within the compossibles of purpose within process wherein also the complete realization of the good takes place. He insists that "every past is redeemable in its inmost reality" (p. 13). The process which includes evil facts is only a necessary step on the road to glory.

The second level, the æsthetic, is also rejected as being a partial perspective. One of its weaknesses is that the temporal perspective is lacking. Eternity is treated spatially. "Eternity and time cannot be treated as primarily congruent spaces" (p. 18). From the standpoint of æsthetics the good and the bad are "united into a present whole of vivid contrast." This standpoint is contrary to religion, for it demands that evil be done away and hence requires a temporal process. Thus there must be both transcendence and immanence of God. On the other hand, we are told, "God inhabits eternity; man time" (p. 18). "God is not the whole, but rather He creates, sustains, rules, and redeems all that is other than Himself."

The third level, discussion of which comprises the major portion of the volume, is the "personal-spiritual." There are nine applications and implications of this standpoint of which account should be taken. We shall list them briefly and comment on some of the issues which they raise.

1. Only persons can transmute experience in such a way that where sin has abounded grace can the more abound. Man can learn by past failure and difficulty. 2. The personal-spiritual level repudiates the idea that any solution of the problem of evil is possible on the basis of the hedonistic premise. 3. Personal experience is enriched by selection and variety. The new does not have to mean loss to experience. 4. "On the personal-spiritual level there can be no monotony" (p. 29). "The full life in God's fellowship is characterized by both freedom and creative zest" (p. 30).

5. On this level freedom takes on fuller and deeper meaning. "Our freedom is the key to the world's evil" (p. 33). "Evil is basically due to the necessity of our rebellion, at least in temptation, that we might be free; our estrangement that we might understand; our hate and hiding that we might love" (p. 36). Ferré's treat-

ment of this problem stands in marked contrast to that of Reinhold Niebuhr, being rooted in a profounder grasp of the teleology of divine love.

6. Evil in nature, especially on the animal level, is viewed as a speculative, secondary, and subsumptive problem, not a central problem of faith. Yet he admits that "frankly we have no complete solution to offer" (p. 62). He inclines speculatively to the "Eastern view" and adds: "Life lives on life and by means of life. . . . God Himself finally takes all earthly lives, devours them, for a new existence. He is the truth of creative-coöperation and of endless life more abundant. Shall He not do right in the end in His way with every life that He has created?" (pp. 63-64).

7. The personal-spiritual perspective illuminates the meaning of God in history. "Through fear and faith history has been built providing the conditions necessary, under God, for the transmutation of experience into good on the personal-spiritual level" (p. 103). In the compound of fear and faith which constitutes history the fears that drive are the illusions of a false self. The false self feels estranged from fellow man and from God, but the truth is that "individuation is for the sake of fellowship—primarily with God, and through Him with our fellow men" (p. 95).

8. Another area of application of the above perspective is that of death and its relation to the end of history. "Death is the total frustration of the will to live and to self-satisfaction apart from the will of God" (p. 104). But though death is the worst enemy to the natural man, it is the best friend to the self-to-be. "No one is naturally immortal." "Death is the divine shock treatment to restore spiritual sanity" (p. 105). Thus while history as a whole has no self-sufficient meaning, it is capable of progress because in it "the conditions and helps for fellowship can be improved and enlarged" (p. 113).

9. The final application of the spiritual-personal principle is that found in the universal ultimate salvation of all being. "Without the ultimate salvation of all creatures, men, and we think, animals, in God's time and way, it is easy to see that there can be no full solution of the problem of evil. . . . If there were an eternal hell, God's love would, of course, unquestionably be finite" (p. 117).

Ferré's discussion is a significant religious treatment of the problems and deserves serious consideration. His warm and confident piety is profound and inclusive. His desire to synthesize faith and reason in a practical whole-response is impressive. And his insight that the problems cannot be solved on an impersonal plane is thoroughly vindicated. And yet, there are several persistent difficulties which prevent his argument from being fully persuasive. In the first place, he arbitrarily identifies the speculative with the philosophical approach and then subordinates speculation and philosophy to the existential or practical religious viewpoint. It may be argued, on the other hand, that "faith" for Ferré is more speculative in its method of handling the attributes of God, for example, than is empirical philosophy. Indeed, Ferré rather summarily dismisses the level of fact and of the "here and now actual." Can the existential perspective dare to do this?

There is, in the second place, no appreciation for the fact that for many mature religious persons the philosophical issues partake of the very essence of the existential. Some of faith's deepest problems require philosophical adjustments. "It is hard," says he, "for an existential thinker to be sufficiently patient with the speculative philosopher" (p. 31). This impatience results in some superficial theology and brings him to the verge of both callousness and pantheism with respect to the animal world. One fails to sense that ethic of "reverence for life" which Schweitzer's philosophy extols. Ferré admits that the problem of animal pain is intellectually his most pressing problem (p. 54) and that he has no complete solution to offer (p. 62), but instead of facing it squarely with a revision of his absolute *agapē* conception,

he retreats to the position that the problem is a "secondary problem of knowledge" (p. 64), essentially subsumptive; and since it is only speculative it can be viewed only from a partial perspective (p. 65). On the other hand, his own suggestion, inadequately developed, that animal suffering be viewed from the standpoint of Eastern philosophy, is most speculative and borders on absolute pantheism. He does not show how his inclination to Eastern views squares with the divine transcendence which he stresses in chap. I. On the other hand, again, he seems to ignore the genuine selfhood which some animals have developed: "Are the lion and the rabbit, the snake and the mosquito, the horse and the wren actually in us, not in a general life stream, but individually, finding in us their fuller fruition and eventual individuation in a more permanent form?" (p. 62).

Ferré's appeal to Royce (p. 86) with respect to the relation of time to eternity underscores the charge that the former's wholistic absolutism is in danger of destroying the concrete individual. Evils, he says, are inevitable in historic existence, but have no meaning to "Him who lives in the perfection both of perfect being and of anticipated attainment." Must all intrinsic value be referred to eternity? Are there no consummatory experiences for persons in history? Is it meaningful to refer the intrinsic values to a postponed realization in some obscurant realm of eternity? But if, on the contrary, there are presently experienced intrinsic values, there are also genuine frustrations of these, real tragedies involving real losses, so that the universe is now worse off for their being experienced. There is scant comfort in the thought that evils are a necessary part of God's willed process and that the really good life is lived only through the cessation of historic existence. Apparently the "end justifies the means" is a doctrine ascribable to God, though unworthy when used as a policy in history. The burden of proof is on Ferré to show that schizophrenia, for example, is a suitable means for the perfection of personality as it suffers in time and is taken up into the communion of saints within the larger life of God-*agapē*. Does not the attempt to reduce all evil to means for good ends make for the reduction of all human good (including existential values) to merely instrumental good? And if all evil is instrumental good unknown, may we be confident that any value is really good?

We may point out, finally, that Ferré's attitude toward history tends towards social quietism. His position gives comfort, despite his intentions, to the defenders of the *status quo*. They will rejoice to know that it is God's plan of salvation that it should be easier to be self-centred than to be God-centred. They will not be convicted of sin when they read: "The world as a total condition . . . is not perfect as an end, but as a means. This is the right kind of world to grow the Christian fellowship" (p. 49). But some will find this whole conception too complacent with respect to history and too obscurantist with respect to the resolution of man's agony and irrational suffering.

WALTER G. MUELDER

The Johannine Epistles, by C. H. Dodd, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. lxxi, 168, $2.75.

With the publication of this commentary the series occasioned by the Moffatt translation nears completion, with only the *Thessalonian Epistles* to come. The present work is appropriately dedicated to the memory of the editor, James Moffatt. Dr. Dodd shares with T. H. Robinson, E. F. Scott, and James Moffatt the honor of having contributed two volumes to the series. His *Romans* is one of the most valuable of the commentaries and the *Johannine Epistles,* long awaited, maintains the same high level. This is not the time or place to appraise the series as a whole or to ask

whether the commentaries betray a family likeness and represent a "school" of New Testament thought. We shall consider later whether this latest contribution reflects a current trend in New Testament studies. One of the excellencies of the series is the freedom afforded the writers to criticize the Moffatt translation, and Dr. Dodd avails himself of this freedom both in his *Romans* and in this book.

The Johannine Epistles will seem to most modern readers so simple in thought and style as to call for little comment, evoking the mood of pious meditation rather than of intellectual effort. There is a sense in which this judgment is correct, and I John will always be valued for its simplicity and directness. Only an understanding of the background and setting reveals the fact that the simplicity is far from naïve and that this writing is a solid intellectual achievement. Dr. Dodd devotes more than a quarter of his book to introduction—sixty pages as compared with 140 pages of commentary on I John, eleven on II John and fourteen on III John—preparing the modern reader to appreciate the permanent significance of these small writings.

Dr. Dodd's critical conclusions are not radically new. He holds that all three writings emanate from the province of Asia, regardless of the provenance of the Fourth Gospel, and that I John need not be dated much later than A.D. 115. He accepts Polycarp's *Epistle to the Philippians* as a witness to I John and while agreeing with P. N. Harrison that "the so-called Epistle to the Philippians consists of two epistles of Polycarp to the same church, written at different times," he sees "no cogent reason why the interval between the first letter and the second may not be measured in months rather than years" (p. xii). On the question of authorship, Dr. Dodd summarizes the similarities and the differences between the First Epistle and the Fourth Gospel and concludes that "the simplest hypothesis . . . seems to be that the author of the Epistle was a disciple of the Evangelist and a student of his work" (p. lvi), qualifying this judgment by the statement that "in such matters strict proof is seldom obtainable" and that "the question of authorship is not of first importance" (p. lvi). The limits imposed by the commentary do not permit a full-length discussion of this question, and his discussion of it, as he is well aware, will not prove convincing to all (*cf.* "The Common Authorship of the Johannine Gospel and Epistles, by Dr. W. F. Howard, in *Journal of Theological Studies,* January-April 1947). He further concludes that although "the evidence is far from satisfactory . . . the best tentative conclusion would seem to be that all three Johannine epistles are the work of the 'Presbyter,' who is to be distinguished from the Fourth Evangelist" (p. lxvi). He thinks that the hypothesis that our III John refers to II John in vs. 9 "is not very probable" (p. 161).

Admitting that "any attempt to divide the work (I John) into orderly paragraphs and sections must be largely arbitrary" and that the movement of thought "has not inaptly been described as 'spiral'" (pp. xxi, xxii), he finds "three main divisions, to which the following headings may be supplied: I. What is Christianity? i.5-ii.28. II. Life in the Family of God. ii.29-iv.12. III. The Certainty of the Faith. iv.13-v.13." This appears to be a fresh analysis which works as well as any analysis of this type of writing. He follows this outline by a four-page summarized statement of the thought of I John as it unfolds in the epistle (pp. xxii-xxvi).

The outstanding contribution of this commentary lies in the field of New Testament theology. He is concerned throughout to relate the thought of I John to the type of Gnosticism against which this writing in common with the Fourth Gospel is directed, on the one hand, and to the Christian *kerygma* and *didaché,* on the other. It is not possible within the limits of this review to present Dr. Dodd's conclusions in detail. He believes that I John is more affected than the Fourth Gospel by the

Gnosticism against which both writings are directed and yet is closer to the apostolic preaching, *e.g.*, eschatology, the death of Christ, and the Holy Spirit, than the gospel. This again, is hardly brand new; the value of his work consisting in the method and the documentation of this thesis.

He uses the words *Gnosticism* and *Docetism* sparingly, concentrating attention on expressions such as "We are born of God," "We have no sin," "We know God," "We abide in God," "We are in the light," appearing in I John, rejected by the writer yet accepted as reinterpreted by him. Dr. Dodd cites the literature of Gnosticism which at a later time incorporated these ideas in a system. He avoids the trap of easy identification with crystallized Gnostic systems.

As was to be expected Dr. Dodd's major contribution lies in relating I John to the Christian *kerygma* and *didaché*. We are prepared by his *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments* for his outline of the primitive preaching. The main emphases he finds solidly presented in I John (pp. xxvii-xxxvii, and throughout the commentary). Dodd's phrase, "realized eschatology," appears (p. 33) but is not obtrusive. He does not discuss the question whether "realized eschatology" fits I John, assuming rather that it was part of the primitive gospel.

One of the main excellencies of the commentary is the treatment of the Sayings of Jesus reflected in I John. "There is no verbal similarity close enough to suggest that the author was acquainted with any of [the] Gospels in their existing forms. Nevertheless there are some striking resemblances which strongly suggest that he was acquainted with an oral tradition of the Sayings similar to that which underlies the Synoptic record" (p. xxxviii). He examines these resemblances in detail (pp. xxxviii-xlii and repeatedly in the commentary) and they constitute further evidence that I John witnesses to the primitive gospel now being translated into another world of thought than the Palesthinian.

Like the author of I John, Dr. Dodd is keenly aware of and in part sympathetic with current trends of thought. One refers to the trend toward "integration," "synthesis," and the reconstituting of New Testament theology as a discipline. Consciously or unconsciously, he seeks to integrate the Johannine Epistles with other New Testament writings as a part of the whole message of Christianity to the world today. This is the over-all impression left on the present reviewer by his work. One need not agree with all his conclusions to applaud most warmly his method of approach to this present-day trend. It is a welcome relief from the "proof text" methods now being revived by otherwise competent scholars.

One can only call attention to a few of the many noteworthy special interpretations of difficult passages. Dr. Dodd holds that the "chrism" (2:27) is the Word of God, that is, the gospel itself (pp. 58-64). He accepts the reading, "Who came by water, blood, and Spirit" in vv. 6-8 and interprets the phrase as referring to the descent of the Spirit, baptism, and the crucifixion, *i.e.*, historic facts witnessing to "Christ's incarnation and redemptive death" (*cf.* pp. 127-131). He believes that I John is consistently maintaining the balanced presentation of the objective, external witness to Christ and the "interior witness" in the believer. This is the key also to his interpretation of the "mysticism" of I John (*cf.* pp. 71, 75 ff.) and of the arresting words, "God is love" (pp. 106-112), for "to say 'God is love' implies that *all* His activity is loving activity" (p. 110) and has nothing in common with erotic, æsthetic, or passionate mysticism.

This commentary sustains its author's reputation for sound scholarship and brilliant exposition.

ALEXANDER C. PURDY

Religious Liberals Reply, by Henry N. Wieman, Arthur E. Murphy, Gardner Williams, Jay William Hudson, James Bissett Pratt, and Roy Wood Sellars, Boston, Beacon, 1947, pp. viii, 177, $2.

Wieman was for many years professor of the philosophy of religion in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. The other contributors are, or until recent retirement were, professors of philosophy in secular colleges of liberal arts, with colleagues in the natural and social sciences, and with students of all and no religious affiliations. These philosophers seek to ascertain whatever truth there may be in religion, and they expect to find this truth consistent with scientific knowledge and confirmed or at least supported by reason and experience. Revelations, inspirations, intuitions, traditions, myths, and legends do not appear to such men to be trustworthy sources of knowledge.

Wieman, to be sure, does not reject myths entirely, and he finds some things to praise in neoörthodoxy, of which he and the other contributors regard Reinhold Niebuhr as the most brilliant American defender and interpreter, and against whom accordingly they direct most of their criticism. Neoörthodoxy, Wieman concedes, is at any rate a corrective of the shallow liberals of the first two decades of this century who sought to derive immediate "religious experience" from an "historical Jesus" of their own imaginative creation. They were ignorant of many biological, psychological, and social facts which now throw much light upon religion. However, "Neo-Orthodoxy has confused myth and intellectual understanding, and it tries to live under the guidance of an incoherent mixture of the two" (p. 13). Wieman endorses Murphy's judgment that Niebuhr claims that certain traditional Christian doctrines contain something that is ultimately true, but nevertheless "something which turns out, in every attempt to think it through, to be either false or logically inconceivable" (pp. 3, 19).

Williams makes another attack upon Niebuhr, whom he cites extensively. He accuses him of believing in "the almost total natural depravity of man," as well as in an ethic in which *agapē* is the highest and almost only principle, a principle which it is sinful not to follow, but which it is often not only impractical but absolutely wrong to obey (as in a just war) with the result that man must inevitably sin against God when he does his duty. In fact, "man is hopelessly sunk in sin every time he does anything" (p. 43). God is extremely jealous and vindictive, and yet after all loving and merciful. Williams concludes that "Mr. Niebuhr says what he does largely because of the training which he has received in the ecclesiastical institutions in which his lot has been cast" (p. 50). Here, I suspect, is the clue to understanding the whole neoörthodox movement. The advocates of neoörthodoxy, unlike the religious liberals, are not as a rule professors of philosophy in secular institutions of learning. On the contrary, they usually are professors of systematic theology in institutions under ecclesiastical influence if not control, and their job is to train young men to be pastors in traditional churches where they will have to preach doctrines still cherished by the laity, although no longer logically defensible in the light of contemporary natural and social sciences and philosophy. So the neoörthodox theologians are trying their best to find some mythical or mystical or otherwise extralogical support for the tenets of Augustine and Calvin. The remaining contributors to this volume (with the exception of Otto) attack other aspects of neoörthodoxy, Pratt giving attention largely to Barth and Brunner.

Otto's attack is directed at the Roman Catholic Church. He rightly claims that neoscholastics rely too much upon Thomas Aquinas, who is now outdated in many respects, although I suppose every one concedes that the Angelic Doctor, was, at

least up to his own time, the profoundest and most comprehensive theologian that Christianity had produced. Otto also is right in insisting that the Catholic parochial schools in the United States shall not be supported by public taxation. But Otto goes too far when he claims that the Roman Catholic Church is "religionless" and "reactionary." Religious piety and inward spiritual experience are certainly as common in America among Roman Catholics as among Protestants and Jews. While Roman Catholics are neither communists nor socialists, they are moderately progressive and certainly not reactionary on such matters as religious toleration, labor, social betterment in general, international coöperation, and world peace. When the Roman Catholic clergy cautiously take a step forward, they lead with them one half of all the Christians in the world. The Greek Orthodox churches, I suppose, move forward even more slowly than the Roman Catholics, and the neoörthodox Protestants a little more rapidly. Almost all Christians of every persuasion, I believe, should be classified as progressive rather than reactionary. However, no Christian theologians, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant, who profess to be either orthodox or neoörthodox, can lead their laity forward at too rapid a pace. Organized religion will always have to be very cautious in theological modifications, and to a considerable extent sacrifice logical consistency to traditionalism.

The gallant little company of religious liberals, who have frankly abandoned all pretensions to orthodoxy, alone are free unreservedly to follow the argument wherever it leads them. They certainly head the van of advancing humanity, but they can hardly expect that the great mass of Christians will ever catch up with them. Perhaps they would not like it very well if this should ever happen.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Revelation and Response in the Old Testament, by Cuthbert A. Simpson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. viii, 197, $2.50.

The title given to the seven lectures, delivered in 1946 as the Bishop Paddock Lectures at General Theological Seminary, New York, indicates the thesis which is developed and illustrated, but does not describe the contents of the volume. In this modest work Professor Simpson has undertaken to give a bird's-eye view of the development of Israel's religion from its beginnings down to the Exile. Obviously, this is no mean task for seven lectures. Yet the result of the attempt is a fascinating story of the rise of Israel's faith; its enrichment by contacts with other cults; its accumulation of other legends, beliefs, and institutions; until there emerges finally a religion which asserts an essential unity of life in God and the belief that the community of Israel had a supranational significance. The long and extremely complicated story is told simply, easily, and with compelling interest. The book is a marvel of condensation, superbly written, a volume which cannot fail to interest one who has even a modicum of interest in the origin and development of the religion of Israel. The ideas of revelation and of response are the overtones of the story; the response of Israel's creative minority was to certain historical events in her history; that this response was so fruitful is evidence that divine revelation had been mediated through the historical events and the responses which Israel made to them.

By an accident of schedules in publishing it is well-nigh impossible for a reviewer of this volume to appraise it critically. At many crucial points—I counted over twenty-five places—reference is made to a volume by Professor Simpson, *The Early Traditions of Israel,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1947. As far as I know, the volume has not reached this country, nor do I find it named in the list issued by Blackwell of new and forthcoming books, dated spring, 1947. Thus, because of this

delay in publication, one is placed in the awkward position of reading the book of answers to problems which are stated and worked out in a volume which has not yet been published. That many of the conclusions of Professor Simpson are highly controversial will become apparent from a brief summary of the contents.

The first lecture has to do with the origin of Yahwism. Yahweh, originally a god of the storm and to whom later the activity of the volcano was ascribed, was once a deity whose chief attribute was that of "unpredictable destructiveness." To this god the people of Israel originally responded with fear; later this response changed to that of self-surrendering acceptance. At another point in the development the god of nature became the god of history; this may well have taken place when a battle in which Israel was victorious happened to coincide with a storm. In the second lecture the contribution of Moses is described in terms of the facts which gave birth to the traditions which we now have. Moses, a priest and judge at Kadesh, remained at that ancient shrine to a god of justice and of creativity while Israelite clans went into Egypt. Upon the return of the clans from Egypt, Moses saw in the story of their remarkable deliverance by Yahweh an object lesson which would serve to emphasize the righteousness of Yahweh. Israelite religion was indebted to Moses for the recognition that Yahweh was a god of justice as well as of power. At Kadesh Yahwism received one of its most significant characteristics and acquired its most famous leader. The absorption of the religion of Kadesh by the growing Yahwism resulted in the enrichment of the tradition of Sinai by a new divine attribute and a powerful priesthood.

The third chapter of the book describes the enrichment of Yahwism by the religions of Canaan. When the Israelites were forced to leave Kadesh because of certain deeply rooted resentments felt by the inhabitants of Kadesh, they moved to Hebron, where they encountered for the first time a culture of settled life. They took over the local sanctuary with its customs and enthroned Yahweh as the tutelary deity of Hebron. The chief contribution which Yahweh received here was the tradition of Abraham; these stories portrayed a god who entered into friendly relations with men. With a fortunate sense of discrimination the Israelite priesthood excluded certain of the coarser elements of the cult at Hebron. Upon Israel's further entry into Canaan the local traditions of Jacob of East Jordan, of Isaac of Beer-sheba, of Rachel of Ephrath, and of Joseph of Shechem were incorporated into the growing religion of Yahwism.

That the views expressed in this interesting reconstruction of the factual basis for Israel's early tradition will be hotly contested is apparent. Yet one hesitates to enter into the discussion until there appears in print the background for the conclusions so frankly set forth in this series of popular lectures. In a footnote Professor Simpson indicates that a detailed analysis of the Hexateuch appears in his work on the early traditions of Israel.

Chapter four is an excellent and penetrating characterization of the monarchy. Chapter five deals with the J document, the purpose of which is asserted to be the uncovering of the supernatural foundations of intertribal unity which had been realized for a short time under David and Solomon. Here the author follows Eduard Meyer in finding the origin of the covenant idea in the religion of Shechem. The last two chapters deal with the prophets and their contributions to the religion of Israel. Here the conclusions are more conventional, although at many points there is room for debate.

Students of the Old Testament are indebted to Professor Simpson for this straightforward statement of his conclusions with regard to Israel's early traditions;

the book will eventually be judged, however, upon the work which lies behind this more popular presentation.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion, by Robert F. Davidson, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947, pp. ix, 213, $2.50.

Rudolf Otto is one of the most influential philosophers of religion in the nineteenth century. He who is familiar with Höffding, Otto, Temple, Hocking, Wieman, and Knudson, knows the main recent developments in the field. Dr. Davidson has made a timely contribution in revising his Yale doctoral dissertation and publishing it as a book. It is provided with a useful bibliography, although books about Otto are omitted.

The work shows evidence of careful study, and it should be read by everyone who is interested in philosophy of religion. After a preliminary survey, Dr. Davidson, in successive chapters, gives an account of Otto's Lutheran heritage, his view of the numinous, his concepts of sanctity, sin, and salvation, his treatment of divination, his background in the idealism of Fries, his doctrine of the religious *a priori,* and his treatment of morality, reason, and religion. Discussion of the last named subject is in some ways the best part of the book, for it deals with the tensions between the rational and the nonrational in Otto's thought. Davidson declines to be stampeded into labeling Otto an irrationalist. He does not overlook the fact that Otto "quite explicitly recognizes the necessity and the value of the contribution of reason to religion," and opposes "an extravagant and fantastic irrationalism." He might have laid even more stress on Otto's opening remarks in Chapter I of *Das Heilige,* in which he declares that it is essential to Christian theism that God be thought as "personal-rational." Otto conceived himself as supplementing, not undermining, that concept.

Valuable as is Davidson's work in correcting popular misconceptions of Otto's thought and in contributing to an appreciation of his insight into the unique and autonomous "holy," it is far from definitive, as will appear from a consideration of some of its defects. The order of subjects in the outline is based on no clear developmental or logical principle. Otto was molded equally by Lutheran thought and by the philosophy of Fries, as revived by Nelson. Yet, although the Friesian influence preceded Otto's development of "the holy" and "the numinous," it is not taken up by Davidson until after he has treated those concepts. This gives a false impression of the growth of Otto's mind, and of the roots of the holy in the earlier concept of *Ahnung.* Davidson also missed a golden opportunity in failing to connect Otto's numinous with "illud secretum" of the early Germans, as described in the *Germania* of Tacitus; but it may be too much to expect such investigation.

Davidson may be praised for pointing out many of the right problems, but blamed for not pursuing them. He discusses reason and the irrational, but fails to explore their definitions critically. He discusses the religious *a priori,* but omits all reference to the important treatment of the concept by A. C. Knudson. He neglects the whole area of Catholic criticism of Otto, notably the striking booklet by Dr. Joseph Geyser of Freiburg, entitled *Intellekt oder Gemüt?*

Three important aspects of Otto's thought fail to receive the systematic treatment that is their due. First, Otto's appreciation of mysticism is inadequately treated. It is true that Davidson discusses many of Otto's ideas about mysticism, but Otto's own mystical nature somewhat eludes him. Second, Otto the Orientalist comes off poorly. A connected account of what Otto learned from the Hindus, and why he investigated both Shankara and Ramanuja, would have strengthened the book. Third,

Davidson takes no account of Otto's social conscience. At the time of his visit to America in 1924, Otto was full of plans to train Ph.D.'s in various fields—sociology, economics, theology, philosophy—and then send them into the ranks of labor in factories and mines, there to become members of unions, and, he hoped, enlightened leaders of labor. This sheds a new light on the importance of the social and ethical in his personal religious life.

Although the book is an unusually attractive specimen of the printer's art, it is marred by certain defects. Nothing is likely to convince this reviewer that any sentences should begin with a small letter, even though this sentence be a footnote and its first word an abbreviation (as "cf."). The printer on p. 46 divided Troeltsch's name at the end of a line as "Tro-eltsch"! The German also suffers in n. 44 on p. 49. The American Theological Society is called "American Theological Association" (p. 195). The odd phrase "the 21-22 Edition" appears on p. vi; since it is without apostrophes, one wonders whether 1921-1922 is meant, or the 21st and 22nd edition. The former is intended.

Despite defects which this review has stressed, the book is informing and often enlightening, and should not be neglected. It may well initiate fresh studies of one of Germany's truly noble and profound scholars in the field of religion. It is much better in its discussion of *The Idea of the Holy* than in dealing with Otto's other contributions, but Otto's mind and thought are not treated either as a developing or a logical whole.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Foundations of Democracy, edited by F. Ernest Johnson, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 278, $2.

This informative symposium constitutes one volume in a series sponsored by the Institute for Religious and Social Studies, established at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, through a gift of Lucius N. Littauer, as an agency to draw upon and serve all religious faiths. The present work is a succession of lectures given before the Institute in New York by sixteen authorities, at least two of whom are Jewish and at least two Catholic; most of the remainder appear to be Protestants.

Delivered during the closing months of World War II, these addresses deal with the problems and possibilities of democracy. Every speaker stated his position in his own way without restraint and without much reference to his colleagues; consequently even though the manuscript has been edited by the scholarly and ingenious Professor F. Ernest Johnson, of Teachers College, Columbia University, there are marked divergencies in outlook, technique, and treatment. An inevitable lack of full and logical continuity results.

Nearly one half of the book is devoted to an analysis of the sources of democracy, from Greek and Hebrew times down to the present day, the living literary exponents of democracy being ably treated by Amos N. Wilder. Others who handle this three-thousand-year evolution according to their fields of respective interest are Irwin Edman, Louis Finkelstein, George N. Shuster, John T. McNeill, Horace M. Kallen, and Moorhouse F. X. Millar. Contemporary democracy is then examined by such authorities as Scott Buchanan, Harrison S. Elliott, Justin Wroe Nixon, H. Paul Douglass, and Dr. Johnson, who himself construes the basic problem of democracy to be that of reconciling freedom with world order and law, a thesis which has not been pursued by all his associates. A long concluding chapter by Mordecai M. Kaplan on Democracy and Zionism is in reality an appendix presenting able but partisan special pleading for the Zionist cause.

An outstanding impression from the earlier chapters is that democracy is older in concept and application than has been commonly assumed. The writers differ as to whether such pioneer figures as the Greeks and Romans and Thomas Aquinas who supported inequality and slavery can be considered democratic in the larger sense. Considerable space throughout the book is devoted to the Founding Fathers of the American Republic; attention is called to the manner in which they limited democracy through devices like indirect election, and recommendations are made for the extension of the more progressive aspects of their theories into the complex twentieth century.

Most of the writers adopt a liberal point of view, although George H. Houston, an industrial consultant, bases his democracy upon individualism and free competition and contends that "no tyranny can or is likely to exist in the economic field, or in any other area of man's interests, greater than the tyranny of the many over the few." He warns against the excesses of labor groups, which, on the other hand, A. J. Muste defends with such assertions as that the CIO has done more than the church to overcome racial discrimination in the south. Goodwin B. Watson briefly but clearly seems to prove that a collectivist age can be made a period of increasing democracy.

There is general agreement that a main instrument for the improvement and extension of democracy is more adequate and widespread education, embracing adults as well as children and stressing more equal economic opportunity, racial justice, and a more conscious study and improvement of underprivileged urban communities. Most of the experts hold that an enlightened and dynamic religious outlook clarifies and implements democratic theories and practices.

One may feel that economic, social, and educational aspects receive fuller attention than do the political and international elements, and that more might have been said about international democratic organization, then at the Dumbarton Oaks stage. The Far East is scarcely mentioned, although strong movements toward democracy in that area were already manifest. One notes a few inaccuracies, as in regard to the three items which Jefferson prescribed for his epitaph, or the numerical designation of the King Charles against whom the Covenanters rebelled. Yet on the whole the book contains in brief compass a wealth of fact, interpretation, and suggestion to which any teacher, minister, or general reader may well refer for years to come. The Institute in this and its other volumes has set a high standard which stimulates scholars to look forward with eager interest to its forthcoming studies and publications.

EARL CRANSTON

Jesus: What Manner of Man, by Henry J. Cadbury, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xi, 123, $2.25.

Those who know Professor Cadbury's contributions to sound and solid scholarship—and it would be hard to imagine any student of the beginnings of Christianity who did not—will welcome this new volume, his Shaffer Lectures at Yale. In no sense is it an attempt at a life of Jesus. Despite the many attempts of the past, such a task every intelligent man now knows is utterly impossible. Nor is this an attempt to list his teachings. Instead it is precisely what the subtitle suggests; it is a sober and eminently sensible attempt to answer the question: "What manner of man was Jesus after all?" The author calls the book aptly "an unfinished questionnaire." Through the years Jesus has been the object of countless questions. Many of them are to be found phrased in the gospels themselves; many more have been insistent and embarrassing to the thoughtful reader of these ancient records. In this volume

Cadbury has, to my mind most wisely, deliberately bypassed most of those which many readers might consider the great questions, and has instead concerned himself with others, tremendously revealing. His volume falls into six chapters, each with a question for a title: "Is not this Jesus?" "Whence this wisdom?" Why speakest thou in parables?" "What is this? New teaching!" "How knoweth this man?" and "By what authority?" As he frankly confesses, he is far less concerned with *what* Jesus thought than he is with *how* he thought.

He frankly admits a certain informality of style incident to the fact that this is a series of delivered lectures; there is an equal unconventionality of treatment. And both invest the book with distinct charm. There is a solid sanity about it—at least things which seem to me solid and sane are the things which occupy his attention.

Those who read the book, hoping because of the suggestion in the preface that he has attempted "to be more positive than in the *Peril of Modernizing Jesus*" to find lists of sayings and doings of which they can say with pulpit fervor, "These are historically sure; even Professor Cadbury admits them!" are destined to a rude awakening. It is throughout a pretty salty book, and one devastating to smug and easy complacency but mighty rewarding to the man who is not shocked at an author who really seems to believe in the reality of the Incarnation and who prefers to see what Jesus really was rather than the traditional stage props for making him into what they have romantically wanted him to become. You have to hunt for what you find. Cadbury's cautious style and scholarly recognition that much in the gospels is late restrain him from too frequent positive statements, despite his aforementioned "attempt." His principle is rather that where there is a lot of smoke there must be some fire. There may be uncertainty, even downright suspicion, about many individual sayings, but constant and characteristic habits of thought and expression are probably likely to be revelatory. One can see Jesus' interests, his concern for man's moral duty, the way his mind worked, his stress of the needfulness of excess in virtue, his sensitiveness to human frailty, the sense of urgency which resulted from his confidence that the end was at hand, his uncompromising demands, the impression of "underived power" rather than of novelty or uniqueness which he made on his hearers.

It would be very easy to list many important, even profound, insights in this unpretentious little book. Nearly every page of my copy is already marked, and I expect it will be frequently reread. Personally, I should find it far more difficult to discover points of weakness. As I read it, I was increasingly sure that here was a volume which I could recommend as wholeheartedly and without reserve to the general reader of this QUARTERLY as to my own students who will most certainly find it in the list of prescribed reading. And unless I am mistaken both of these classes of readers will find their attention caught as by a hook by more than one racy and arresting statement. Professor Cadbury appears to believe—would more shared his view!—that words are for the purpose of revealing, not concealing, thoughts.

His treatment of the parables is particularly fine although it will undoubtedly bring pause to some to be told, "We shall do well not to claim for Jesus as teacher either a unique or a superior parable technique." And the sad part of it is that those who may be pained at this forthrightness have only to examine the evidence to see how entirely substantiated and warranted his conclusion is. Equally rewarding is his whole discussion of uniqueness and novelty, ending with the sober warning: "Indeed, we may well inquire whether in the field of religion and morals novelty has any inherent value." How many gallons of ink might have been saved if this eminently sane conclusion had been more widespread.

Similar provocative insights abound throughout the volume. It would be a pity, however, to catalogue them all and thus blunt the reader. Let him come on them unawares. And when you read the volume, be sure to read the preface first. It is important and well worth pondering. Its emphasis is just right. The author has stated with characteristic exactness precisely the problem which the competent student of the gospels and of its central figure finds himself confronted with, but which is so often obscure to those who would talk on these themes with a zeal but not according to knowledge.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Skeptic's Search for God, by Barbara Spofford Morgan, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiv, 248, $3.

The skeptic who searches for God in this book is a person who very much wants to believe in him, who does in fact believe in God, and tries to discover as reasonable grounds for that belief as possible. One gets the impression that this skeptic would go on believing in God, even though the rational supports for that belief were a great deal more shaky than they do, in fact, turn out to be. It is assumed that belief in God is of the essence of the good life, certainly of the Christian life, and one must maintain such a belief at all hazards. The reviewer has a great deal of sympathy with this point of view and finds himself quite ready to follow the author's mind as she organizes the various intellectual arguments to support the theistic affirmation. Yet this tendency should not be allowed to mislead readers. While it is true that, "Whoever would approach God must have faith in his existence and in his willingness to reward those who try to find him," yet there are skeptics who cannot make this basic affirmation. The true skeptic is, indeed, one who does begin his search with some important beliefs and who raises all sorts of questions in the effort to refine and strengthen those beliefs. This is the kind of skeptic for whom Mrs. Morgan seems to be writing. For that reason, the book strikes very responsive chords in the experiences of Christian liberals. It may not win great numbers of converts to the Christian faith, but it will steady and strengthen the theistic faith of many a sincerely questing liberal Christian.

But Mrs. Morgan is not willing to allow the skeptic to confine his search for God to the processes of intellectual investigation. She is sure that the mystic way is wide open to anyone who is willing to walk in that way, and that it yields certainty for the individual seeker because of the "awareness" of God which is warm and immediate. There is still another way open to the real skeptic. It is the way of morality which turns out to be "consciously or unconsciously, a relation to God." No system of high morality is possible without bringing the seeker after the good life to the consciousness of a relationship to God. This relationship is the real sanction for the moral code and the ethical ideal.

There is an aspect of style about this book which has at times delighted the reviewer and at other times caused him some confusion of thought and difficulty of understanding. The author makes extensive use of symbolic and picturesque terminology. For any reader accustomed to philosophical and theological thought, this presents no real difficulty. But for the scientist or technician, who assumes to be much more exact and concrete in his analyses and descriptions, this style is often hard to follow. This is especially true where, as must almost inevitably happen, the figures become somewhat mixed. Mrs. Morgan is quite aware of the difficulties involved and devotes one entire chapter to the discussion of the "Barrier of Words." Words, figures, and symbols mean different things to different people. This is true in every universe of terms. It is especially true when the terms undertake to convey

meanings about God, who must always be beyond the systems employed by man to describe him.

The book presents three approaches to God: intellectual, mystic, and moral. The great emphasis is laid upon the intellectual approach, however, in spite of a conviction on the author's part that the intellectual way can never be so convincing or rewarding as the mystic way, with its direct awareness of God. This indicates, of course, that the skeptic must start with the intellectual approach to God even though he may find that he must go beyond logic to discover the nature of reality. But logic cannot be discounted; it must be surpassed. The skeptic will not be content to start upon the mystic way until he has explored all the possibilities of the intellectual way. This is true in spite of the fact that the skeptic, like everyone else, must of necessity resort to some sort of mysticism before he can exhaust the possibilities of his logic. We do not withhold all our prayers and our worship until we have written *q.e.d.* at the end of the proposition. What we must do, of course, is to keep an even balance among the three approaches to God; but we take them together, if we are wise, and allow one to be corrected by the other. In marking out the trail for the intellectual approach to God, Mrs. Morgan takes a look at materialism and finds it wanting in the sense that its denials of God carry no great conviction because materialism itself has been largely discredited by both science and philosophy. As one pushes his inclusive logic to discover the nature of reality, he comes face to face with the principles of relationship, and purpose, and freedom. From every one of these angles, the thoughtful mind is forced by the very logic of the whole to posit an adequate concept of reality which must always take account of personality as in some sense ultimate. This may be a somewhat reluctant acknowledgment of the existence of God. It is still partial and cold and lacking in the kind of motivation which will transform life. Here is the point at which the mystic awareness of God and the devotion of faith in a moral and ethical program carries the skeptic beyond recognition to affirmation, commitment, and commission.

Mrs. Morgan has a fine ability to put ideas into quotable sentences. I have read and reread this book, underlining passages to quote in this review. There is not room enough to quote them here. But, after all, such quotations might spoil the rich experience of other readers who will gather from these pages the same kind of enjoyment and stimulation which has come to this reviewer.

CHARLES M. BOND

The Heart of the Yale Lectures, by Batsell Barrett Baxter, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xiii, 332, $2.50.

The Heart of the Yale Lectures is a valuable contribution to the libraries of preachers and theological students. It represents an unusual sifting of the Lyman Beecher Lecture Materials and sets forth a thorough grouping of the advice given by the various lecturers upon preaching. The volume will more than likely become a "must" book for classes in homiletics. The author seeks in this book to set forth the answer to the question, "What is the secret of real influence in the pulpit?" He believes the best answer is to be found in what the lecturers have said to the Yale divinity students across the seventy-seven years of this noted series.

Batsell Barrett Baxter is a minister belonging to that branch of Christians known as the Church of Christ. He is at present the professor of speech in David Lipscomb College of Nashville, Tennessee. His personal contribution through the volume lies in the excellent grouping of subject materials. The meaty quotations derived through a thorough and scholarly research of the seventy-odd volumes comprising the lectures

are carefully footnoted. The brief summary conclusions of each chapter are well stated. The volume is extensively indexed.

The book is divided into three parts, emphasizing the three major elements involved in preaching: the preacher, the sermon, and the congregation. The author does not attempt to deal with the message.

The general division dealing with the preacher covers such subjects as the preacher's personality, qualifications, and attitude. The value of the volume can be understood when some of the qualifications are noted: character, sincerity, enthusiasm, mentality, knowledge, courage, reality, imagination, originality, and health, with the choice experience of men like Henry Ward Beecher, Henry Van Dyke, Charles E. Jefferson, and Ralph Sockman, to mention just a few, carefully reproduced in their own language.

The division covering the sermon treats such aspects as style, delivery, and setting. Under style, for example, the reader will find available the choice opinion of the lecturers grouped under headings such as clearness, concreteness, elegance, and originality. One of the chief values of this book lies in the fact that the lecturers have not been paraphrased or interpreted. They have been quoted exactly on the points at issue, and the reader can interpret directly for himself what these lecturers desired to say and emphasize.

The author under the last division has grouped the lecturers' contributions on the minister and the congregation around the purpose of the sermon, the analysis of the audience, and the approach to the audience. A chapter is devoted to each of these. The author points out that twenty-one of the Lyman Beecher speakers discussed in their lectures the importance of the thoughtful consideration of the purpose of the sermon. The expressed opinion of such a group of outstanding ministers on this point alone should be worth the price of this book. Add to this the advice of these successful preachers on how to approach a congregation relative to rapport, reason, life situations, motives, and humor, and the average pastor will quickly become aware that here are materials not just to be read but to be studied.

The author's last chapter returns to the question, "What is the secret of real influence in the pulpit?" Here he summarizes in relatively brief statements his conclusion from the materials quoted. These conclusions are compared and evaluated in relation to the principles of effective speaking as set forth by secular rhetoricians both ancient and modern.

This book contains a "gold mine" of experience and advice. Ministers and theological students will find a careful study of it profitable.

JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

A Man Can Live, by Bernard Iddings Bell, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 128, $1.50.

A lion and elephant were engaged in a deadly struggle. A tiger passed by, appraised the situation, and philosophically continued on his way. A second tiger, however, moved by compassion, sought to mediate, was set upon by both combatants and despatched. A third tiger, sitting high above in a tree, wrung his hands, crying, "How terrible, how sad the state of our world!" Dr. Bell has preferred hand-wringing to sound analysis or to serious involvement. "Civilization is on its last legs . . . we have no prospects of peace." Nothing can be done but save a few individuals, a remnant, "who have the wit" to understand what it is all about. Having opened Pandora's box of modern ills, the author, as did Pandora, discovers it quite another thing to put them back again.

A Man Can Live is far from Dr. Bell's best. These are lectures, given in the

course of sixty-two teaching missions, to rank-and-file adults, revised and remade on the basis of such a grueling test. In spoken form, they undoubtedly were useful and popular, for they speak to man's condition. The author's familiar idiom of sophisticated common sense at a rakish angle and his compelling directness and charming ecclecticism enable him to deal with profound problems in everyday language with dignity and reverence. The problems covered—man's hungers, God's nature, the church's redemptive mission, Christian conduct, sources of spiritual strength—are the core of Christian faith and action. In the public forum, these exhortations must have been quite effective. But, alas, in cold type they simply do not stand up. In fact, to this reviewer, here is an appalling abdication of Christian responsibility.

The book begins with lamentations over the state of our civilization; few will disagree. But the reader may be troubled by the preference for histrionic effect over historic fact. A wholesale, almost cynical, disparagement of the contemporary efforts and motives of men dealing with our modern predicament is unrelieved by any sense of moral inadequacy resting upon all of us. The four freedoms are mere "sops to conventional morality," the "allegedly United Nations" are "window-dressing." Greed, desire for power, sordid ends dominate leaders in politics, industry, government. Changes in economic or social arrangements would make not the least bit of difference. One senses here more diatribe than analysis, dramatics rather than insight.

An analysis of man's hunger, his need of God, draws upon familiar psychology, and a following treatment of the redemptive task of the church is inspiring. For it makes central the spiritual transformation of the individual life. But mixed throughout are bits of Spenglerian history, first-century apocalypticism, and respectable conceit. All civilizations in the past have fallen as will this one. The naïve belief in continuous progress is undermined. We are doomed, and the Christian's hope lies in a saving "remnant." As in the past, so now some "Black Death," "war," "internal revolution" will sweep away the old order, but "the Remnant knows a righteous order will rise again though possibly from ashes." There is frequent reference to "degenerate majorities," "wrath of the rabble," "support of the mob," and "the mob." (One wonders just what Dr. Bell thinks of democratic institutions.) In contrast stands the "remnant," a kind of elite, "pledged to resist social disintegration" but not to overcome it. A chapter on "Christian morality" puts self-forgetfulness, sacrificial love, at the core of Christian living but contains no single reference to the implications of this in wider social relations. There is a closing chapter on the power of love of Christ to drive out fear, the gnawing cancer in every phase of modern human relations. As the reader completes the book, he is not sure whether Dr. Bell absolves the Christian of any serious effort to redeem our whole society because it is futile (too late) or because it is irrelevant.

Three critical questions to ask oneself as he reads this book: First, has the church no redemptive mission for social institutions? Second, does a catastrophic view of history deny the relevance of the church's social mission? The reader is disturbed by such a bland, historical generality as (p. 72), "of all political and social institutions . . . when Jesus was on earth, the only one which has survived . . . till today is the church." Or on p. 66, the identification of faith in inevitable progress with belief in the continuity of history indicates confusion rather than error. Third, men today are in a desperate struggle to determine the uses and purposes of unprecedented power through technological control. Is this the time for the Christian remnant to flee to the mountains? If not, then what shall they do?

MAYNARD CASSADY

The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion, by Guy Howard Dodge, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. ix, 287, $3.50.

Guy Howard Dodge, in *The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion,* makes a valuable contribution to the current controversy as to the relationship of Protestantism to the development of modern democracy.

In a more uncritical age the Reformers of the sixteenth century were listed among the fathers of modern democracy with few questions being raised as to the historical validity of this assumption. With the adoption of critical methods of historical investigation, however, this ascription of parentage began to be challenged, and modern democracy was described as "the child of the Reformation, not of the Reformers." Finally, in the last two decades, the view has been advanced that there is no relationship at all between the Reformation and the rise of democratic institutions.

Dodge, in this study of Calvinist political thought among the French Calvinists of the late seventeenth century, does much to bring the controversy back into focus. His examination of the writings and activity of Pierre Jurieu has led him to concur in the judgment of Figgis that "reluctantly and in spite of themselves, religious societies were led by practical necessity to employ on their own behalf doctrines which are now the common heritage of the Western World." Yet he found that there was something more than the mere struggle of religious groups to survive involved in the development of democratic institutions in Protestant lands. "Protestantism, in insisting upon the isolation of the individual soul before God—an isolation intensified by the Calvinistic doctrine of election—is a spirit that inevitably resulted in setting the individual man against society, whether religious or secular. The very existence of the numerous sects which the Reformation could not overcome, is an indication of its liberating power."

Dodge rightly points out that the most knotty problem for the Protestant theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the problem of toleration. The corollary of revolution in defense of true religion seemed to be a theocracy necessitating a large degree of official intolerance. Jurieu, for example, supported repressive measures in Protestant lands at the very time he was attacking the repressive laws of the Romanist monarchs. As Bayle said, "in France he took it very badly that the secular power should be used, and in Holland he takes it very badly that it should not be employed." Fortunately, religious diversity and a healthy skepticism of man in Calvinism has usually tended to put the brakes on the development of a persecuting state, especially in those lands where the influence of Calvinism has been predominant.

This careful and competent study of seventeenth-century Huguenot political thought is especially welcome because it covers a field hitherto largely neglected. Jurieu, in particular, has never received the attention he deserved as the outstanding continental political theoretician of his day, and Professor Dodge's discussion of his relationship to the English revolution of 1688 is fresh in approach and illuminating in content. Many readers will find his use of John Locke as a foil by which the thought of both men is illumined to be a very useful literary technique.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

The Pastor and the Children, by Mildred Moody Eakin and Frank Eakin, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 182, $2.

The authors have prepared a timely and worthwhile treatise in which they delineate clearly that the children of today become the church of tomorrow. Now is the proper time to recognize and to make a rightful place for children in the pro-

gram of the church. They contend that ministers do not know how to carry on a conversation with a child, either in following the lead or in using simple words the child will understand; also, that ministers are poorly equipped and untrained professionally for the leadership of children. Consequently, ministers should acquire a knowledge of psychology in order to understand children. Furthermore, ministers should become responsible for close supervision of all children's work in their parishes.

Since modern psychology has made significant contributions to the knowledge of childhood, the book is commendable as an effort to arouse the interest of the average minister in child psychology which will give him a deeper insight into his work. According to the authors: "Without qualifying as an educational psychologist, or imagining that he is so qualified, the minister with some special training in this area, backed by a good general education and well-balanced outlook upon life, can help parishioners to see things in better perspective, steer a more consistently wise course than he would be capable of without help. And in rendering such service he will be doing a vital part of his job, fulfilling an essential aspect of his Christian ministry."

Some ministers will probably not take kindly to the criticism of them, but thoughtful readers will acknowledge the charges are justified and will welcome the suggestions for developing a more effective and rewarding work among children. There is much truth in the statement: "As leaders we often utter impressive words about the sacredness of personality and the importance of young life in God's sight, but our record of implementing such words is less impressive." Yet another statement points to a major sin that stands out as an indisputable charge against many of "the cloth": "Why ministers tend to dodge the responsibilities of the Sunday School is that however important they feel it to be, they know well that it is to one side of the usual road to advancement in their profession. In the more tightly organized denominations, the pastor is under heavy pressure from overhead control to show results in the terms of 'church progress.'"

The educational progress of Protestant churches as it now stands, lacks a necessary understanding of psychology and educational principles and techniques. Protestantism is losing its children through its poor quality of education. The children are taught by well-meaning but untrained people of the church; also, in many churches the children's work is allocated to an "ill-smelling basement." If Protesantism is to have a future, it must change from an almost wholly adult religion to a religion that evaluates and recognizes the place of children.

The authors are acutely aware of widespread racial and religious prejudice and mention it several times. Since prejudice, as a rule, becomes ingrained at home, the church must influence and change the attitudes of parents. Constructive ways in which to overcome prejudice are outlined in this book as planned trips for the children to a Roman Catholic cathedral, with an opportunity to talk with the resident priest about the meaning of the symbols, and a planned visit to a synagogue where a rabbi will interpret the meaning of his faith. In this manner children may be given an opportunity to catch firsthand the best from our contemporary religions.

Although this small, attractive book is prepared primarily for ministers, it should be read also by church workers who have supervision of children. It will give them a substantial jolt and an idea of the seriousness of the present condition in religious education. Fortunately, ministers of small churches, as well as of large, will find the book helpful. This challenging and convincing presentation will impress all readers with the fact that this generation of Christian people is false to the future of the church if it does not initiate a more salutary and constructive program that will interest the children of the parish. The Christian church may well ponder the

words of the ancient Taoist inscription: "And he who would straighten out the end of the process must commence with making its beginning correct."

HAROLD BANCROFT WHITE

Render unto the People, by Umphrey Lee, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 164, $1.50.

This is an important book for all Protestants to read. President Lee deals with the problem of church and state not in the abstract, legalistic terms of the church versus the political government. Instead he handles the concrete, sociological problems of the relation of the Protestant churches to the majority opinions of the people who, in the democratic state, determine the actions of the government. The middle term here is community, and this is a subtle entity compounded of popular prejudice, moral attitudes, inherited values, shifting opinions, and stubborn jealousy of personal rights.

Accordingly, he devotes chapters at the beginning to the shift in the status of religion in the American republic, and to the conflict between Christianity and paganism in American public opinion. He finds a dangerous tendency towards centralization of state power over the citizenry, a supplanting of religious guidance by the political bloc with its modern techniques of propaganda, and a growing neglect of religion as a factor in community life.

These tendencies are seen in the increasing state control of public schools, which at the same time are more and more concerned with development of the whole personality and thus enter the area of character formation. Here education of a secularized kind is coming to control the value judgments of our children, so that religion plays a decreasing rôle in educated public opinion. In our institutions of higher learning the state is securing control through subsidy and regulation, while the curricula are themselves more and more technological and the humanities are neglected. But the latter are precisely the area where judgment on moral and spiritual problems is trained. We need not only a more integrated program of education, but one in which the bases and aims of life are discussed so as to help the student develop a world view for personal guidance.

Only as this is done will educated people be able to shape public opinion—and thus the future of American government—in terms of the assumptions and ends of Christian idealism. This is more fundamental than having religious blocs seeking to exert direct pressure on legislation. The social tasks of the churches are still the cultivation of an intelligent public opinion able to form judgments in large perspective, and the training of people in a form of community experience which shall shape their attitudes on governmental matters affecting public welfare. But in both these areas the prophetic impulse must be kept alive through allowance of dissent and willingness to accept new ideas.

One could wish that in so thoughtful and well-documented a book more attention had been given to the literature on public opinion from A. V. Dicey to Lasswell, since this is the author's key to the problem. Such a discussion would have strengthened the general argument of a timely and courageous volume.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Song of the Church, by Marie Pierik, New York, Longmans Green, 1947, pp. xi, 274, $3.

For the author of this learned treatise "the song of the Church" is the Gregorian plain chant which developed *pari passu* with the formulation of the *Roman Missal* and *Breviary Offices;* which reached its greatest perfection in the fifth and sixth cen-

turies; and which was given its permanent form and character under the guidance of Gregory the Great (*ca.* 600). Miss Pierik entirely ignores all other "songs of the Church," except for brief references to the quite different music of the Divine Liturgy of the Eastern Church by way of illustration and contrast.

Within the limits thus set she writes with the authority of a very competent scholar who is not only a highly trained musician and musicologist but is also, of necessity, well acquainted with the history of the Roman rite. Since she assumes that her readers will have a considerable acquaintance with both the theory of music and the Roman liturgy, her book is obviously intended for students of plain chant who already have had a good introduction to the subject. For them it is an important and valuable treatise. But the average minister or choirmaster in a Protestant church who opens the book through a mistaken notion of its contents will speedily find himself confronted by words and symbols which speak a language unknown to him, and not to be mastered without much study.

Miss Pierik goes back to ancient Greece for the ultimate roots of the practice and theory of music. Between the first and the fifth centuries (A.D.) Rome was greatly influenced by this phase of Hellenic culture, but with the fall of the Roman empire secular (instrumental) music practically disappeared and the vocal music which has survived is that developed by the church as the handmaid to give emotional uplift to its liturgy. "Ecclesiastical music grew up with the service" as "an original art, new in its forms and tendencies, which sprang from the heart of Christian society."

The beginnings of this church music are traced to the early use of sung responses. By the fourth century a *schola cantorum* was established at Rome, which endured for several centuries and was widely copied elsewhere. Through these schools the use of plain chant was universally established, though with local variations. By the end of the seventh century the fires of inspiration had died down, but plain chant remained "the song of the Church" for approximately a thousand years before it gave way to polyphonic music and was almost completely forgotten. Fortunately for us the records of its existence were preserved in the countless music books of many monasteries, and the story of its rediscovery by the labors of the Benedictines of Solesmes and others in the last eighty years is well known. As the late Wilfred Douglas wrote, it is the most complete example of any ancient art which has come down to us.

The music of plain chant is very different from modern music, and sounds strange to ears unfamiliar with it. As Miss Pierik points out, it is an ensemble of words, melody, and rhythm. The words of the liturgy are the essential thing. The melody is the handmaid to serve them. The rhythm is that of the natural spoken word, hence the value of the musical notes is not a determined one, as in measured music. The result, when well rendered, is strangely unworldly, or—in a literal sense—unearthly. "It does not move us to the depths of our being, producing within us a world of sensations, images, ideas. It is content to exercise but a discreet and tranquil charm by the expression of simple and definite sentiments: hope, faith, aspiration toward heaven."

While Miss Pierik writes for Catholic students of plain chant, it is to be hoped that her book will come into the hands of Protestant musicians qualified to understand her treatise, and that Protestant church music may ultimately be enriched by an intelligent use of at least some part of this rich inheritance of Christian culture.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

Nervous Disorders and Character, by John G. McKenzie, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 126, $1.50.

This small volume contains a series of lectures on pastoral psychology delivered before the students and faculty of Manchester College, Oxford, by a professor of social science and psychology. They are essentially a restatement of Freudian psychologyy from the point of view of a student of religion and a psychotherapist of some thirty years' experience.

As a psychologist Professor McKenzie is somewhat eclectic. He has been influenced by Eric Fromm and Karen Horney and he rejects the extreme determinism of orthodox Freudians. He is not convinced of the all-importance of toilet training as a predeterminant of adult attitudes. He holds that both child and adult react to a situation in accordance with their individuality and that why one should react in one way and another in a different way to a common situation is a question no one can answer. He also agrees with Dr. Horney in viewing most sexual troubles as reactions to something more basic. In general, however, his position is fairly orthodox. In the Freudian concepts of "the unconscious" and of "repression" he sees an advance in our knowledge of human nature whose tremendous importance cannot be overestimated. It is for him an axiom in psychotherapy that tendencies which are conscious, conflicts which are not "repressed," can never create a nervous symptom of the more distressing type. He defines "repression" as the refusal to see a disowned tendency which is actually present in the mind. He insists that such a tendency is truly excluded from consciousness and he devotes considerable space to an explanation of how "the unconscious" becomes unconscious. An interesting suggestion is his distinction between the "prohibitive," or "negative," conscience and the "positive" conscience. The former he identifies with the Freudian "superego" and holds that the Freudians have not paid sufficient attention to the positive conscience.

One lays down this book with the feeling that, despite its many merits, the concepts Dr. McKenzie works with are not adequate to explain the phenomena under consideration. Is it true that "repressed" material is excluded from consciousness? According to Pierre Janet such material behaves like ill-digested food. Because it is disowned and hence unassimilated it causes trouble. Instead of sinking into the background of dim awareness as organized experience normally does, it clamors for attention and gives the sufferer no peace until it is taken care of.[1] Dr. Cabot, in a book which has not received the attention it deserves,[2] contends that many of the phenomena ascribed to the unconscious are better explained in terms of human nature's unique capacity to deceive itself. And even the psychoanalysts recognize that the "superego" can never really be deceived.[3]

It is well to bear in mind that Freud, as a true man of genius, worked out his theories on the basis of his own direct observation with a minimum of attention to what others had done. His contribution is certainly one of great value. But there seems no reason why the modern student of human nature should limit himself by Freud's limitations and ignore the contributions of men like Mead and Dewey who offer far more adequate explanations of the phenomena of conscience and consciousness and personality structure than those which take their departure from the Freudian concepts.

ANTON T. BOISEN

[1] *Médications Psychologiques* (Paris, Felix Alcan, 2 vols. 1919), vol. I, pp. 268 ff.

[2] *The Meaning of Right and Wrong* (Macmillan, 1933), pp. 283-350.

[3] Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (Norton, 1937), p. 251; Alexander, *Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality* (Nervous and Mental Disease Publ. Co., 1933), p. 111.

A Baptist Bibliography, Section A, edited by Edward C. Starr, Philadelphia, Judson, 1947, pp. 240, $2.50

Mr. Starr, curator of the Samuel Colgate Baptist Historical Society, Hamilton, New York, has undertaken an almost Herculean task. It is none other than to produce a complete bibliography of all published works by Baptist authors, as well as those that concern Baptists, whether by authors of this religious body or not. To list this printed material from all the world since 1609 to the present is indeed an endeavor demanding the energy and application of the most enterprising and persevering of men. But it is one greatly needed and, although the extent of exhausting labor necessary to effect its successful completion may not be appreciated, there will be generous praise for its appearance. Few Bible students would care to have engaged in the arduous labors of Alexander Cruden, but there is no one who is not grateful for the work so well done.

Baptists have made a significant contribution to the political and religious progress of the world within the last three hundred years, and it is well to be made aware of the extent of that contribution as it has been preserved in printed form and to know where it may now be found. The volume under review lists the works of authors whose surnames begin with the letter *A,* arranged under this letter in alphabetical order and numbering 2,456 items.

So prodigious but successful has been the task that one hesitates to advance any criticism. Yet it must be stated that in many instances not all the published works of some of the authors are mentioned. In other cases not all the libraries are listed in which many of the items of the bibliography are deposited. Again there is lacking a clear distinction between the other bibliographies, such as Whitley's and McIntyre's, in which names of authors and titles of their writings are also listed, and the symbols of the libraries in which the published articles may be found. Certain questions also arise. Since this *A* section closes with the year 1947, will the later volumes, issued according to the alphabetical order of the authors' names, close with this year? What provision has been made to include works inadvertently missed? These are minor criticisms, for, as has been said, a tremendous amount of hard, painstaking labor has gone into the production of this first volume.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

BOOK NOTICES

An Approach to the Teaching of Jesus, by Ernest Cadman Colwell, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 128, $1.25.

This little book consists of six chapters given as the Quillian Lectures at Emory University in 1946. Without repeating the familiar facts or judgments about Jesus and the gospels the author calls attention to some less familiar ideas which he feels that he can add to the common body of scholarly opinion. With delightful freshness he selects and collects a few features of Jesus' teaching that he has come to recognize for himself. How much better it is to do so than to scatter them in the voluminous pages of a more comprehensive treatise. President Colwell thinks the gigantesque language of Jesus is personal and not merely oriental hyperbole. Like the content of his teaching, it marks his demands as rigorous and radical. Though his similarity to Jewish thought is rightly recognized, he had individuality which justifies us in claiming, with due discrimination, that he was original at certain points. Then Jesus' humility is discussed and explained. He is strangely silent, at least in the earliest gospels, about himself, so that his views on himself are quite inadequately hinted. This is not due to any deliberate silence as of a Messianic secret. It is simply due to Jesus' preoccupation with doing and teaching the will of God. This personal humility of Jesus has been far less recognized than has his teaching others to be humble. It was a recognition of God's beneficence that made Jesus unself-assertive. As his contemporaries failed to recognize him as Messiah, so Christological dogma has largely overlooked his humility. As for the kingdom of God, while its future and apocalyptic nature must not be explained away, it existed for Jesus also in a present tense, as something requiring men to act at once and in society. Such books are to be welcomed. They help us see Jesus as he appears to a trained historical student who is willing to set down simply a few points that he has found out by his own study. Three or four well chosen topics so studied illuminate Jesus' whole career. Dr. Colwell sees their present value and he can illustrate them not only by gospel passages but from A. N. Whitehead or from homely experiences of our day.

HENRY J. CADBURY

A Plain Man's Life of Christ, by A. D. Martin, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xii, 217, $2.

Meet the "plain man" for whom this book is written. He is a simple soul who is untroubled about critical problems in literary criticism. He accepts without question the data of the first three gospels and adds information from the fourth gospel at face value when it suits his purpose. His Jesus is primarily the christological figure of traditional Christian belief. Beginning with his baptism, Jesus became a supernatural person endowed by heaven with his call to be the divine Messiah to introduce the kingdom of God. This is not to be an apocalyptic event but is a new revelation of Christian truth designed to inaugurate a new supernatural order to be promulgated in the history of Christianity, a new faith in God destined to replace the religion of the Jews. The story of the temptation aimed at further defining the truly spiritual character of Jesus' mission. His miracles, all taken to be genuine, attested his heavenly power and were supernatural witnesses to his unique personality. And so the story of his life continues after the gospel pattern through the crucifixion and resurrection. Thus Jesus became the manifestation of something new in the designs of the Creator. He was now the true God-man, the climax of creation. One is not to take the

nativity stories literally; they are myths but myths with a profound meaning. They are meant to emphasize the tremendousness of the Divine overshadowing power, the new management of God in creating the unique man who is both human and divine. So the traditional outlook in favor of the plain man is not disturbed. The book has an air of scholarship but one is overlaid with a charming literary style and a reverence that take the sting out of any hints at historical criticism.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

The Holy Spirit in the Life of Today by P. W. Dillistone. Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 126, $1.50.

The present volume grows out of the desire that the average man should understand the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Yet more than that it is written with the hope that the average man may have success in his effort to experience the power of the Holy Spirit in his own life. Having stated these twin aims in the preface of the book the reviewer went back to them after he laid the volume down, asking, "Has the author succeeded?" And to himself he replied, "He has illuminated the doctrine in fresh ways and offered suggestions as to how the average Christian can experience the vitalizing power of God's Spirit." Written with the biblical background constantly in mind and alternately stated by far the larger portion of the book is concerned with the results of the Spirit's activity. In four chapters these are described as life, power, order and glory. The life imparted by the Spirit is not only something physical or natural, but also moral, spiritual, and social. As the function of the Spirit is accepted in the Christian land the gift of life expresses itself as love. This is the new life in Christ Jesus. Concerning power the record-actions of the Old Testament is held to be the expression in human experience of a power which creates life and releases energy. In the New Testament the power of the Spirit becomes more fully a spiritual power, enabling men to resist temptation and to gain the victory: to wit, Jesus in the wilderness experience. As to order, the Spirit is conceived as that spiritual energy producing of harmony, discipline and cooperation among men. The last result of the Spirit's functioning is described as "glory." The key for understanding this term is found in the New Testament position that in Jesus Christ there has been "a radiant self-expression" of the divine. In the face of Jesus Christ the glory of God has been revealed. The creation of that same glory in the faces of the followers of Jesus is the culminating function of the Spirit. Having described the results of the Holy Spirit's work the author points out with cogency that it is of little use to describe the Spirit's operation in former days unless he acts in the same way today. It is the conviction that he does. Why then do so many people have no awareness of the Spirit's work in their lives? The answer lies in the fact that as one phase of our life after another has been brought under the complete domination of science men have made the assumption "that there is nothing in the universe which is beyond the power of the scientist to know and ultimately to control" (p. 103f.). Such a closed system, it is contended, leaves no expectation in the individual's mind that the living God will act in man's life or in his world. The way to know the Spirit's activity lies in a change of outlook or imagination, "a change from a system of thought and outlook which is bounded by the laws and possibilities of this world and a glad recognition of a personal living spirit who, proceeding out of that world, maintains the laws and possibilities of that world, in the very midst of this world which is so familiar to us" (p. 104). As a corrective to certain naturalistic views which regard the divine as pegged entirely within the order of the world this volume is welcome. Its refined supernaturalism with its strong belief in the personal activity of God stands much more definitely within the Christian tradition than any

sheer naturalism. While written primarily for the layman, the average minister and theological student will find their minds clarified by the treatment of this important phase of Christian faith and experience. GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Christian Doctrine of Grace, by Oscar Hardman, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 128, $2.

The problem of grace has beset the church across the centuries. How far does God's grace extend? Does it reach to all men or touch only an elect few? Is it a spiritual energy necessary even for the beginning of man's salvation, or does it operate only after man has done his part by turning himself Godward through an active desire to do good? Is grace only a supernatural descent, or is it also mediated through the constructive aspects of nature as well as through human personalities of spiritual stature? Such are some of the questions which have concerned Christians as they have thought of the operation of God's grace. With these and other questions the author seeks to deal intelligently that grace may not be thwarted in its ultimate function of producing Christian character. Starting with a brief historical survey of the primary Christian interpretations of grace, the views are noted of such Christian thinkers as Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, Pelagius, John Cassian, Gottschalk of Orbais, Anselm, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas, the Reformers, Arminius, and the crisis theologians of our day. In this long development the opposing views are found to be 1. that grace is absolutely necessary even to turn men to God that they might be saved by God's gracious redemptive action in Christ and 2. that grace lies primarily in the bestowal of man's natural gifts, is further enhanced in the forgiveness of sins at baptism, and enjoys added manifestations in the provision of supplementary and external aids to human effort in the form of instruction and example. Between these end positions held by Calvin and Pelagius respectively, Christian views concerning the nature and operation of grace find classification. In his constructive statement, Dr. Hardman defines grace as "the divine favour which is bestowed upon man," taking "the form of a beneficent personal influence which is brought to bear upon the spirit of man by the Spirit of God." Grace is thus seen to be essentially a personal influence, the influence of "the Personality of the Creator working upon the personality of each of His creatures." This divine influence reaches its zenith in Jesus, requiring us to speak of grace as "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ." The volume carries a healthful influence in its pointed repudiation of all views of grace which regard it as a divine influence arbitrarily employed. Double predestination, which holds that some men receive God's saving grace through no merit of their own, while all others are abandoned to destruction, is described as "this most immoral doctrine." In opposition to any such view the author reaches the conclusion that God's mercy is upon all men and that all may be saved. Set against the historical background of the development of Christian doctrine, this little book can bring perspective, understanding, and a working Christian philosophy of grace to all who diligently seek them. GEORGE W. DAVIS

Veterans Challenge the Colleges: The New York Program, by J. Hillis Miller and John S. Allen, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. x, 150, $2.25.

The authors of this book are, respectively, the associate commissioner of education and the director of higher education of New York State. They are thus in a position to speak with authority concerning the manner in which the problem of handling the "tidal wave of veterans returning to college" was met in their State, which, they remind us, contains approximately ten per cent of the population of

the United States. Just before the war the colleges and universities of New York boasted a full-time enrollment of 104,000 students. By the autumn of 1945 this number had dropped to approximately 71,000. In the spring of 1946 the best data available permitted an estimate of 100,000 veterans alone seeking admission in the fall of that year. When the roll was finally called, 180,000 students, including 120,000 veterans, were found to be in attendance. These figures etch sharply the nature of the dilemma which today confronts institutions of higher learning throughout this country. The present volume is devoted chiefly to an account of the manner in which New York State met this challenge. Spearheaded by the Governor's Conference in March 1946, all of the educational agencies within the State rallied to the cause. Existing legislation was modified and new legislation provided where necessary. A joint attack was made upon the problems of housing, staffing, the expansion of facilities in existing colleges, and the establishment of off-campus centres. The story of the manner in which emergency colleges were conceived and set in operation at a number of centres furnishes a convincing and encouraging example of what may be accomplished when the interest, enthusiasm, and energy of many individuals and agencies are directed toward a common goal. The authors state that "Not since the early years of the growth and development of our country has higher education under private auspices demonstrated such rapid expansion." The story of the manner in which this expansion was accomplished constitutes an important document in the chronicle of American education.

JOHN M. FOGG, JR.

The Christian Hope of Immortality, by A. E. Taylor, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 112, $2.

The tendency today toward conservatism in theology is illustrated by this small, but concentrated volume, which contains no conclusion not in accord with the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. It is excellently written, avoiding the pitfalls into which writers on immortality so often fall, and is neither sentimental, harsh, nor vacuous. The book begins by showing that there can be no convincing demonstrations either for or against what is called a "hope" of a survival after death, and dismisses both scientific agnosticism and spiritualistic "evidence." The Christian belief in immortality is not simply a "natural" future life, but a new life, a rebirth, which depends entirely upon the existence of a good and just God, and which is different in quality from mere survival as we are. Emphasis is laid upon the distinction of knowledge of an object, and knowledge of our own experiences as those of subjects, although it is not mentioned that this distinction has been denied, particularly by Buddhist thinkers, as unreal. The hope of immortality is based upon the assumption of a good God, and upon the necessity of immortality if the universe God has made is to be considered rational. The author does not attempt to tell us too much, imitating the restraint of the writers of the gospels, and of our Lord; but he does maintain that the Christian doctrine, which, after all, is agnostic on many points, is reasonable and legitimate. He is not afraid of difficult questions, discussing both a Last Judgment and the possibility of hell, from a conservative point of view. The book is well worth reading, and shows a wide knowledge.

JOHN K. SHRYOCK

Physicians of the Soul, by Charles F. Kemp, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xiv, 314, $2.75.

The task undertaken in this book is an historical survey of the attempts to deal with the personal needs and problems of individuals. Beginning with a consideration of the cure of souls in the Old and New Testament periods, the story moves rapidly through the Mediæval and Reformation periods to modern American Protestantism

and the scientific approach represented in psychology, psychiatry, social case work, mental hygiene, and psychosomatic medicine. The chief contribution is to be found in the consideration of the modern movements for a program of personal counseling and a clinically based theological education and the attempt to place these in their larger setting. The author is a young Disciples minister who has had considerable experience in personal counseling with young people. His aim has been to give an account not merely of the movements but of the persons involved, their purposes, the obstacles they have encountered, their methods, their successes and failures. He has succeeded in bringing together in readable form much pertinent information which should be of real interest to the minister of religion. In plan and treatment this book is comprehensive rather than discriminating. It includes an enormous number of names without much attempt to evaluate their contribution. It is therefore surprising to find in a history of the cure of souls no mention of the Y.M.C.A. evangelism as represented by Mott and Speer or of its continuation in modified form under Frank Buchman. Neither is sufficient attention given to the therapeutic significance of the revivalistic cults in a period when the liberal churches were offering neither treatment nor diagnosis to those who were sick of soul. As an attempt to give expression to the growing interest in the efforts to bring the methods of science to bear upon the problems of pastoral care in which our theological schools have shown such a surprising lag, Mr. Kemp's book is worthy of a hearty welcome. It should help to make clear that what is now needed is not just the adding of another course or two to an already overcrowded seminary curriculum but a thoroughly new approach to the abiding problems of theology and of pastoral care. ANTON T. BOISEN

These Words upon Thy Heart, by Howard Tillman Kuist, Richmond, John Knox, 1947, pp. 189, $2.50.

After reading this book I am at a complete loss to describe in a phrase or sentence the subject with which it deals. The title, like the names given to most movies, tells little about its contents. As noncommittal as the title are most of the chapter headings: "Adventuring in Firsthand Acquaintance," "Opening the Eyes of the Understanding," "The Form and Power of Holy Scripture," "Translating Scripture into Action." This weakness—the lack of a clearly defined field of inquiry—should not obscure the values to be found in the book. Professor Kuist has read widely; the fruit of his reading he has brought together in six lectures about the Bible. He has raised many questions which are of interest to those who teach the Bible in church and school, and frequently he has brought to bear upon the problem some illuminating insight. For example, one question of particular interest has to do with the common man and the Bible. Should he trust the experts? Or should he venture an opinion of his own and stand responsible for it? The author asserts that there are places—and the "spiritual understanding" of Scripture is one of them—where "a man must depend not upon explanations offered by someone equipped with special knowledge, but upon his own inherent powers." One wishes that the author had gone further to indicate what he meant by the term "spiritual understanding." Here and elsewhere the force of the argument is vitiated by vague phrases which can mean almost anything. That these lectures, delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, are now printed in a handsome volume will be a source of real satisfaction to the many students and friends of the author.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The World's Great Madonnas, by Cynthia Pearl Maus, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. viii, 789, $4.95.

Like Albert Edward Bailey, the compiler of this anthology is an experienced educationalist of cultivated taste and wide familiarity in the fine arts who believes

that works of artistic merit have enhanced value for educational purposes. Concentrating on the appealing motherhood theme of Mary and the child Jesus, she has produced a well-selected compendium of artistic source materials that is very impressive in quantity, variety, range, and usability. In sheer bulk the compilation is enormous: well over a hundred reproductions of paintings and sculptures, each with a carefully wrought literary interpretation; nearly two hundred and fifty pieces of poetry; sixty examples of artistic prose; and a larger number of musical compositions—chiefly hymns, lullabies, and folk songs. The coördination of musical and literary masterpieces, along with the examples from the representational arts, makes the collection trebly interesting and valuable. Equally significant are the geographical and racial ranges of productivity here recorded. All the continents and most of the main nationalities of the present-day world are represented. Our good neighbors northern and southern, Canada and Mexico—as well as ourselves—are included. In these days of global thinking and planning and acting, the space assigned to Asian and African and Australian Madonnas is very much to the good. For once, also, Latin Americans receive the æsthetic recognition that they merit. Where the volume is decidedly defective is in the complete exclusion of early Christain and Byzantine productions, and the large neglect of Mediæval examples from the Latin West. The absence of early and East Christian work is particularly to be deplored. In qualities of simplicity, symbolism, and suggestiveness, early and East Christian art remain unexcelled. The two noble Russian icons reproduced in the volume: Our Lady of Vladimir and Our Lady of Smolensk, should have led Mrs. Maus inevitably to the archetypes of such icons. Four various indexes concretely increase the usability of this volume for purposes of private study and for programming in church schools. From conveniently located agencies slides are available in color and monochrome, reproducing the statuary and paintings that are here interpreted. Also the publishers provide a special musical supplement for the volume. Defects aside, this volume as it stands is well organized for use in worship services and school programs.

HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY

God Confronts Man in History, by Henry Sloane Coffin, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 154, $2.50.

Here is a good book to put in the hands of a layman. It gives a summary of Christian faith with admirable clarity, simplicity, and conciseness. The president *emeritus* of Union Theological Seminary presents his lectures given a year ago through the Orient. His topics are the familiar ones: God in history, Jesus Christ as revelation of God, salvation, the church, the kingdom of God. Lecturing to audiences made up in good part of non-Christians he had to take nothing for granted, yet to deal with the "general revelation of God" as well as with the "special revelation" in Christ. The opening chapter will give Americans something to think about as it reports Orientals' critical attitudes toward us and our policies. The tone of the volume is irenic but forceful; and, as always, Dr. Coffin keeps his message firmly anchored in the historical Jesus.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

In Such a Night as This, by Oswald W. S. McCall, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. x, 204, $2.

It is very difficult to write about some books; they move one so deeply, they challenge one so imperatively. The afterexperience of reading them is a mixture of unrest and peace in alternating supremacy. Now the urge is to talk about what one has thought and now the desire is for quiet meditation upon the rediscovery of

great sources of strength. Such a book is as different "a book of devotion" as Robert Frost is different from Edgar Guest. To attempt to describe the difference, to try to characterize either the book or the experience, is to know from the beginning the inevitability of failure. It seems foreordained that one will leave out the very thing one wants most to say. A factual description would mention phrases from the publisher's comment: "a sparkling gem of imagery," "in varied form, mood and tempo," and "episodic prose-poem." Still there would be untouched the greatest value of the book: its effect upon the reader. If you want a new, or renewed, fellowship with the truly spiritual, read this book!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Prayer and the Lord's Prayer, by Charles Gore, with an Introduction by Angus Dun, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xv, 124, $1.25.

The publishers and Angus Dun are to be commended for the reissue of this little book that was published first in 1898. The words of Charles Gore always came with sincerity and deep reverence; today, a half-century later, his thought on prayer and his study of the Lord's Prayer are as convincing and as pertinent as ever. They really "speak to our condition." This is good devotional reading, inspiring and chastening. Dun's quotation from Thomas Fuller as the final word of his introduction is a subtle challenge to our reading the book: "Witches are reported . . . to say the Lord's Prayer backward. Are there not many, who though they do not pronounce the syllables of the Lord's Prayer retrograde . . . yet they transpose it in effect, desiring their daily bread, before God's Kingdom come, preferring temporal benefits before heavenly blessings. Oh! If every one by this mark should be tried for a witch, how hard would it go with all of us."

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Executive Director on the Job, by Margaret Logan Clark and Briseis Teall, New York, Woman's Press, ©1947, pp. 128, $2.75.

This approach to an evaluation of the responsibilities of the executive of a Y.W.C.A. as analyzed by the authors is worthy of careful study by the executive of any membership organization. The essential unity of the job to make possible a program based on community needs developed through democratic procedures is demonstrated by carefully prepared reports of actual experiences. Through the book the executive director will receive very valuable help in technique and philosophy procedures in her administrative responsibility; and the layman will gain a deeper respect for the Y.W.C.A., an organization which is blazing some new trails among group-working agencies.

ELISABETH D. EGGLESTON

The New Life: Six Studies in the New Life in Christ, by Allen R. Knight and Gordon H. Schroeder, Syracuse, New York Baptist State Convention, ©1947, pp. 51, 25 cents.

This is a manual for an instruction class in church membership. It is attractive in form. If the content matched the general composition, this would be a good pamphlet. Unfortunately, here is once again the usual manual concerned with traditional theological generalities. The last section on Baptist history and principles is the best. This manual will be of little help to the well-trained and thoughtful minister who is looking for an experience-centred guide to aid his young people in discovering what it means today to accept and follow Jesus Christ.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

BOOKS RECEIVED

**A History of the Jews,* by Solomon Grayzel, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1947, pp. xxv, 835, $3.50.

**Adopting a Child,* by Frances Lockridge, New York, Greenberg, ©1947, pp. vi, 216, $3.

**An Introduction to Jesus for the Twentieth Century,* by R. W. Stewart, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 127, $1.75.

**Prayers for Young People,* by Abigail Acker Johnson, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 130, $1.50.

God the Only Divine Wisdom, by Peter Anastas, Boston, Chapman and Grimes, ©1946, pp. 250, $3.

A *potpourri* of quotations and fanciful, even grotesque, interpretations from various parts of the Bible, especially the prophets. The author, born in southern Greece and "inspired by the Greek Christian leader, John Abakoom, to devote his life to spreading the truth of religion," is undoubtedly a very good man but he has written a very bad book.

**Their Faith and Ours: Part I, The Old Testament,* by Muriel Streibert Curtis, Louisville, Cloister Press, 1947, pp. 110, $1. (leader's manual); pp. 153, $1.50 (students' manual).

**Darkness of the Sun,* by Richard Terrill Baker, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 254, $2.50.

**The Protestant Pulpit,* compiled by Andrew W. Blackwood, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 318, $2.75.

**A Handbook of Judaism,* by Meyer Waxman, New York, Bloch, 1947, pp. xii, 195, $3.50.

**Best Sermon, 1947-1948 edition,* edited by G. Paul Butler, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xxii, 318, $2.75.

**Modern Nationalism and Religion,* by Salo Wittmayer Baron, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. x, 363, $5.

**The Human Race,* by Emil Froeschels, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1947, pp. 197, $3.

**Hindu Philosophy,* by Theos Bernard, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1947, pp. xi, 207, $3.75.

Toward the Understanding of Jesus, by Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xiii, 165, $2.75.

This is the twentieth printing of a book which was hailed with enthusiasm as a real contribution to historical understanding when it first appeared in 1921. The present printing gives the unaltered text of the first edition but with a new preface.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1948, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. vii, 439, $2.

This is the twenty-seventh volume of helps to an understanding of the International Sunday School Lessons. A new feature is the introduction of illustrative material—episodes from history, literature, and present-day happenings.

**Therefore Choose Life,* by Edith Lovejoy Pierce, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. viii, 76, $1.75.

**Albert Schweitzer,* by George Seaver, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiii, 346 (illustrated), $3.75.

**On the Meaning of Christ,* by John Knox, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xvi, 117, $2.50.

**The Pastoral Epistles,* by Burton Scott Easton, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xiv, 238, $3.

**American Overture,* by Abram Vossen Goodman, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1947, pp. xiv, 265, $3.

Another Story Shop, by Mary C. Odell, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1947, pp. 189, $2.

Sixty-five short stories on various themes likely to be of interest to youngsters from four to ten. The black-and-white illustrations are by Edith May Cunnings.

The Borrowed Glow, by Richard Ellsworth Day, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1947, pp. 417, $2.

This is a volume of devotional readings, each a page long, for every day of the year. A short passage of scripture is followed by edifying comments.

**Christian Beliefs,* by Ralph E. Knudsen, Philadelphia, Judson ©1947, pp. 177, $1.75.

**United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly,* Vols. I-III, International Documents Service [New York, Columbia University Press], 1947, pp. 65, 64, 247, 75 cents, 75 cents, and $2. (resp.).

**The Story of the Bible Today and Tomorrow,* edited by Harold R. Willoughby, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1947, pp. xviii, 436, $6.

**Prophet in the Wilderness,* by Hermann Hagedorn, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 221, $3.

**The Invisible Encounter,* by Igor I. Sikorsky, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 120, $2.

**Philo,* by Harry Austryn Wolfson, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947, 2 vols., pp. xvi, 462, and xiv, 531, $10.

**Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped,* by Henry H. Kessler, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. x, 274, $3.50.

**The Jew of Tarsus,* by Hugh J. Schonfield, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 255, $2.50.

**The Religion of Philosophers,* by James H. Dunham, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947, pp. 314, $4.

**Paul's Epistle to the Romans,* by E. F. Scott, S. C. M. Press, ©1947 [New York, Scribner], pp. 125, $2.

Divine and Sacred Catechism, by Apostolos Makrakis, Chicago, Hellenic Christian Educational Society, 1946, pp. 224, no price.

Memoir of the Nature of the Church of Christ, by Apostolos Makrakis, New York, Christian Brotherhoods Zealots of Orthodoxy and John the Baptist, 1947, pp. 168, no price.

These two volumes by the late Apostolos Makrakis are enthusiastically endorsed by leaders of the Greek Orthodox church as calculated to save many souls. The former volume sets forth the catechism "as taught by the Holy Spirit and its official instruments from the day of the Pentecost until the last ecumenical synod" which is here "expounded in comparison and contrast with the contradictions and misinterpretations of the devil." The latter, having to do with the one church which the Lord Jesus Christ founded on earth, "which today is represented by the Greek Orthodox Church," is, as orthodox theology naturally tends to be, a combination of apologetic for the Greek Orthodox Church and a polemic against such false organizations as the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant churches. To many American readers these volumes will probably seem literary curiosities from an age long since past.

**The Person and the Common Good,* by Jacques Maritain, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 98, $2.

**Ancient Christian Writers: Julianus Pomerius' The Contemplative Life,* translated by Mary Josephine Suelzer, Westminster (Md.), Newman Bookshop, 1947, pp. 220, $2.50.

**The College Seeks Religion,* by Merrimon Cuninggim, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947, pp. x, 319, $4.

**Doctor Freud,* by Emil Ludwig, New York, Hellman Williams, 1947, pp. 317, $3.

* To be reviewed.